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ABSTRACT 
The tragic events of September 11, 2001, brought about changes in the procedures 
for interagency collaboration.  That day air traffic controllers in New York, Boston, 
Washington, and Cleveland were scrambling due to the hijacking of four American 
commercial airliners.  In their efforts to bring order to chaos the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) in communication with Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) 
and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) scrambled fighter aircraft 
to escort the airliners. The collaborative teamwork that occurred during this response is 
recorded in the radio transcripts between NEADS and FAA air traffic controllers. The 
goal of this thesis is to use the September 11, 2001, NEADS/FAA channel 4 transcripts to 
provide a real-world example of a team collaborating on a unique, one of a kind problem, 
to contribute to the effort to validate the structural model of team collaboration, 
developed under the Collaboration and Knowledge Integration Program, sponsored by 
the Office of Naval Research. The focus of the model is on individual cognitive processes 
used during agency or team collaboration with the goal of understanding how individuals 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A.  CHRONOLOGY OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, MAJOR EVENTS.............1 
1.  Timeline ................................................................................................1 
2.  Actions...................................................................................................2 
B.  OBJECTIVES ..................................................................................................3 
1.  Goals for the Model of Team Collaboration......................................3 
II. RESEARCH BACKGROUND...................................................................................7 
A. NORAD AND THE FAA RELATIONSHIP.................................................7 
B.  NORAD MISSION...........................................................................................8 
C. FAA MISSION...............................................................................................11 
1. FAA and the September 11 Attacks .................................................12 
2. FAA, Department of Defense (DoD), and White House 
Teleconferences ..................................................................................13 
D. COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE AGENCIES.................................17 
E.  NATIONAL MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND..................................19 
F.  PRIOR KNOWLEDGE?...............................................................................21 
G. IMPROVEMENTS SINCE 9/11...................................................................22 
H.  FOCUS OF THE MODEL............................................................................23 
1. Previous Studies .................................................................................24 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................................27 
A. COMPLEX TEAM PROBLEM SOLVING ...............................................27 
1. Team Situational Awareness.............................................................28 
2. Team Coordination............................................................................30 
3. Anticipatory Thinking.......................................................................31 
a. Types of Anticipatory Thinking..............................................31 
4. Team Design .......................................................................................32 
5. Macrocognition Traits in Collaborative Teams..............................33 
B. TEAM COGNITION AND AUTOMATION..............................................35 
1. Framework for Augmenting Team Cognition with Automation 
Technology..........................................................................................35 
C. COLLABORATION......................................................................................37 
1. Collaborative Capacity......................................................................37 
a. Model of Collaborative Capacity ............................................37 
2. Collaborative Critical Thinking .......................................................38 
a. CENTER..................................................................................40 
3. Collaboration Technologies in Distributed Teams .........................40 
IV. STRUCTURAL MODEL OF TEAM COLLABORATION .................................43 
A. FOCUS AND STAGES OF THE MODEL .................................................43 
B. FAA AND NEADS THROUGH THE COGNITIVE STAGES.................49 
1. Individual Knowledge Building Stage..............................................49 
2. Team Knowledge Building Stage......................................................50 
 viii
3. Developing Shared Problem Conceptualization Stage ...................52 
4. Team Consensus Development Stage ...............................................53 
5. Outcome Appraisal Stage..................................................................53 
V. METHODS .................................................................................................................55 
A. CHOICE OF NEADS AUDIO CHANNEL.................................................55 
1. Coding Practice Between Raters ......................................................55 
B. COMMUNICATION CODING FOR THE NORAD/FAA 
TRANSCRIPTS .............................................................................................55 
C. ADDITION OF COGNITIVE PROCESS CODES AND 
MODIFYING DEFINITIONS......................................................................56 
D. MEASURING INTER-RATER RELIABILITY........................................57 
VI. RESULTS ...................................................................................................................59 
A. TRANSCRIPT CODING RESULTS...........................................................59 
1. Percentages and Usage of Cognitive Processes ...............................59 
B. INTER-RATER RELIABILITY ANALYSIS.............................................70 
C. COGNITIVE PHASES IN RESPONDING TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS....71 
1. First Phase of Responding to the September 11 Attacks................73 
2. Second Phase of Responding to the September 11 Attacks............74 
3. Third Phase of Responding to the September 11 Attacks..............75 
4. Fourth Phase of Responding to the September 11 Attacks............77 
D. CHI-SQUARE TEST.....................................................................................78 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................83 
A. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................83 
B. FAA / NEADS AND THE STRUCTURAL MODEL OF TEAM 
COLLABORATION......................................................................................83 
C. FAA / NEADS - ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT.......................................83 
1. Common Operating Picture (COP)..................................................84 
D. FUTURE RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES....................................................84 
E. USE OF LABORATORY COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN REAL-
WORLD SCENARIOS..................................................................................85 
F. EXCESSIVE INFORMATION IN THE MODEL .....................................85 
APPENDIX.  NORTHEAST AIR DEFENSE SECTOR AND FEDERAL 
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION CHANNEL 4 TRANSCRIPTS FROM 
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, 0837 THROUGH 1106 (EST)..........................................87 
LIST OF REFERENCES....................................................................................................157 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................161 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Initial Route and Deviation of AA 11 and UA 175 (From: National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). ....................4 
Figure 2. Initial Route and Deviation of AA 77 and UA 93 (From: National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). ....................5 
Figure 3. Reporting Structure, Northeast Air Defense Sector (From: National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). ....................7 
Figure 4. NORAD / FAA / NEADS Organizational Relationship (From: NORAD, 
2008). .................................................................................................................8 
Figure 5. NORAD Organizational Structure...................................................................10 
Figure 6. FAA Air Traffic Control Centers (From: National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004)..............................................11 
Figure 7. FAA to NORAD information flow (From: NORAD, 2008). ..........................12 
Figure 8. Structural Model of Team Collaboration (From: Warner, Letsky, & 
Cowen, 2005)...................................................................................................24 
Figure 9. Three facets of team performance (From: MacMillan, et al., 2001)................33 
Figure 10. Theoretical Framework for Augmenting Team Cognition with Automation 
Technology (From: Cuevas, et al., 2007). .......................................................36 
Figure 11. Model of Collaborative Capacity (From: Thomas, et al., 2006)......................38 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Characteristics of Macrocognition in Teams (From: Letsky, et al., 2007). .....34 
Table 2. Operational Definitions for CKI Macrocognitive Processes (From: 
Warner, Letsky, & Cowen, 2005)....................................................................44 
Table 3. Excerpt from NORAD / FAA Team Collaboration on September 11, 2001; 
Example of Individual Knowledge Building Stage. ........................................50 
Table 4. Excerpt from NORAD / FAA Team Collaboration on September 11, 2001; 
Example of Team Knowledge Building Stage.................................................51 
Table 5. Excerpt from NORAD / FAA Team Collaboration on September 11, 2001; 
Example of Developing Shared Problem Conceptualization...........................52 
Table 6. Excerpt from NORAD / FAA Team Collaboration on September 11, 2001; 
Example of Team Consensus Development. ...................................................53 
Table 7. Cognitive Processes Examples found in the NEADS / FAA Channel 4 
Transcripts........................................................................................................59 
Table 8. Cognitive Processes Occurrence Percentages..................................................68 
Table 9. Revised Cognitive Processes Occurrence Percentages (excludes 
miscellaneous codes). ......................................................................................69 
Table 10. Frequency of macrocognitive processes used during first phase of the 
NEADS / FAA channel 4 transcripts. ..............................................................74 
Table 11. Frequency of macrocognitive processes used during second phase of the 
NEADS / FAA channel 4 transcripts. ..............................................................75 
Table 12. Frequency of macrocognitive processes used during third phase of the 
NEADS / FAA channel 4 transcripts. ..............................................................76 
Table 13. Frequency of macrocognitive processes used during fourth phase of the 
NEADS / FAA channel 4 transcripts. ..............................................................78 
Table 14. Observed values of cognitive processes per phase. .........................................78 
Table 15. Expected values of cognitive processes per phase...........................................79 
Table 16. Chi-square values of each cognitive processes per phase................................80 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
To my wife, Patry, and daughter, Patricia, thank you for being so understanding 
of my schedule and patient with my research hours.  To my thesis advisor Professor Sue 
Hutchins, your guidance and mentorship was essential in putting this work together.  To 
my program officer Lieutenant Colonel Karl Pfeiffer whose leadership and ability to “put 
out fires” was very helpful in my time at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Professor Tony 
Kendall, thanks for all your help and your time in the coding process.  Captain Kathryn 
Hobbs, you were outstanding and are the true definition of a leader.  Nancy Sharrock 
thanks for all the help and your professional input.  Finally, I would like to thank all the 
NORTHCOM and NORAD personnel who guided me in the right direction. 
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  CHRONOLOGY OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, MAJOR EVENTS 
The following is a timeline of major events during the attacks of September 11, 
2001.  It highlights the times of the attacks and when agencies involved in responding to 
the attacks were informed. 
1.  Timeline 
7:59 am American Airlines flight 11 departs Boston, MA, for Los Angeles, CA. 
8:14 am United Airlines flight 175 departs Boston, MA, for Los Angeles, CA. 
8:20 am American Airlines flight 77 departs Washington Dulles International 
Airport for Los Angeles, CA. 
8:25 am Boston Center aware of hijacking. 
8:37 am  Boston Center notifies NEADS of a hijacked aircraft.  
8:42 am United Airlines flight 93 departs Newark, NJ, for San Francisco, CA. 
8:44 am NORAD orders launch of fighter aircraft to escort hijacked aircraft in 
NY City (Bronner, 2006). 
8:46 am AA flight 11 flies into the North Tower of the World Trade Center 
(WTC) in New York City. 
8:51 am NORAD gets first report of North Tower crash from Boston Center. 
9:02 am United flight 175 flies into the South Tower of the WTC in New York 
City. 
9:03 am NORAD learns of second possible hijacking/NORAD gets unconfirmed 
report of a second hit from another aircraft into South Tower of WTC. 
9:21 am Boston Center advises NEADS that AA 11 is airborne heading for 
Washington. 
9:24 am NEADS scrambles Langley fighter jets in search of AA 11. 
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9:37 am AA flight 77 flies into the Pentagon in Washington, DC. 
9:59 am the South Tower collapses. 
10:03 am United flight 93 crashes into a wooded area in Pennsylvania. 
10:07 AM Cleveland Center advises NEADS of UA 93 hijacking. 
2.  Actions 
On September 11, 2001, air traffic controllers in New York, Boston, Washington, 
and Cleveland were scrambling due to the hijacking of four American commercial 
airliners.  In their efforts to bring order to chaos the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) in communication with the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and the North 
American Aerospace Command (NORAD) scrambled fighter aircraft to escort the 
airliners.  For all the agencies involved, the hijackings became a heated chase with 
reports of more than a dozen potential hijackings, some that were real and some that were 
not.  The reports of these false hijackings were caused by the confusion that occurred as a 
result of misinformation that developed during the attacks (Bronner, 2006).  Of the 
potential hijackings four were real, American 11, United 175, American 77, and United 
93.  Their initial routes and deviations from these routes are shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
Communication between the FAA and NEADS was not precise leading NEADS 
to search for a flight that no longer existed, American 11, instead of searching for 
American 77.  Another source of confusion arose from the scrambling orders to 
intercepting fighters which led the pilots on an incorrect flight route.  This led the 9/11 
Commission Report to conclude that the defense of the U.S. airspace was not conducted 
in accordance with pre-existing training and protocols.  Instead, civilians and military 
personnel who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear and 
eventually crashed into national landmarks, improvised and tried to make order out of 
chaos.  NEADS air defenders had nine minutes notice on the first hijacked aircraft and no 




The 9/11 Commission Report goes on to state,  
we do not believe that the true picture of that morning reflects discredit on 
the operational personnel at NEADS or FAA facilities.  NEADS 
commanders and officers actively sought information, and made the best 
judgments they could on the basis of what they knew.  Individual FAA 
controllers, facility managers, and command center managers thought 
outside the box in recommending a nationwide alert, in ground-stopping 
local traffic, and, ultimately, in deciding to land all aircraft and executing 
that unprecedented order flawlessly (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 31). 
B.  OBJECTIVES 
1.  Goals for the Model of Team Collaboration 
The goal of this thesis is to use the September 11, 2001, NEADS/FAA channel 4 
transcripts to provide a real-world example of a team collaborating on a unique, one of a 
kind problem, to contribute to the effort to validate the structural model of team 
collaboration, developed under the Collaboration and Knowledge Integration Program, 
sponsored by the Office of Naval Research. This model focuses on individual cognitive 
processes used during collaboration with the goal of understanding how individuals work 
together towards making a decision.  
Changes in technology and defense continue to shape the evolution of military 
operations.  The changes are crucial to prepare the military for the future.  According to 
Letsky, Warner, Fiore, Rosen, and Salas (2007), the critical objective of command and 
control in the 21st century will be to achieve knowledge interoperability.  He goes on to 
state, “all missions will be interconnected and interdependent, socio-technical factors will 
increase, and cognitive work will be distributed among people and machines (Letsky, et 
al., 2007, p. 3).”  These factors are essential for teams to be able to collaboratively plan, 
think, decide, solve problems, and take actions as integrated units (Letsky, et al., 2007). 
The inter-agency collaboration captured in the team communications between 
NORAD, NEADS, and the FAA on the September 11, 2001, channel 4 transcript 
illustrate how these agencies attempted to bring order to the chaotic events of that 
morning.  Each speech turn in the transcript was coded using definitions of the macro-
cognitive processes included in the model of team collaboration.   Prior research reported 
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on in the Garrity (2007) thesis, the Donaldson and Johnson (2008) thesis, and the addition 
of the coding of these team communications transcripts reported on in this thesis will help 
determine if the metacognitive and macrocognitive processes in the model truly represent 
how teams collaborate to solve real-world problems.  
 
Figure 1.   Initial Route and Deviation of AA 11 and UA 175 (From: National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). 
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Figure 2.   Initial Route and Deviation of AA 77 and UA 93 (From: National 
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II. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
A. NORAD AND THE FAA RELATIONSHIP 
The U.S. airspace depends heavily on the close interaction between the FAA and 
the NORAD.  NORAD is divided into three sectors, the Canadian NORAD Region, the 
Alaskan NORAD Region, and the Continental United States Region (CONR).  CONR is 
further divided into two sectors, the Western Air Defense Sector (WADS), and the 
Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS).  In the reporting structure, NEADS reports to 
the Continental U.S. NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters, in Panama City, Florida, 
which in turn reports to NORAD headquarters, in Colorado Springs, Colorado, as 
depicted in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Reporting Structure, Northeast Air Defense Sector (From: National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). 
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In an effort to understand how NORAD and the FAA worked together on the 
morning of September 11, 2001, this thesis will review their missions, command and 
control structures, and working relationships.  Figure 4 depicts the NORAD, FAA, and 
NEADS organizational relationship. 
 
Figure 4.   NORAD / FAA / NEADS Organizational Relationship (From: 
NORAD, 2008). 
 
B.  NORAD MISSION 
NORAD was established in 1958 in a bi-national agreement between the United 
States and Canada.  Its mission since its establishment has been to defend the airspace of 
North America and protect the continent.  NORAD oversees all missions of aerospace 
warning and aerospace control for North America.  Aerospace warning includes 
monitoring man-made objects in space, and the detection, validation, and warning of 
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mutual support arrangements with other commands (NORAD, 2008).  Aerospace control 
includes ensuring air sovereignty and air defense of the airspace of Canada and the 
UnitedStates (NORAD, 2008). 
Although the NORAD mission does not make a distinction between national and 
international threats, its original mission was to protect the U.S. airspace from the Soviet 
threat and therefore it came to define its objective as defending against external attacks.  
Due to the end of the cold war, the Soviet air threat decreased and so the high number of 
NORAD alert sites was reduced from its Cold War high of twenty six to seven during the 
September 11 attacks.  Some Pentagon officials even argued for the total elimination of 
NORAD alert sites.  Members of the air defense community, in an effort to prevent the 
elimination of these sites, made a case for the preservation of NORAD due to the 
importance of air sovereignty against emerging asymmetric threats to the United States: 
drug smuggling, state and non-state sponsored terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States, 2004).  
According to the 9/11 Commission Report, NORAD perceived the dominant 
threat to be from cruise missiles. During the late 1990s threats of terrorists using aircraft 
as weapons were identified but exercises to counter this threat were not based on actual 
intelligence.  The biggest threat NORAD perceived from these aircraft was their use in 
delivering weapons of mass destruction.   
Before the attacks of September 11, 2001, any order to shoot down a commercial 
aircraft would have to be given by the National Command Authority (a phrase used to 
describe the president and secretary of defense) (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States, 2004).  Officials had the mindset that any threat or 
hijacked aircraft that needed to be shot down would come from another country.  This 
would allow time to identify the target and scramble interceptor aircraft.  By September 
11, since only seven NORAD alert sites remained, commanders worried that NORAD 
was not postured adequately to protect the United States (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).   
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On the morning of the attacks, all the hijacked aircraft were flying in the NEADS 
sector, based in Rome, NY.  NEADS is responsible for the protection of half a million 
square miles of North American airspace.  This area that stretches from the east coast to 
Tennessee, up through the Dakotas to the Canadian border, including Boston, New York, 
Washington, D.C., and Chicago (Bronner, 2006).  It was in this airspace that the tragic 
events of September 11, 2001, occurred.  Figure 5 illustrates NORAD’s organizational 













Figure 5.   NORAD Organizational Structure 
 
As NEADS watch standers learned of the attacks from air traffic control 
personnel they would scramble aircraft from two alert sites, Otis Air National Guard Base 
in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Virginia.  Any 
other facility that provided additional interceptor aircraft would find themselves pressed 
for time since they were not on alert and needed time to arm their fighters (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).   
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C. FAA MISSION 
The oversight of the safety and security of civil aviation in the United States is 
performed by the FAA.  There are twenty-two air route traffic control centers that help 
the FAA accomplish their mission.  Controllers at these centers are grouped under 
regional offices and work in close coordination with the national Air Traffic Control 
System Command Center, in Herndon, VA, which oversees daily traffic flow within the 
entire airspace system.  The operations center at FAA headquarters receives notifications 
of incidents, including accidents and hijackings (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States, 2004). 
Each FAA Control Center receives information and makes decisions 
independently of one another.  In the attacks of September 11, the hijacked aircraft were 
all flying in airspace monitored by the centers in Boston, New York, Cleveland, and 
Indianapolis.  These centers are illustrated in Figure 6.   
 
Figure 6.   FAA Air Traffic Control Centers (From: National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). 
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Each center had some knowledge of what was going on in the national airspace.  
It is important to note, as stated before, that each center worked and made decisions 
independently and so what one center knew in Boston was not necessarily known to other 
centers, the command center, or FAA headquarters (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States, 2004).  Figure 7 shows the FAA, NEADS sector and 
NORAD information flow. 
 
Figure 7.   FAA to NORAD information flow (From: NORAD, 2008). 
 
1. FAA and the September 11 Attacks 
All aircraft flying above 10,000 feet, under FAA regulations, are required to emit 
a unique signal while in flight to determine the aircraft’s identity and altitude.  On 
September 11 the hijackers were able to make their aircraft disappear by turning off their 
transponders on three of the four aircraft.  It is possible to track aircraft with their 
transponders off but it becomes more difficult because tracking can only be accomplished 
through the aircraft’s primary radar returns.  The aircraft’s primary radar return also does 
not show the aircraft’s identity and altitude.  Air traffic controllers at centers are so 
dependent on transponder signals that they usually do not display primary radar returns 







2004).  Configuration settings on the scopes can be changed by personnel to see primary 
radar returns and this was the procedure followed after the transponder signals for three 
of the four aircraft disappeared.  Although plausible for an air traffic controller to lose an 
aircraft’s transponder signal, the loss of the transponder signal in addition to the loss of 
radio contact, as it happened in the September 11 hijackings, would be a sign of a major 
system failure or that the aircraft had crashed.  After air traffic personnel had attempted to 
implement operational procedures to deal with the loss of transponders and loss of radio 
communications and contact could not be made with the aircraft, air traffic personnel 
knew something was gravely wrong. 
2. FAA, Department of Defense (DoD), and White House 
Teleconferences 
After learning of the hijackings, personnel at FAA headquarters began a 
teleconference with multiple agencies, including DoD, at about 9:20 am.  According to 
the 9/11 Commission Report, the National Military Chain of Command (NMCC) officer 
who participated stated that, “the call was monitored only periodically because the 
information was sporadic, it was of little value, and there were other important tasks 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 36).”  The 
report goes onto state that the teleconference did not play a factor in coordinating a 
response to the attacks (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States, 2004). 
The FAA, DoD, and the White House initiated a teleconference around 0930 
(EST).  Since none of these teleconferences (at least before 1000 EST) included the right 
officials from the FAA and DoD, the teleconference did not succeed in producing a 
meaningful coordination of the military and the FAA in response to the hijackings 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). 
Richard Clarke, special assistant to the President, conducted the teleconference 
from the White House.  Records indicate that it began at 9:25 and the agencies that 
participated were the CIA, the FBI, the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, the 
FAA, and the White House shelter, however the FAA and CIA did not join until 9:40.   
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The initial focus of the teleconference centered on the physical security of the President, 
the White House, and federal agencies.  Soon after the teleconference began the report of 
a third plane crashing into the Pentagon was received (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States, 2004).   
Senior officials from FAA headquarters participated in this video teleconference 
throughout the day.  The 9/11 Commission Report did not determine who from DoD 
participated in the conference but it does report that in the first hour none of the personnel 
involved in managing the crisis were present.  The report goes on to state that in the first 
hour of the teleconference none of the information conveyed in the White House video 
teleconference was being passed to the NMCC.  As one witness accounts, “it was almost 
like there were parallel decision-making processes going on; one was a voice conference 
orchestrated by the NMCC and then there was the White House video teleconference.  In 
my mind they were competing venues for command and control and decision making 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 36).” 
Around 10:03, reports of additional missing aircraft and that a combat air patrol 
had been established over Washington, DC, were received.  Discussion regarding rules of 
engagement became necessary and soon the President was asked for authority to shoot 
down aircraft.  Confirmation to shoot down aircraft was given at 10:25, but the command 
had been already relayed to the Pentagon through direct contact with the President 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). 
3. FAA Deputy Director of Air Traffic Statement 
The following is an excerpt from the written testimony of Jeff Griffith, FAA 
Deputy Director of Air Traffic during the 9/11 terrorist attacks, to the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 
Before 9/ll, the primary duty of U.S. air traffic controllers was to provide 
safe, efficient and expeditious air traffic services for our national airspace 
system (NAS) users. Safety was defined as separating air traffic from 
other traffic, terrain and weather. FAA controllers were trained to use 
covert signals to help communicate with crewmembers during hijackings, 
and to notify appropriate officials when such events occurred, but that 
training never contemplated the kind of hijackings seen on 9/11.  While 
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FAA and military air traffic controllers supported DoD contingency plans 
and exercises, air defense was not considered a role for FAA.  FAA air 
traffic personnel supported DoD efforts to counter threats to the U.S. from 
outside the country, such as prioritization for air defense fighter intercepts 
and other DoD support missions, shutdown of navigation aids that might 
assist incoming enemy aircraft, and restrictions to flight operations not 
supporting air defense roles.  But, again, this support contemplated an 
airborne threat coming from outside of theU.S..  In fact, memorandums of 
agreement existed between FAA and DoD that specified procedures to be 
used (flight routes, altitudes, etc.) whenever our Nation’s borders (the Air 
Defense Identification Zone which surrounds the United States) were 
threatened.  Similar procedures had not been considered or developed for 
use within our borders. 
Although the 9/ll terrorist attacks were not anticipated, FAA controller 
training designed to respond to the various contingencies presented by the 
National Airspace System (NAS) allowed timely and effective actions to 
be taken to shut down civil aircraft operations on 9/ll within 4 hours.  
Based on FAA controller training the following actions were taken: 
• Upon learning of the first aircraft “hitting” the World Trade 
Center, Air Traffic Services called the Headquarters management 
team together and began preparing to address an aircraft accident. 
• When word of the second aircraft “hitting” the World Trade Center 
was received, Air Traffic Services set up a situation line with all 
Regional Air Traffic Division Managers, large facility managers 
and the Command Center. The purpose of this line was to have 
real-time information flowing to/from field elements. One person 
was designated to immediately start the data collection process, 
including radar plots and voice recordings. I assumed a role in the 
Washington Operations Center. 
• In the Washington Operations Center, a direct communications 
line was set up with the Air Traffic Control System Command 
Center. This line became the real-time source of information on 
aircraft reported as missing or experiencing other unusual 
situations.   
• Air Traffic Control Facilities activated procedures contained in 
Letters of Agreement with DoD organizations.  In most cases, all 
participants realized the situation was beyond anything anticipated 
when these agreements were written.  Decision makers reacted 
quickly and professionally to ensure the safety of the aircraft 
operating in the air traffic system, and to support the military 
response. 
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• In Headquarters, Air Traffic Services set up an additional situation 
room in the front office that was occupied by DoD liaison officers 
who worked on the Air Traffic Services Headquarters staff. 
• In the Washington Operations Center, key personnel were assigned 
to multiple coordination positions with direct telephone 
communications to other government agency key personnel.  There 
were also other “secure” lines established to coordinate with 
certain organizations.  One of these organizations was the National 
Military Command Center.  As information was received from the 
FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center on aircraft 
reported as missing or experiencing other unusual situations over 
the direct communications line, that information was announced to 
all key personnel coordinating with other agencies.  These key 
personnel would immediately provide this information to their 
counterpart on the phone line.  The entire group was situated in a 
manner to facilitate relaying this information. 
• At the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center, the 
military officers assigned to the Air Traffic Services Cell became 
immediately involved in coordinating FAA Air Traffic Control 
System Command Center actions with military elements. 
• The link for exchange of information with the White House was 
accomplished through Secure Video Teleconference System. 
Several of these conferences took place. 
Post-9/11 changes, or reforms, made to improve FAA’s role in responding 
to future security breaches include the following: 
• After 9/11 the single most significant change in air traffic was 
establishing a direct communications link between FAA, DoD, and 
NORAD. FAA air traffic personnel worked with DoD and other 
federal agencies to put in place procedures for closer 
communication between FAA, DoD and law enforcement 
agencies.  FAA dedicated air traffic control staffing to NORAD 
facilities for direct support of air defense measures, and to support 
the newly-established Domestic Events Net (DEN).  FAA 
established the DEN to link, in real time, FAA security and air 
traffic personnel at headquarters, the Air Traffic Control System 
Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, all Centers across the 
country, all NORAD Air Defense Sectors, and other federal 
agencies as needed, including Secret Service, Customs, etc. 
• FAA developed air traffic procedures to relay timely notifications 
between FAA and DoD concerning identification and tracking of 
suspicious pilots/aircraft or targets of interest, specific international 
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air carriers, and aircraft operations in or near certain airports and 
areas of interest. 
• FAA implemented special security measures and airspace changes, 
and expanded temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) and other 
airspace control measures to support DoD and law enforcement 
agencies engaged in NAS threat detection and/or defensive 
activities. 
• FAA developed software to graphically depict these national 
security TFRs, then established internet access to them for flight 
service specialists and NAS airspace users. 
• FAA has integrated all long-range radars into the NORAD system 
so that all of the Continental U.S. may be viewed. Additional work 
is ongoing to integrate terminal radars to increase the coverage 
area. 
• FAA expanded its notice to airmen (NOTAM) processing 
capability to support the increased number of NOTAMs required 
for NAS security restrictions, and set up a Flight Service 
Operations Support Center to explain complicated airspace 
security restrictions to flight service specialists. 
• FAA developed air traffic control procedures that can be 
implemented at each threat level established by DHS. 
• Air Traffic personnel continue to draw lessons learned from crisis 
management exercises and real-time events to continually re-
evaluate and revise air traffic control plans and procedures for 
NAS security. 
• The FAA developed a set of broad instructions to be used as 
guidelines if the U.S. airspace system is ever again used in terrorist 
activities. 
• FAA accelerated the physical security program at ATC facilities 
and placed temporary guards at all en route centers, towers and 
terminal approach controls. 
D. COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE AGENCIES 
NORAD and the FAA had developed joint standard operating procedures to deal 
with the threat of hijacked aircraft.  As the 9/11 Commission Report states, “on 9/11, the 
protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORAD required multiple 
levels of notification and approval at the highest levels of government (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004, p. 17).”  Established 
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procedures called for the pilot of the hijacked aircraft to notify the air traffic controllers 
either via radio or by squawking 7500, the universal code to represent a hijacked aircraft.  
As soon as controllers were informed of the hijacked aircraft they would inform their 
supervisors, who would then pass up the information to higher management at FAA 
headquarters.  Once it was determined that an aircraft had been hijacked the report would 
be passed to the director of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security.  Once at this 
office operating procedures called for the notification of Pentagon’s NMCC and the 
request of military escort aircraft to shadow the flight, report anything unusual, and aid 
search and rescue in the event of an emergency.  The NMCC would then seek approval 
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide military assistance and once the 
approval was given the orders would be transmitted to NORAD’s chain of command 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). 
The FAA hijack coordinator was kept updated by the NMCC, who also assisted 
FAA centers in their coordination with the military.  FAA traffic control facilities, along 
with radars helped NORAD track the hijacked aircraft and would attempt to have the 
hijacked aircraft squawk 7500.  These protocols though, did not consider the possibility 
of an intercept.  The protocol assumed that fighter escort would be discreet, vectored to a 
position five miles directly behind the hijacked aircraft where it could perform its mission 
to monitor the aircraft’s flight path (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States, 2004).  As pointed out in the 9/11 Commission Report the protocols in 
place for the FAA and NORAD to respond to a hijacking presumed that: 
• the hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not attempt 
to disappear; 
• there would be time to address the problem through the appropriate FAA 
and NORAD chains of command 
• hijackings would take the traditional form: they would not be a suicide 
hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile. 
According to the 9/11 commission report these protocols were unsuited for the 
events that occurred (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 
2004). 
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E.  NATIONAL MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND 
In the NMCC, the deputy director for operations immediately thought the second 
tower strike was a terrorist attack.  The NMCC’s role in such an emergency is to bring 
together all relevant personnel and establish the chain of command between the National 
Command Authority, the President and the Secretary of Defense, and those who need to 
carry out their orders (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 
2004). 
Soon after the second air strike, the NMCC deputy director for operations called 
for an all purpose significant event conference.  At this conference a quick summary of 
events were discussed which included, two aircraft striking the World Trade Center, 
confirmation of a third hijacked aircraft, and the scrambling of military escort aircraft.  
Records indicate that the FAA was not added to the call and therefore the FAA was not 
present(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).  
Confirmation of a hijacked aircraft (American 11) heading toward the Capital was 
reported and the NMCC deputy director transitioned to an air threat conference call.  
NORAD was able to confirm that American 11 was airborne and heading towards 
Washington, relaying erroneous FAA information since American 11 had already crashed 
into North Tower (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 
2004). 
The air threat conference call lasted over eight hours.  Participants in the call 
included The President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, Vice Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley.  According to the 
9/11 Commission Report, teleconference operators worked feverishly to include the 
FAA, but equipment problems and the difficulty of finding secure phone numbers 
prevented the participation of the FAA.  When the FAA was finally able to join the 
teleconference around 10:17 am, the FAA representative had no familiarity with or 
responsibility for hijackings, no access to decision makers, and none of the information 
available to senior FAA officials (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States, 2004). 
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The 9/11 Commission Report found no evidence that NORAD’s top commanders, 
in Florida or Cheyenne Mountain, coordinated with their counterparts at FAA 
headquarters to improve awareness and organize a common response.  The Commission 
did determine that lower level officials improvised by bypassing the chain of command 
and directly contacting NEADS after the first hijacking.   
The following events timeline was obtained from the 9/11 Commission Report 
and shows how the events unfolded (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States, 2004, p. 38). 
At 9:39, the NMCC’s deputy director for operations, a military officer, 
opened the call from the Pentagon, which had just been hit. He began: “An 
air attack against North America may be in progress. NORAD, what’s the 
situation?”  NORAD said it had conflicting reports.  Its latest information 
was “of a possible hijacked aircraft taking off out of JFK en route to 
Washington D.C.”  The NMCC reported a crash into the mall side of the 
Pentagon and requested that the Secretary of Defense be added to the 
conference. 
At 9:44, NORAD briefed the conference on the possible hijacking of Delta 
1989.  Two minutes later, staff reported that they were still trying to locate 
Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice Chairman Myers.  The Vice Chairman 
joined the conference shortly before 10:00; the Secretary, shortly before 
10:30.  The Chairman was out of the country. 
At 9:48, a representative from the White House shelter asked if there were 
any indications of another hijacked aircraft.  The deputy director for 
operations mentioned the Delta flight and concluded that “that would be 
the fourth possible hijack.”  At 9:49, the commander of NORAD directed 
all air sovereignty aircraft to battle stations, fully armed. 
At 9:59, an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel working in the White House 
Military Office joined the conference and stated he had just talked to 
Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley.  The White House 
requested (1) the implementation of continuity of government measures, 
(2) fighter escorts for Air Force One, and (3) a fighter combat air patrol 
over Washington, D.C. 
By 10:03, when United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania, there had been no 
mention of its hijacking and the FAA had not yet been added to the 
teleconference. 
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F.  PRIOR KNOWLEDGE? 
Between 1991 and 2001, one of NORAD’s sectors conducted exercises 
simulating a foreign hijacked airliner crashing into a building in the United States.  
NORAD claims these exercises were solely to test procedures and were no indication that 
NORAD had any reason to believe these scenarios would happen in the real world (Starr, 
2004). 
Barbara Starr, CNN correspondent, states “it is unclear whether the simulated 
scenario was that of a hijacked plane being used as a missile intentionally crashing into a 
building, or an out of control hijacked plane.  NORAD officials said the exercise 
involved simulating a crash into a building that would be recognizable if identified, but 
the building was not the World Trade Center or the Pentagon.  The exercise involved an 
aircraft being hijacked as it flew into United States airspace from abroad, a different 
scenario from what happened on September 11, 2001.” 
The exercise involved military aircraft and a command post exercise in which 
communication procedures were practiced.  NORAD officials emphasized that had it 
been a real world event, NORAD would have instituted standard procedures to try to 
contact the aircraft and keep it from crashing.  At the time, NORAD commander, GEN 
Ralph Eberhart said, "We have planned and executed numerous scenarios over the years 
to include aircraft originating from foreign airports penetrating our sovereign airspace. 
Regrettably the tragic events of 9/11 were never anticipated or exercised."  
According to a statement from NORAD to Barbara Starr, "Before September 
11th, 2001, NORAD regularly conducted a variety of exercises that included hijack 
scenarios. These exercises tested track detection and identification; scramble and 
interception; hijack procedures; internal and external agency coordination and operational 
security and communications security procedures.  All of those tasks are the 
responsibility of NORAD.” 
The statement continues: 
NORAD did not plan and execute these types of exercises because we 
thought the scenarios were probable. These exercises were artificial 
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simulations that provided us the opportunity to test and validate our 
processes and rules of engagement with the appropriate coordination 
between NORAD's command headquarters, its subordinate regions and 
sectors and National Command Authorities in Canada and the United 
States. 
Since 9/11 we have continued our exercise program having conducted 
more than 100 exercises, all of which have included mock hijacks. 
NORAD has flown 35,000 sorties and scrambled or diverted fighters from 
air patrols nearly 1,800 times. Additionally, NORAD fighters out of 
Florida have intercepted two hijacked aircraft since 9/11; both originating 
from Cuba and escorted to Key West in Spring 2003. NORAD remains 
vigilant and its tolerance for any anomaly in the sky remains very low. 
The 9/11 commission has been informed about our exercises that include 
hijack scenarios. 
At the NORAD headquarters' level we normally conducted four major 
exercises a year, most of which included a hijack scenario. Since 9/11 
however we have conducted more than 100 exercises, all of which 
included at least one hijack scenario. 
G. IMPROVEMENTS SINCE 9/11 
Since 9/11, NORAD forces remain at a heightened readiness level to counter 
potential threats to North America (Kucharek, 2008).  To protect metropolitan areas and 
critical infrastructure facilities, pilots fly irregular air patrols over these areas.  Over 
36,000 mishap-free sorties have been flown by NORAD pilots over the U.S. and Canada 
in support of Operation NOBLE EAGLE.  Since 11 September 2001, NORAD has 
scrambled or diverted aircraft more than 1600 times in response to potential threats.  
Aerial refueling tankers are prepared to support scrambled fighters and E-3 Airborne 
Warning and Control System aircraft augment situational awareness.   
NORAD has implemented an integrated air defense system to defend the National 
Capital Region.  Exercises improving agencies interoperability have increased, with more 
than 100 command-level exercises to test these rules of engagement and to train 
designated authorities.  NORAD and the FAA have partnered to enhance their ability to 
monitor air traffic within the interior of the country.   
Since 9/11 NORAD monitors the FAA's Domestic Events Network (DEN) which 
is a 24/7 FAA sponsored telephonic call network that includes all of the FAA’s major air 
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traffic facilities in the U.S.  The DEN also includes other government security agencies 
that monitor the DEN. The purpose of the DEN is to share “real-time” information with 
the appropriate authorities that deal with an emerging, potential air-related incident 
within the continental United States.  This is a significant improvement in interagency 
coordination since 9/11 as it allows all required agencies and organizations to 
continuously share information. 
The FAA has a representative stationed in the NORAD command center and the 
military has representatives who sit in FAA control centers to facilitate term 
interoperability and understanding.  Moreover, the President and Secretary of Defense 
have revised and approved rules of engagement to confront hostile acts within the 
national airspace, which help ensure the protection of citizens and critical infrastructure.  
These rules of engagement define what NORAD and other agencies involved can and 
cannot do in responding to a situation.   
H.  FOCUS OF THE MODEL  
Various models of team collaboration exist that focus on different aspects of 
collaboration.  In the structural model of team collaboration the aim is to understand the 
macrocognitive processes and their relationship to collaborative team decision making.  
The model was developed by Warner, Letsky, and Cowen and has continued to develop 
with ongoing research.  Three main tasks which are the focus of the model, team data 
processing, developing a shared understanding among team members, and team decision-
making and course of action selection (Garrity, 2007). 
The original model contained four interdependent stages of team collaboration; 
these stages were, knowledge construction, collaborative team problem solving, team 
consensus, and outcome evaluation and revision, as illustrated in Figure 8.  As the model 
has evolved, the four stages were modified and a new stage added by splitting the 
knowledge construction phase into individual knowledge building and team knowledge 
building.  The new five interdependent stages are individual knowledge building, team 
knowledge building, developing shared problem conceptualization, team consensus 




Figure 8.   Structural Model of Team Collaboration (From: Warner, Letsky, & 
Cowen, 2005).  
1. Previous Studies 
Initial studies to validate the model of team collaboration were performed by 
analyzing transcripts from Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) and from air warfare 
teams (Hutchins, Bordetsky, Kendall, Looney & Bourakov, 2006).  Other research to 
validate the model of team collaboration includes the Garrity (2007) thesis, “Investigating 
Team Collaboration of the Fire Department of New York Using Transcripts from 
September 11, 2001.”  This thesis investigated the effects of loss of situational awareness 
and adherence to standard operating procedures as an indicator of efficient radio 
communication. Efficient radio communication expedites the process of moving the team 
towards their ultimate goal; on September 11, 2001, that goal was to rescue the thousands 




structural model of team collaboration to help the Fire Department of New York 
understand how it works together as a team, and offered suggested improvements 
(Garrity, 2007). 
A similar thesis, “Validating a Model of Team Collaboration at the North 
American Aerospace Defense Command Using Selected Transcripts from September 11, 
2001” also analyzed transcripts (channel 2) of the NEADS / FAA collaboration on 
September 11, 2001.  This thesis investigated the teamwork and collaboration that 
occurred between NEADS, their counterparts at the Federal Aviation Administration and 
various air traffic control centers in order to provide military air support and ground 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. COMPLEX TEAM PROBLEM SOLVING 
Several definitions for describing a team are found in the research literature.  
Teams can be considered as “interdependent collections of individuals who share 
responsibility for specific outcomes for their organizations” (Sundstrom, De Meuse, & 
Futrell, 1990, p. 120) or as “two or more people who interact dynamically, 
interdependently and adaptively toward a shared goal” (Salas, Dickinson, Converse, & 
Tannenbaum, 1992, p. 4).  The need for teams to work together to plan, think, decide, 
solve problems, and take actions as integrated units require collaboration and effective 
team decision making among all involved.  These complex factors are essential in team 
problem solving if teams are to be successful in the accomplishment of their missions.  
Military, government, and business teams possess heterogeneous knowledge, 
unique roles, rotating members, and a hierarchical or flat command structure (Letsky, 
Warner, Fiore, Rosen, & Salas, 2007).  Letsky et al. (2007) state, “each of these factors 
represents a particularly challenging form of team structure given that they possess a 
compressed developmental life span and heterogeneous composition, the combination of 
which potentially exacerbates problems arising from team collaboration (Letsky, et al., 
2007, p. 5).”  These military and government teams work in an environment 
characterized by ill-structured and ambiguous situations, where consequences for error 
are severe (Letsky et al., 2007).  
In complex military team problem solving situations, the emphasis is on sharing 
information and decision-making (Elliot, Schiflett, Hollenbeck, & Dalrymple, 2001).  
Factors such as collection, protection, and the interpretation of information are vital for 
the successful accomplishment of the mission.  Information must flow from one point to 
the next with many obstacles that prevent its smooth flow such as, a limited time frame, 
circumstances of uncertainty, fast paced events, and hostile intent (Elliot, et al., 2001).  
Members of the team must evaluate all information received, filter out unnecessary 
information and then communicate this information to other team members or the 
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decision maker.  Throughout the process team members must constantly analyze the 
information to determine its accuracy.  The primary role of team members is the 
collection, interpretation, and distribution of information to support decisions regarding 
the allocation of effort and resources (Elliot, et al., 2001).  
All team members must be able to problem solve and when the solution fails to 
answer the problem be able to quickly identify an alternative (McNeese, Salas, & 
Endsley, 2001).  Because of the need to quickly find an alternate solution, McNeese et al. 
(2001) state that it becomes difficult to evaluate the team according to its adherence to a 
pre-specified coordination of actions.  Teams in general can be distinguished by the 
degree to which the group or its leader must generate coordination strategies during 
performance execution, as opposed to following a predetermined and static plan.  The 
execution of a pre-coordinated plan is challenging in itself but trying to execute the plan 
as situations and mental models change is even more difficult and requires constant 
adjustment by team members to maintain accurate situational awareness. 
1. Team Situational Awareness 
Situation awareness is defined as “the perception of the elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and 
the projections of their status in the near future” (Endsley, 1988, p. 97).  Interpretation of 
external events by team members and adaptation of their mental models to the changing 
circumstances is what allows team members to achieve and maintain situation awareness.  
Once individual situation awareness is achieved members must pass their interpretation 
of information to the team or decision makers to formulate the best possible response.   
Communication of this information is essential for successful performance by 
decision makers in a wide variety of domains.  In complex decision-making domains the 
requirement for situation awareness is compounded by the presence of multiple team 
members and multiple teams (Endsley & Jones, 2001).  Members of the team must have 
an understanding of all communication systems used, but also the amount of information 
or lack of information that other team members may or may not have, given that these 
factors play a part in ultimate decision making and successful completion of the mission.  
 29
Within the team, each member is responsible for developing their own situational 
awareness.  When team members lose or fail to gain situation awareness they are putting 
the mission in jeopardy since it is possible for the team as a whole to lose situational 
awareness.  On September 11, 2001, NEADS personnel and FAA air traffic controllers 
across the northeastern United States did not have good situational awareness due to the 
uniqueness and large scale nature of the attacks.   
Team situational awareness can be thought of as “the degree to which every team 
member possesses the situational awareness required for his or her responsibilities” 
(Endsley, 1995, p. 39).  For the team to be successful in problem solution generation all 
team members must know which information they are responsible for and share this 
information.  It is not sufficient if one knows it perfectly but the other does not.  Not 
fulfilling their responsibility, that team member will become the team’s weakest link and 
decrease the chance of successful mission accomplishment for the team.  The state of the 
team’s situation awareness will change over time just as individual situation awareness 
will change over time (Endsley & Jones, 2001). 
Team situation awareness is an important factor for performance in a wide range 
of environments and operational settings (Endsley, 1995).  The greater part of a team’s 
situational awareness depends heavily on developing accurate individual situational 
awareness amongst team members.  When each individual that is part of the team 
achieves situational awareness, the chances of successful mission accomplishment for the 
team are increased.    
To facilitate the process of obtaining team situational awareness members of the 
team must have shared mental models or shared knowledge bases (Elliot, et al., 2001).  In 
complex task situations, as was the case of the NEADS / FAA mission on the morning of 
September 11, 2001, shared strategic knowledge bases were crucial in order to ensure the 
utilization and continuous updating of cues in the situation assessment process.  This 
would enable the team to develop high levels of team situation awareness.   
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2. Team Coordination 
Coordination is the attempt of multiple entities to act in concert in order to 
achieve a common goal by carrying out a plan they all understand (Klein, 2001, p.70).  
Given this definition, team coordination during the September 11 attacks was somewhat 
degraded due to the unprecedented and overwhelming attacks.  As Klein states, 
“coordination assumes entities are acting in concert (Klein, 2001, p.71).”  Acting in 
concert for the NEADS and FAA agencies became a difficult task because some of the 
information known by certain agencies was not known by others.  Responsibility for 
aircraft tracks became a challenging task after air traffic controllers lost the ability to 
communicate with the aircraft.  Some FAA controlling stations had outdated phone 
numbers needed to communicate with the military, which in turn resulted in lost valuable 
time in the decision making process.  All these factors contributed to the degradation of 
team coordination. 
Coordination in teams is based on the effective use of technology and sharing 
accurate information between team members (Caldwell & Garrett, 2007).   The team 
must be able to integrate information from individual members and be able to create a 
coherent understanding in order to develop efficient solutions.  The inability to integrate 
information by the team will likely result in information being overlooked and decrease 
the chance for an accurate solution generation.  
Since the September 11 attacks, improved coordination procedures and 
technology have been implemented to coordinate between the agencies.  New common 
operating picture systems were installed to improve the shared mental model amongst the 
team.  Personnel from each of the agencies were assigned to supporting agencies to 
decrease the potential for confusion when communicating.  The implementation of the 
Domestic Events Network (DEN) enables agencies to join the communications network 
of collaborating agencies at any time which can improve the coordination between 
agencies during crisis management. 
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3. Anticipatory Thinking 
The capacity of decision makers to perform anticipatory thinking is key to the 
solution option generation process.  Anticipatory thinking is defined as the process of 
recognizing and preparing for difficult challenges which may not be understood until they 
are encountered (Klein, Snowden, & Pin, 2007).  An important distinction is made 
between anticipatory thinking and prediction.  Prediction attempts to deduce future states 
of the world while anticipatory thinking deduces these states and prepares a response. 
Obstacles that hinder anticipatory thinking include: overconfidence in one’s 
abilities, organizational barriers, disconnects between personnel, complexity, and team 
coordination (Klein, et al., 2007).  Although some of these challenges were present in the 
NEADS and FAA agencies during the attacks, the agencies have made progress in 
reducing these barriers.  Eradication of these barriers in all agencies is necessary to 
improve collaboration and ultimately the chance for mission success. 
a. Types of Anticipatory Thinking 
Three types of anticipatory thinking are pattern matching, trajectory 
tracking, and conditional (Klein, et al., 2007).  During pattern matching personnel 
develop a bank of knowledge from experience and rely on this knowledge to alert them if 
a situation does not follow its regular course of action.  As more experience is gained the 
levels of accuracy and success in anticipatory thinking are improved.  This gained 
experience was evident in air traffic controllers during the September 11 attacks as they 
knew that the loss of transponders and radio communications with the aircraft meant that 
something had gone awfully wrong.  Unfortunately due to the uniqueness of the attacks, 
no prior pattern had been built to enable the team to anticipate that these hijacked aircraft 
would be used as missiles, thus the pattern matching form of anticipatory thinking could 
not be used to predict this event.   
In trajectory tracking individuals prepare themselves for how the events 
are unfolding and how long it will take them to react.  This type of thinking requires 
people to “get ahead of the curve” (Klein, et al., 2007).  For example, during the 
September 11 attacks, Boston air traffic controllers shut down their airspace to prevent 
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other possible hijackings of aircraft.  Instead of waiting for reactions from the higher 
chain of command, being aware that this would take some time, the Boston controllers 
prepared themselves by not permitting any more possibly hijacked aircraft to depart or 
enter the Boston airspace. 
Conditional anticipatory thinking uses connections between events to 
make a response (Klein, et al., 2007).  During the attacks, as commercial aircraft were 
hijacked and eventually flown into buildings, senior leadership at the FAA, NORAD, and 
the Pentagon saw a pattern emerging.  Their response to this emerging pattern was to shut 
down the national airspace and if necessary shoot down threatening, non-responsive 
aircraft. 
4. Team Design 
The need for effective teams has led to considerable progress on methods for 
improving the performance of teams (MacMillan, Paley, Levchuk, Entin, Freeman, & 
Serfarty, 2001).  An effective team has the following characteristics (Salas, Dickinson, 
Converse, & Tannenbaum, 1992): (1) dynamic, interdependent, and adaptive interaction 
between team members; (2) a common goal, mission, or objective; (3) some 
organizational structure of the team members; and (4) each individual team member has 
specific tasks or functions.  Task completion requires the dynamic interchange of 
information, the coordination of task activities, and constant adjustment to task demands. 
A majority of the focus on team performance has concentrated around two 
factors: improving team performance through training and collaborative tool technology. 
MacMillan, et al. (2001) suggest that a third factor can be manipulated to improve team 
performance, the team structure.  In order to put together a high performing team, factors 
such as the right knowledge, skills, shared mental models, and abilities must be taken into 
account.  These factors along with the right training will further improve team 
performance. Figure 9 illustrates the three facets of team performance and the tools and 
processes available to support them as suggested by MacMillan et al. 
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By putting the right team together, where shared mental models are common, 
members possess the right knowledge and skills, and abilities are shared amongst the 
team, performance will be improved, thus increasing the opportunity for success in the 
mission. 
 
Figure 9.   Three facets of team performance (From: MacMillan, et al., 2001). 
 
5. Macrocognition Traits in Collaborative Teams 
Macrocognition is described as the way cognition emerges in natural 
environments (Letsky, Warner, Fiore, Rosen, Salas, 2007).  Letsky et al. (2007) further 
define macrocognition as the “internalized and externalized high-level mental processes 
employed by teams to create new knowledge during complex, one of a kind collaborative 
problem solving.”  The term “high-level” is defined by Letsky et al. (2007) as “the 
process of combining, visualizing, and aggregating information to resolve ambiguity in 
support of the discovery of new knowledge and relationships.  Letsky et al. (2007) define 
internal processes as high-level mental processes that occur at either the team or 
individual level, and which cannot be expressed through external means as in writing, 
speaking, gesture, and can only be assessed by qualitative metrics like cognitive mapping 
or think out loud protocols or by using surrogate quantitative metrics such as pupil size or 
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galvanic skin response.  They also describe externalized processes as higher level mental 
processes that occur at either the individual or team level, and which are associated only 
with actions that are observable and measurable in a consistent, reliable, repeatable 
manner or explicitly through the conventions of the subject domain having standardized 
meanings.  Teams in complex environments where collaborative problem solving is 
focused on one-of-a-kind situations utilize these processes (Fiore, 2007).  Several unique 
characteristics of macrocognition that are found in collaborative teams are depicted in 
Table 1. 
Table 1.   Characteristics of Macrocognition in Teams (From: Letsky, et al., 
2007). 
 
Macrocognition as a concept provides a structure for the comprehension of 
cognitive processes and how they directly influence the performance of tasks (Klein D., 
Klein H., Klein G., 2000).  Klein et al. (2000) state that macrocognition’s time scale is 
measured in seconds, minutes, hours, or longer, vice tenths or hundredths of a second.   
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B. TEAM COGNITION AND AUTOMATION 
Today’s technology provides team members greater efficiency in performing their 
duties. Though this increased dependence of teams on automation has also increased the 
challenges these teams face in their operational environment (Cuevas, Strater, Caldwell, 
Fiore, 2007).  Systems designed to support human operators during task performance 
such as computer decision support systems and radio controlled robotic vehicles are all 
included in describing automation.  Cuevas, et al. (2007) state that effective team 
collaboration in highly technological environments requires a greater focus on team 
cognition, in the context of both human-human and human-automation team dynamics.  
Coordinated behavior is the result of team cognition and emerges from the relationship of 
a team member’s individual cognition and their team process behavior. 
A human-automation team is defined as, the dynamic, interdependent coupling 
between one or more human operators and one or more automated systems requiring 
collaboration and coordination to achieve successful task completion (Cuevas, et al., 
2007).  Factors such as psychological, cognitive, social, situational, and system design 
affect the relationship of individual team members and automation technology.  Human-
machine interactions that require high levels of automation, transform automation into a 
vital member of the team that can greatly affect the decision making process (Cuevas, et 
al., 2007). 
1. Framework for Augmenting Team Cognition with Automation 
Technology 
Cuevas et al. (2007) have developed a theoretical framework to illustrate the 
design and implementation of automation technology and how it influences team 
cognition and the decision making process in complex operational environments.  The 
goals of the framework were to “illustrate the mitigating effects of stressors on cognitive 
processes, show the relation of team processes to team behaviors, and finally to indicate 
where automation may most efficaciously scaffold team cognition and support team 
decision making (Cuevas, et al., 2007, p. 2)”.  The framework emphasizes how increasing 
human automation team cognition entails the comprehension of how task related factors 
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interrelate with team member’s cognitive and metacognitive processes to influence 
critical team behaviors.  The framework is illustrated in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10.   Theoretical Framework for Augmenting Team Cognition with 
Automation Technology (From: Cuevas, et al., 2007). 
 
To improve the framework, attitudinal factors that mold the human-automation 
relationship were studied, in specific team member’s attitudes towards automation.  
Levels of trust amongst the human operators of the automation technology ultimately 
influence the operator’s over-reliance and therefore complacency of the automated 
system or the under-reliance and hence mistrust of the automated system.  
Results indicated how attitudes of human operators can negatively affect human-
automation interaction in complex operational situations.  While on average, participants 
of the study had neutral attitudes toward automation, findings in the study revealed 
concerns over the effect of automation on skill proficiency and communication overhead 
could reduce the user’s preference for using automation in completing their tasks.  
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C. COLLABORATION 
1. Collaborative Capacity 
Thomas, Hocevar, and Jansen (2006) define collaborative capacity as, “the ability 
of organizations to enter into, develop, and sustain inter-organizational systems in pursuit 
of collective outcomes (Thomas, et al., 2006, p. 2).”  The ability of agencies to 
collaborate improves their ability to achieve all tasks assigned and also to gain from the 
additional resources other collaborators can bring to the mission.  These resources 
include (Thomas, et al., 2006): (1) cost savings through the transfer of small practices; (2) 
better decision making as a result of advice and information obtained from colleagues; 
(3) enhanced capacity for collective action by dispersed units; (4) innovation through the 
cross pollination of ideas; and (5) recombination of scarce resources.  
Co-dependency between organizations is a factor that requires collaboration in 
order for these organizations to be successful.  Although the benefits of collaboration are 
apparent to the accomplishment of the mission, Thomas et al. point out that organizations 
usually fail at building these collaborative relationships.  They state that the reasons for 
these failures are attributed to: (1) diverse missions; (2) goals and incentives that conflict 
with one another; (3) histories of distrust; (4) leader’s lack of ability to collaborate; and 
(5) the limitation of coordinating systems needed to support collaborative efforts. 
In contrast, in successful collaborating organizations, some of the success in 
collaboration is attributed to: (1) pursuit of a common objective/goal; (2) organizations 
are flexible to the interest of other collaborating  organizations; (3) leadership support to 
collaboration; (4) appreciation of other’s perspectives; (5) trust; and (6) effective 
communication and information exchange. 
a. Model of Collaborative Capacity 
Thomas et al. (2006) developed a structure that illustrates the conditions 
for effective interagency collaboration.  In the model two interdependent organizations 
with a common goal are facing a problem.  Arrows in the model illustrate interaction 
between organizations which aid in collaboration to meet the common goal as shown in 
Figure 11.  These interactions occur in three domains.   
 38
 
Figure 11.   Model of Collaborative Capacity (From: Thomas, et al., 2006). 
In the first domain the five system design categories (strategy, structure, 
incentives, lateral mechanisms, and people) for each organization must be aligned with 
each other and the external issue at hand.  The arrows within each of the pentagons 
illustrate this point.  In the second domain the system elements must also be aligned 
across organizations.  In the final third domain developing of interaction is needed so 
that, “design characteristics of the interagency task force or team are not only internally 
consistent, but also are aligned with the primary organizations they represent (Hocevar, 
Thomas, & Jansen, 2006, in Thomas, et al., 2006, p. 10.)”  
2. Collaborative Critical Thinking 
Research suggests that individuals succeed in uncertain and dynamic settings in 
part by thinking critically about the situation they’re facing.  Collaborative critical 
thinking is the process by which team members work as a team to apply critical thinking 
to the group level (Hess, Freeman, Coovert, 2008).  Collaborative critical thinking is 
further defined as “the interaction between team members that manages uncertainty by 
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revealing it, identifying its sources and devising ways to test its depths or diminish it 
(Hess, et al., 2008, p. 241).”  The ability to handle uncertainty improves risk estimates so 
that plans can be verified, decrease their chance of failure, or not used at all.   
Collaborative critical thinking has four unique interactions that each team member 
takes part in (Hess, et al., 2008): (1) monitoring interactions that warn other team 
members that uncertainty exists; (2) assessment interactions in which opportunity and the 
need to resolve the uncertainty are assessed by team members; (3) critiquing interactions 
where members of the team identify the source of uncertainty, conflicting interpretations 
of the evidence at hand, and untested assumptions that shape the inferences from explicit 
knowledge; and (4) devising actions that decrease uncertainty or compensate for 
irresolvable uncertainty. 
Any uncertainty faced by a team can be handled by collaborative critical thinking, 
but it is most usually applied to the specific mission at hand, and the team processes in 
achieving the mission.  Mission focus entails critiquing evaluations and plans that are 
imperative for the success of the mission.  Team processes are focused on the critique of 
the goals and plans for achieving the goal (Hess, et al., 2008).  
Hess et al. (2008) suggests that collaborative critical thinking is not a process for 
novices but through training is a process that can be acquired.  This was demonstrated by 
research in which teams were trained to reduce uncertainty about future goals and this 
resulted in improved team performance and mission success. 
Collaborative critical thinking is a cyclical process.  Each action results in a 
modification of the state of the perceived environment and in so doing reducing warnings 
to the presence of uncertainty.  The purpose of the assessment process is to determine 
when to devote team effort in critiques, and when to act right away.  Hence assessment is 
a function that accommodates quick, recognitional decision making on the short path, and 
more calculated analytic decision making on the other (Hess, et al., 2008). 
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a. CENTER 
To measure the state of knowledge and judgments about knowledge within 
teams, Hess et al., (2008) have designed a software system to enhance team member’s 
collective knowledge and decisions by enhancing collaborative critical thinking.  This 
software system, known as CENTER, enables leaders to query team members in relation 
to the state of mission knowledge and decision.  CENTER also elicits brief responses and 
statistically summarizes them.  Finally CENTER displays these responses to leaders and 
recommends the issues on which leaders and team members should focus their attention.    
Through CENTER decision makers can monitor the organization’s state of 
collaborative critical thinking with respect to mission-specific issues (Hess, et al., 2008).  
The software also aids leaders in understanding measures of collaborative critical 
thinking and actions to enhace it by evaluating distribution patterns in each response and 
displaying this guidance to the decision maker.   
Insights into the use and interpretation of information can help ease of 
accessibility of knowledge state.  CENTER helps in the integration of data and social 
systems and thus it can become a very helpful technology in distributed organizations 
(Hess, et al., 2008). 
3. Collaboration Technologies in Distributed Teams 
Degradation of social and contextual cues have increased military and business 
team’s susceptibility to time constraints and poor decision making (Rentsch, Delise, 
Hutchison, 2008).  As an example of this Rentsch et al. (2008) describe how distributed 
team members use up more of their time discussing information held in common by 
several team members when compared to the time spent on discussion of unique, expert 
information held by individual team members.  This type of information management is 
made worse when teams have temporal pressure, which is linked with inhibited sharing 
of unique information, likelihood of failure in achieving team consensus, and reduced 
decision quality.  Moreover, the addition of a high cognitive load to temporal pressure 
can reduce the sharing of unique information and result in sub-standard task performance 
(Rentsch, et al., 2008). 
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It is therefore essential to understand the correlation of cognitive processes and 
collaborative decision making and problem solving as it is a basis for the evolution of 
collaborative technologies.  Future effective technology should concentrate on helping 
teams take advantage of the knowledge held by individual team members and therefore 
develop new task knowledge that could be critical in complex team problem solving 
(Rentsch, et al., 2008). 
Current technology used in communication is deficient and limits the 
development of cognitive similarity (e.g. mutual knowledge, shared understanding, 
shared goals) in distributed teams (Rentsch, et al., 2008).  A distributed team is defined 
as:  
A boundaryless network organization form where a temporary team is 
assembled on an as-needed basis for the duration of the task and staffed by 
members who are separated by geographic distance and who use computer 
mediated communications as their primary form of communication and 
interpersonal contact (Kelsey, 1999, p. 104). 
Cognitive similarity between teams is associated with improved team functioning.  
Studies find that cognitive similarity also reduces differences between distributed and co-
located teams as a result of team members knowing each other prior to working together.  
Although Rentsch et al. (2008) also point out that due to the obstacles to effective 
communications in distributed teams, team members may take longer relative to co-
located teams to develop cognitive similarity.    
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IV. STRUCTURAL MODEL OF TEAM COLLABORATION 
A. FOCUS AND STAGES OF THE MODEL 
In 2003 a model of team collaboration was developed by Warner, Letsky, and 
Cowen.  The model concentrated on the cognitive aspects of a team’s collaboration 
process and focused on three operational tasks: team decision making, developing a 
shared understanding, and intelligence analysis (Warner, Letsky, & Cowen, 2005).  The 
original model contained four interdependent stages of team collaboration, which were: 
(1) knowledge construction; (2) collaborative team problem solving; (3) team consensus; 
and 4) outcome evaluation and revision.    
Model components included in the original model of team collaboration include: 
inputs to the model, collaboration stages and cognitive processes, and model outputs 
(Warner, et al., 2005).  Inputs to the model are defined as general information needed by 
teams before they collaborate on a problem.  Information can include a description of the 
problem, team member’s expertise, structure of the organization, responsibilities of team 
members, resources, supporting technology, and information accuracy. 
The initial model included four interdependent stages with a feedback loop from 
the outcome evaluation and revision stage to the collaborative team problem solving 
phase for revising team solutions.  The model has evolved such that the four stages were 
modified with a new stage added by splitting the knowledge construction phase into 
individual knowledge building and team knowledge building.  The new five 
interdependent stages are: (1) individual knowledge building; (2) team knowledge 
building; (3) developing shared problem conceptualization; (4) team consensus 
development; and (5) outcome appraisal.  
These stages are not necessarily sequential and collaborating teams may be found 
alternating between stages as they progress to a team solution (Warner, et al., 2005).  The 
focus of the model is on the cognitive processes and their definitions that describe team 
collaboration.  These cognitive stages, and associated cognitive processes along with 
their definitions are found in Table 2. 
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Finally, the model output component is the result the team has produced from the 
collaboration process.  Results from the collaboration process include: course of action, 
recommendations, assessments, product, opinion, and guidelines (Warner, et al., 2005).  
The result of the collaboration process will depend on the situation or scenario the team 
was collaborating on.  
Table 2.   Operational Definitions for CKI Macrocognitive Processes (From: 
Warner, Letsky, & Cowen, 2005). 
Cognitive Process Definitions  
 PHASE I : INDIVIDUAL KNOWLEDGE BUILDING STAGE: Individual 
team members ask for clarification of data or information, or respond to 
clarification requested by other team members. The more clarification or response 
to clarification the more individual knowledge that is built. 
1. Iterative Information Collection: collecting and analyzing information to 
come up with a solution but no specific solution mentioned. 
2. Individual Task Knowledge Development: individual team member 
asking for clarification to data or information about the task; or response to 
clarification about the task.                                       
3.             Individual Mental Model Development: individual team member using 
available information to increase his/her knowledge representation of the problem 
situation.  
 PHASE II: TEAM KNOWLEDGE BUILDING STAGE: All team members 
participate in clarifying information (e.g. answering a question) to build team 
knowledge. The greater the number of clarifications, the more team knowledge 
that is built. 
4.             Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis: Number of patterns 
communicated among team members; the time to detect those patterns and 
accuracy of the patterns.  
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5. Team Mental Model Development: the increasing similarity between an 
individual’s knowledge representation and the team’s knowledge representation 
through the process of individual team members convincing other team members 
to accept specific data, information or knowledge. 
6.            Recognition of Expertise: calculated by comparing an individual’s 
perceptions of fellow members expertise with actual individual level metrics of 
expertise.  This individual level metric of recognition of expertise can be 
aggregated to the team level by averaging the individual scores of the team. The 
closer the actual and perceived rankings, the better the team is at recognizing 
expertise.              
7. Sharing Unique Knowledge: is an exchange process where any 
information uniquely held by an individual is made available to all other group 
members and the group uses this information in their option selection process. The 
greater the number of unique information items that become available to the 
group, the greater the shared unique knowledge. 
8. Uncertainty Resolution: The progressive minimization of sources of 
uncertainty in a decision environment. The greater the number of uncertainty 
sources that are reduced, the higher the uncertainty resolution. 
9. Knowledge Interoperability: defined as the process of individual team 
member’s exchanging their knowledge of the problem situation such that agreement 
is reached among team members with respect to a common understanding of the 
topic’s meaning. 
 PHASE III: DEVELOPING SHARED PROBLEM 
CONCEPTUALIZATION STAGE: team members sharing their understanding 
of problem goals, characteristics of the environment and rules for operating for 
generation of quality problem solutions. The greater the sharing of the above 
information, the greater the team level understanding of the problem. 
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10. Visualization and Representation of Meaning: visualization is where 
individual team members use methods such as graphs and pictures to transfer 
meaning to other team members. Representation is where individual team 
members use methods such as note pads to sort data and information into 
meaningful chunks. 
11. Building Common Ground: common ground equals the amount of 
redundant terms (x) emerging within the group activity over the total number of 
words (n) generated by the group (i.e., cg = x/n; whereas the lower the number the 
greater the common ground among the team) 
12. Knowledge Sharing: the number of pieces of information passed to 
another team member. The amount of knowledge shared between two team 
members is equal to the number of pieces of information given by one team 
member divided by the amount of new knowledge gained from the second team 
member (measure by pre/post session questionnaire). The smaller the ratio 
(items/new knowledge), the greater the knowledge shared. 
13. Knowledge Transfer: The act of exchanging useful, actionable knowledge 
among team members. The more actionable knowledge exchanged, the more 
knowledge transferred.  Knowledge represents a pattern that connects and 
generally provides a high level of predictability as what is described or what will 
happen next. The greater the number of exchanges, the more knowledge that is 
shared. 
14. Team Shared Understanding: discussion among all team members on a 
particular topic or data item (i.e., discussion does not involve answering 
questions). 
 PHASE IV: TEAM CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT STAGE: Team 
negotiation of a solution option and collective agreement by team members on a 
particular option (i.e., each team member does not have to agree on the solution 
option but as a team they need to agree on the option). 
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15. Critical Thinking: Critical thinking impacts decision processes and 
outcomes and can be indirectly measured through these (measures include # of 
issues considered in an assessment, # of conflicting pieces of evidence identified, 
# of explanations of conflict generated, # of alternative assessment generated, 
accuracy of assessment (agreement with SME), consensus on assessment, 
confidence in assessment, frequency of contingency planning, subjective 
evaluations of process. Higher scores on these metrics indicate better critical 
thinking.  
16. Mental Simulation: Individual team members or the whole team using 
their mental models (i.e., individual or team respectively) to run a mental 
simulation of what might happen over time. Pattern matching between features of 
the current situation and those of previous similar situations in order to base 
projections on the outcomes of the current situations. Measures of mental 
simulation content could include pre/post session questionnaires, and concept 
maps; mental model occurrence measures could include detection of 
communication utterances describing comparisons to similar problems and 
projections about current problem. 
17. Intuitive Decision Making: the number of team decisions derived by the 
team members recognizing the situation as typical, so they immediately know 
what course of action they will do. They immediately know the goals, priorities 
and the steps of the course of action in the given situation. 
18. Iterative Information Collection: collecting and analyzing information to 
come up with a solution but no specific solution mentioned. 
19. Solution Option Generation: generating reasonable alternatives in a 
decision problem that satisfy the list of requirements. 
20. Storyboarding: the process of visual thinking and planning, which allows 
a team to brainstorm together along with placing and arranging their ideas on 
cards before taking action. Measures for effective storyboarding include counting 
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the number of cards necessary for explaining a concept or idea, evaluate the 
coherence of the plan by investigating the smoothness of topic shifts and time 
jumps among individual threads and evaluate whether the storyboard has enough 
content to sufficiently describe the plan. 
21. Team Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis: Number of patterns 
communicated among team members; the time to detect those patterns and 
accuracy of the patterns. 
22. Team Negotiation of Solution Alternatives: team negotiation is defined 
as the number of changes of solution alternatives by the total team divided by the 
total time to reach agreement. The larger the ratio, the more effective the 
negotiation. 
 PHASE V: OUTCOME APPRAISAL STAGE: team evaluation of selected 
solution option against problem solving goal.  Team revises solution option if 
option does not meet goal. 
23. Feedback Interpretation: the whole team discusses the selected solution 
option against meeting the problem goal resulting in either completely meeting the 
goal or areas that need to be discussed further. 
24. Replanning: replanning can be measured by counting the number of 
changes made to the initial plan until final plan is achieved. Note: initial plan is 
defined as the preliminary course of action developed by the team. All behavior 
leading up to the initial plan is not included in the replanning measure.  
25.             Team Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis: Number of patterns 
communicated among team members; the time to detect those patterns and 
accuracy of the patterns. 
            ADDED MACRO-COGNITIVE PROCESSES 




27.            Miscellaneous: these codes do not fall into any of the 26 macro-cognitive 
categories.   
B. FAA AND NEADS THROUGH THE COGNITIVE STAGES 
As the FAA and NEADS team collaborated to find solutions to the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, they were also progressing through the stages in the structural 
model of team collaboration.  The following paragraphs describe how the FAA and 
NEADS teams collaborated were involved in each of the five phases of the model.  
1. Individual Knowledge Building Stage 
In the first stage of the structural model of team collaboration, individual 
knowledge building, each individual works to attain all pertinent information and develop 
their situational awareness.  To develop this individual knowledge team members ask 
questions and request clarification from other team members.  As individual knowledge 
is built the team as a whole becomes more aware of the situation and can move to the 
team knowledge building stage.   
As the initial lines in the transcript show, NEADS personnel were gathering 
information to determine what type of situation they were facing.  Questions such as type 
of aircraft, their call sign, and location were part of developing the situational awareness 
of NEADS personnel.  Table 3 shows an example of the individual knowledge building 
stage, where Sgt. Watson from NEADS, is asking for clarification from Boston Center to 
build individual knowledge and build his mental model. 
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Table 3.   Excerpt from NORAD / FAA Team Collaboration on September 11, 
2001; Example of Individual Knowledge Building Stage. 
2. Team Knowledge Building Stage 
As individual situational awareness is increased team members are able to clarify 
information to build team knowledge.  This stage was accomplished by the agencies 
when they established radio communication between the participating agencies as well as 
the aircraft in their area of responsibility.  The FAA air traffic control personnel 
established communications with NEADS, who communicated with the Continental 
United States NORAD region who communicated with NORAD headquarters.  In 
listening to the hijacked aircraft and watching the events that unfolded during 9/11 the air 
traffic controllers formed their mental models: There were hijacked aircraft, and they 
were being used as missiles to destroy American landmarks.  Air traffic controllers 
relayed this information back to NEADS.  The NEADS operation center pieced together 
Code Speaker Communication 
Suk Sgt Watson Yes, Hunters calling in reference to the highjack. 
Itk Boston Center Yes? 
Itk 
Sgt Watson 
We’re checking to get some information from you if we 
could? 
Itk Boston Center OK, what do you need? 
Itk Sgt Watson We need call signs, type aircraft? 
Itk Boston Center It’s American 11 
Itk Sgt Watson American 11? 
Itk Boston Center Type aircraft is a 767 




Um, I don’t know…hold on. Hey Dan? Do you got souls on 
and all that information? (we don’t have any) No we don’t 
have any of that information. 
Itk Sgt Watson You don’t have any of that? 
Itk Boston Center ?? location’s about 40 miles North of Kennedy 
Itk Sgt Watson 40 miles north of Kennedy? 
Itk Boston Center Right. 
Itk Sgt Watson Do you have a mode 3? 
Itk Boston Center No we don’t he’s a primary target only 
Itk Sgt Watson Primary target only? 
Itk Boston Center Yup 
Itk 
Sgt Watson 




No idea. He took off out of Boston originally heading for 
Los Angeles. 
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these individual mental models to form the larger mental model, which was our country 
was under attack.  Throughout the entire evolution NEADS and FAA air traffic 
controllers switched back and forth between the individual knowledge building phase and 
team knowledge building phase since team members were participating in clarifying 
information to build team knowledge.  An example of the team knowledge building stage 
from the transcript was observed when Boston Military informed Sgt Watson at NEADS 
that one of the aircraft was not in radio contact.  This example is provided in Table 4. 
Table 4.   Excerpt from NORAD / FAA Team Collaboration on September 11, 
2001; Example of Team Knowledge Building Stage. 
Code Speaker Communication 
Suk 
Boston Mil 
United Airlines dispatch says what they know is 
united 175 is at this time the aircraft is nordo, not in 
radio contact  
Itk Sgt Watson nordo? 




Is it still airborne sir because we have possible 
confirmation that this is another highjacked aircraft 
that could crash into the world trade center 
Ki/Itk/ 
Ki Boston Mil 
we don’t not know if he's airborne right now, we’re 
trying to research it, he's in New York airspace 
Itk Sgt Watson you get a tail number? 
Itk Boston Mil no I don’t have that information 
Although much criticism has been made regarding interagency collaboration after 
the September 11 attacks, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, the events as they 
unfolded that morning and response by the participating agencies did not reflect discredit 
on the operational personnel at NEADS or FAA facilities.  NEADS commanders and 
officers sought out information and FAA controllers, facility managers, and command 
center managers thought outside the box in recommending a nationwide alert, in ground-
stopping local traffic, and in deciding to land all aircraft.  
In the confusion of the September 11 attacks, many false reports were made that 
contributed to the development of erroneous mental models by decision makers. There 
were reports of planes with bombs onboard which were untrue.  The addition of this 
erroneous information delayed decision making in a time crucial environment.  Clarifying 
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information and determining its accuracy are critical steps in building team knowledge 
and essential to provide pertinent information to the decision makers.  
3. Developing Shared Problem Conceptualization Stage 
By sharing their understanding of the problem and characteristics of the 
environment team members can generate quality problem solutions as defined in the 
developing shared problem conceptualization phase.  It is evident throughout the 
NEADS / FAA transcripts that team members were proactive in sharing information and 
their understanding of the problem to generate problem solutions as in the following 
example in Table 5, where an unidentified speaker develops a solution to find 
information on the aircraft without the aircraft’s mode three. 
Table 5.   Excerpt from NORAD / FAA Team Collaboration on September 11, 
2001; Example of Developing Shared Problem Conceptualization. 
Code Speaker Communication 
Itk 
Sgt Watson 
Ok all we’re asking is your mode 3…your mode 3. Did 
you assign any mode 3 to that aircraft? 
Itk Boston Center  uuum, original was uh…hold on 
Imm Sgt Watson we still should be able to get it without 53 
Ki Boston Center you have to file it, you have to file a 3 
Suk Boston Center Uh, we don’t have any mode 3 right now, 
Itk Sgt Watson nothing, you guys… 
Prta 
Boston Center 
hes a primary target only, um I don’t even know what his 
original..I could try and find his original mode 3 
Itk Sgt Watson yeah that’s all we need 
Misc Boston Center hold on 
*Ki/Ur Sgt Watson they don’t know yet 
*Ki/Ur Sgt Watson  they don’t know, they don’t have a mode 3 
Misc Sgt Watson He’s gonna try to give us… 
Itk 
Boston Center 




He uh, he’s having a rough time talking cause he’s making 
threats in the cockpit 
Sog/Itk 
H4 
you know what I have an idea. ask him if he’s got anybody 
like near the aircraft that’s got stats on him, ??? maybe he 
can find out where the hell he’s by 
Due to the unique nature of the attacks the generation of quality solutions was not 
immediately apparent in the communications between the agencies because they were not 
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trained to handle the events as they unfolded.  Before the September 11 attack, standard 
operating procedure did not train or prepare the NEADS / FAA personnel for handling 
hijacked aircraft used as missiles intoU.S. landmarks.  Generating problem solutions 
occurred over time and after it was apparent that the country was under attack.  Using 
existing protocol, the FAA along with the NORAD chain of command, recommended a 
nationwide alert and decided to land all aircraft. 
4. Team Consensus Development Stage 
In the team consensus development stage team members negotiate a solution and 
collectively agree on a particular option.  An example of the transcripts that demonstrates 
this stage is depicted in Table 6. 
Table 6.   Excerpt from NORAD / FAA Team Collaboration on September 11, 
2001; Example of Team Consensus Development. 






how you doing.. Nobody is departing Boston in all 
airspace Boston center, we shut all aircrafts down, 
rerouting New York metro airports, our only concern is 
that there are aircrafts in the sky and in case any more of 
the divert, before they start turning or whatever their 




I got predators in whiskey 105 right now, I have a tanker 
as well, I got other aircraft on alert down at Langley, and 
I have trackers over JFK, over Boston and in that area 




anything suspicious ok, and we'll let you know about the 
internationals, we're not sure what were doing with them 
anymore at this time 
Itk NEADS Ok, so JFK and Boston are shut down correct? 
Itk/ 
Suk Scoggins - 
Bost Mil 
We've shut down Boston, I'm not sure if New York 
center is done, any aircraft at this time in New York we 
are rerouting to somewhere else 
5. Outcome Appraisal Stage 
Due to the unique nature of the attacks, the decision to shoot down suspected 
hijacked aircraft could only be given by the president (Bronner, 2006).  By the time the 
 54
President had ordered the shooting of hijacked aircraft all hijacked planes had crashed.  
No examples of the outcome appraisal stage were found in the NEADS / FAA channel 
four transcripts.  This was due to the fact that this was the identification channel used 
mainly for information exchange between the agencies.  Most solution option generation 
examples would have been discussed in channel 2 (mission crew commander channel) of 
the NEADS / FAA transcripts. 
The 9/11 Commission concluded that NEADS commanders and officers actively 
sought out information, and made the best judgments they could on the basis of what they 
knew.  Individual FAA controllers, facility managers, and Command Center managers 
thought outside the box in recommending a nationwide alert, in ground-stopping local 
traffic, and, ultimately, in deciding to land all aircraft and executing that unprecedented 




A. CHOICE OF NEADS AUDIO CHANNEL 
The CD containing the recordings of the 24 channels was requested from 
NORAD.  The NORAD public affairs officer mailed two full CDs containing the 24 
channels recorded by NORAD on September 11, 2001.  Each channel ranges in time 
from about 4.5 hours to 6.5 hours of NEADS and FAA communications during the 
September 11, 2001 attacks.  All calls for help and calls to notify NORAD of the 
hijackings were made by FAA air traffic control personnel via NEADS and were 
recorded on channel 4. 
1. Coding Practice Between Raters 
The thesis researcher initially practiced coding using a separate transcript to 
become familiar with the definitions of the cognitive processes in the model of team 
collaboration. To familiarize each coder with the coding process the coders coded one 
hundred lines from another experiment transcript.  The two coders and other thesis 
advisor then reviewed the coding and discussed how and when each cognitive process 
definition should be used.  In addition to this coding practice the two coders also coded 
one hundred lines of the NEADS / FAA channel four transcripts to further synchronize 
their application of the definitions of the macrocognitive processes for the coding 
process.   
B. COMMUNICATION CODING FOR THE NORAD/FAA TRANSCRIPTS 
The NORAD/FAA channel four transcript was analyzed using the definitions for 
the revised macrocognitive processes included in the model of team collaboration as seen 
in Table 2.  Each speech turn was coded to indicate the speaker’s cognitive process.  
Communication turns could be coded with one cognitive process or multiple cognitive 
processes if the speech turn contained several statements with separate cognitive 
processes employed. 
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C. ADDITION OF COGNITIVE PROCESS CODES AND MODIFYING 
DEFINITIONS 
Discussions during practice coding reflected the need to make some additions and 
modifications to the codes.  Because the revised set of macrocognitive processes included 
in the model of team collaboration have been updated since June 2007, some appeared to 
be more applicable to a controlled laboratory environment, thus some changes were 
needed to reflect the type of data produced from a real-world event. It was observed 
throughout the coding process that although these cognitive codes were meant for 
laboratory settings the name of the macrocognitive process sounded like a process that 
applied to the team communications we were coding.  These cognitive processes that 
seem more germane to laboratory settings can be adapted to be used in real-world 
scenarios as described below. 
Under the cognitive category of team knowledge building, a change was made to 
the definition Recognition of Expertise (RE).  The original definition is “calculated by 
comparing an individual’s perceptions of fellow members expertise with actual individual 
level metrics of expertise.”  For our use in coding the NORAD / FAA team collaboration, 
RE was changed to indicate team members recognition of expertise of other team 
members as depicted in the following example:  
-Maj Prodder…this guy wants to talk to you so he can tell these pilots  
what you want them to do. 
In the example above, MAJ Prodder is recognized as the expert in instructing the 
pilots on their course of action.  Therefore the code assigned to his speech turn would be 
RE.  Recognition of expertise was then slightly modified to illustrate recognition of 
expertise by an individual team member.   
Another definition of a macrocognitive process that appears more germane for 
laboratory experiments was building common ground (bcg) under the team collaboration 
model phase developing shared problem conceptualization.  The definition requires a 
calculation described as dividing the number of redundant terms used within the group by 
the total number of words spoken during the event. It was observed throughout the  
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transcript that the team as a whole did build common ground in reaching their objectives 
as depicted in the following example where the team is attempting to identify tracks by 
their call signs and type of aircraft: 
- hi this is hunters, we have one across from you guys, if you have any 
tracks over to the northeast, we just want to know who they are by call 
signs and type aircraft. 
The speaker in the example above is discussing with another team member the 
identification of tracks and that he would like to know what they are by call sign.  Passing 
this information to another team member is important in developing situational awareness 
amongst the team and in doing so builds common ground between the team. 
The addition of the cognitive category decision to take action was implemented 
which includes issuing a course of action (COA) and request take action (RTA) based on 
research by Hutchins, Kendall, & Bordetsky (2008).  A course of action was defined as a 
required immediate task ordered by a superior or a team member.  Request take action 
was not considered immediate or an order but more of a request between team members. 
D. MEASURING INTER-RATER RELIABILITY 
For the final coding, each coder coded 1221 lines of code individually. Once the 
individual coding was completed, the coders and the thesis advisor met to discuss each 
speech turn and discuss the results of each individual coder.  When the coders agreed on 
the code applied to a speech turn no action was taken.  When coders disagreed a 
discussion followed where each coder would explain the reasoning behind their chosen 
code.  Coders would then reassess their coding and either agree or disagree.  In the 
instance of disagreement the code for that speech turn was marked with an asterisk 
indicating that no agreement was reached (NAR) between coders.  
The NEADS / FAA channel four transcripts are found in Appendix A.  Yellow 
color box codes indicate that there was an initial disagreement between coders as to the 
appropriate coding of the communication turn.  The code highlighted in yellow was the 
final code agreed upon by the two coders.  Red color box codes indicate there was 
disagreement between coders and no final agreement was reached.  These red color codes 
are also marked with an asterisk. 
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VI. RESULTS 
A. TRANSCRIPT CODING RESULTS 
1. Percentages and Usage of Cognitive Processes 
Coding results for the communication turns of NEADS and FAA air traffic center 
personnel on September 11, 2001, indicate that 20 of the 27 (74%) cognitive processes 
included in the model of team collaboration were used.  Seven macrocognitive processes 
were not used to code the channel four transcript; these were: knowledge sharing (ks), 
critical thinking (ct), iterative information collection (iic2) for team consensus 
development, team pattern recognition and trend analysis (tprta), team negotiation of 
solution alternatives (tnsa), feedback interpretation (fi), and team pattern recognition 
and trend analysis (tprta2) for outcome appraisal.  Examples of the speech turns that 
were coded as representing the cognitive processes of the NEADS / FAA channel 4 
transcripts are included in Table 7.    
Table 7.   Cognitive Processes Examples found in the NEADS / FAA Channel 4 
Transcripts.  
Cognitive Process Definitions (From Warner, Letsky, & Cowen, 2005) 
and Examples from NEADS / FAA Channel 4 Transcripts on 
September 11, 2001. 
 PHASE I: INDIVIDUAL KNOWLEDGE BUILDING STAGE: Individual 
team members ask for clarification of data or information, or respond to 
clarification requested by other team members. The more clarification or response 
to clarification the more individual knowledge that is built. 
1. Iterative Information Collection: collecting and analyzing information to 
come up with a solution but no specific solution mentioned. 
-Unknown rider, unknown rider, authenticate 283 s kilo. 
-they’re not answering. 
-unknown rider, at position… 
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            -they are not authenticating. 
2. Individual Task Knowledge Development: individual team member 
asking for clarification to data or information about the task; or response to 
clarification about the task.                                       
- Do you have the last known position of American 77? 
-yes 
-could I have it? 
-yes, YRK080 at 010 
-and is there a lat long sir? 
- I don’t have a lat long right here…do you want an approximate location 
-yeah. 
           -it would be Henderson. 
3. Individual Mental Model Development: individual team member using 
available information to increase his/her knowledge representation of the problem 
situation.  
-They’re probably not squawking anything anyway. I mean, obviously      
these guys are in the cockpit. 
-these guys are smart. 
            -yeah, they knew exactly what they wanted to do. 
 PHASE II: TEAM KNOWLEDGE BUILDING STAGE: All team members 
participate in clarifying information (e.g. answering a question) to build team 
knowledge. The greater the number of clarifications, the more team knowledge 
that is built. 
4.             Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis: Number of patterns 
communicated among team members; the time to detect those patterns and 
accuracy of the patterns.  
             -he’s a primary target only, um I don’t even know what his original…  
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             -I could try and find his original mode 3. 
5. Team Mental Model Development: the increasing similarity between an 
individual’s knowledge representation and the team’s knowledge representation 
through the process of individual team members convincing other team members 
to accept specific data, information or knowledge. 
- Boston was telling me its in your airspace that’s why I'm calling. 
6. Recognition of Expertise: calculated by comparing an individual’s 
perceptions of fellow members expertise with actual individual level metrics of 
expertise.  This individual level metric of recognition of expertise can be 
aggregated to the team level by averaging the individual scores of the team. The 
closer the actual and perceived rankings, the better the team is at recognizing 
expertise. 
             -Maj Prodder…this guy wants to talk to you so he can tell these pilots          
              what you want them to do. 
7. Sharing Unique Knowledge: is an exchange process where any 
information uniquely held by an individual is made available to all other group 
members and the group uses this information in their option selection process. The 
greater the number of unique information items that become available to the 
group, the greater the shared unique knowledge. 
            -I got predators in whiskey 105 right now, I have a tanker as well, I got 
             other aircraft on alert down at Langley, and I have trackers over JFK,    
             over Boston and in that area right now, just looking for anything     
             suspicious. 
8. Uncertainty Resolution: The progressive minimization of sources of 
uncertainty in a decision environment. The greater the number of uncertainty 
sources that are reduced, the higher the uncertainty resolution. 
-They don’t know yet 
-They don’t know, they don’t have a mode 3. 
-His original code was 1443. 
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-1443, copy that sir. 
9. Knowledge Interoperability: defined as the process of individual team 
member’s exchanging their knowledge of the problem situation such that 
agreement is reached among team members with respect to a common 
understanding of the topic’s meaning. 
-Ok, there is 3 aircraft missing out of Boston, spoke with Boston and they 
said they're not sure of the third aircraft call sign but they do have two, 
one of them is United 175 and one is American 11.  
- There were  threats in the cockpit being made, this is the initial highjack 
information that we got American 11, Boston to Los Angeles proposed 
route, he was headed towards JFK at the time that they lost contact but 
that was not the aircraft headed into the world trade center that hit it. 
 PHASE III: DEVELOPING SHARED PROBLEM 
CONCEPTUALIZATION STAGE: team members sharing their understanding 
of problem goals, characteristics of the environment and rules for operating for 
generation of quality problem solutions. The greater the sharing of the above 
information, the greater the team level understanding of the problem. 
10. Visualization and Representation of Meaning: visualization is where 
individual team members use methods such as graphs and pictures to transfer 
meaning to other team members. Representation is where individual team 
members use methods such as note pads to sort data and information into 
meaningful chunks. 
-Hey, did we get a tail number? 
-Right there (pointing to plot). 
-That’s where she said it was; I don’t see anybody going, what wait a 
minute…learn how to offset. 
- Hello…forgot how to offset…4-6 scrambled?...that v-point? 
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11. Building Common Ground: common ground equals the amount of 
redundant terms (x) emerging within the group activity over the total number of 
words (n) generated by the group (i.e., cg = x/n; whereas the lower the number the 
greater the common ground among the team) 
- hi this is hunters, we have one across from you guys, if you have any 
tracks over to the northeast, we just want to know who they are by call 
signs and type aircraft. 
- if theres anything you need or anything I can help you with let me know 
where he is right now please. 
12. Knowledge Sharing: the number of pieces of information passed to 
another team member. The amount of knowledge shared between two team 
members is equal to the number of pieces of information given by one team 
member divided by the amount of new knowledge gained from the second team 
member (measure by pre/post session questionnaire). The smaller the ratio 
(items/new knowledge), the greater the knowledge shared. 
            -No coded examples in transcripts 
13. 13) Knowledge Transfer: The act of exchanging useful, actionable 
knowledge among team members. The more actionable knowledge exchanged, the 
more knowledge transferred. Knowledge represents a pattern that connects and 
generally provides a high level of predictability as what is described or what will 
happen next. The greater the number of exchanges, the more knowledge that is 
shared. 
- currently we have Delta 89, its a 767 out of Boston headed for Las Vegas, 
last known now a confirmed highjack on a mode 3 of 1304 and he is in 
your center. 
14. Team Shared Understanding: discussion among all team members on a 
particular topic or data item (i.e., discussion does not involve answering questions). 
-yea, ok I can have my senior director give you a call every time someone 
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goes in the air. 
-I can give you a quick heads up though, I’ve got two, you know Misty 
Thunder Area. 
 PHASE IV: TEAM CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT STAGE: Team 
negotiation of a solution option and collective agreement by team members on a 
particular option (i.e., each team member does not have to agree on the solution 
option but as a team they need to agree on the option). 
15. Critical Thinking: Critical thinking impacts decision processes and 
outcomes and can be indirectly measured through these (measures include # of 
issues considered in an assessment, # of conflicting pieces of evidence identified, 
# of explanations of conflict generated, # of alternative assessment generated, 
accuracy of assessment (agreement with SME), consensus on assessment, 
confidence in assessment, frequency of contingency planning, subjective 
evaluations of process. Higher scores on these metrics indicate better critical 
thinking.  
             -No coded examples in transcripts. 
16. Mental Simulation: Individual team members or the whole team using 
their mental models (i.e., individual or team respectively) to run a mental 
simulation of what might happen over time. Pattern matching between features of 
the current situation and those of previous similar situations in order to base 
projections on the outcomes of the current situations. Measures of mental 
simulation content could include pre/post session questionnaires, and concept 
maps; mental model occurrence measures could include detection of 
communication utterances describing comparisons to similar problems and 
projections about current problem. 
-is it still airborne sir because we have possible confirmation that this is 
another high-jacked aircraft that could crash into the world trade center. 
17. Intuitive Decision Making: the number of team decisions derived by the 
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team members recognizing the situation as typical, so they immediately know 
what course of action they will do. They immediately know the goals, priorities 
and the steps of the course of action in the given situation. 
-O.K. American Airlines is still airborne-11, the first guy. He's heading 
towards Washington. O.K, I think we need to scramble Langley right now. 
And I'm-I'm gonna take the fighters from Otis and try to chase this guy 
down if I can find him. 
18. Iterative Information Collection: collecting and analyzing information to 
come up with a solution but no specific solution mentioned. 
-No coded examples in transcripts. 
19. Solution Option Generation: generating reasonable alternatives in a 
decision problem that satisfy the list of requirements. 
- you know what I have an idea. ask him if he’s got anybody like near the 
aircraft that’s got stats on him, ??? maybe he can find out where the hell 
he’s by. 
20. Storyboarding: the process of visual thinking and planning, which allows 
a team to brainstorm together along with placing and arranging their ideas on 
cards before taking action. Measures for effective storyboarding include counting 
the number of cards necessary for explaining a concept or idea, evaluate the 
coherence of the plan by investigating the smoothness of topic shifts and time 
jumps among individual threads and evaluate whether the storyboard has enough 
content to sufficiently describe the plan. 
-ok its sketchy, but there’s a 600 foot vessel with 1200 people onboard, 
foreign captain, mass onboard, as soon as the crash happened, this ship 
was sitting off shore for two days, came in and anchored 600 yards off the 
coast of Atlantic City and we've got Coast Guard vessels querying it, just to
 let you know we got Helos asking the Master questions on the radio, and 
that helicopter was initially manned for New York. 
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21. Team Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis: Number of patterns 
communicated among team members; the time to detect those patterns and 
accuracy of the patterns. 
-No coded examples in transcripts. 
22. Team Negotiation of Solution Alternatives: team negotiation is defined 
as the number of changes of solution alternatives by the total team divided by the 
total time to reach agreement. The larger the ratio, the more effective the 
negotiation. 
-No coded examples in transcripts. 
 PHASE V: OUTCOME APPRAISAL STAGE: team evaluation of selected 
solution option against problem solving goal.  Team revises solution option if 
option does not meet goal. 
23. Feedback Interpretation: the whole team discusses the selected solution 
option against meeting the problem goal resulting in either completely meeting the 
goal or areas that need to be discussed further. 
-No coded examples in transcripts. 
24. Replanning: replanning can be measured by counting the number of 
changes made to the initial plan until final plan is achieved. Note: initial plan is 
defined as the preliminary course of action developed by the team. All behavior 
leading up to the initial plan is not included in the replanning measure.  
-At flight level 350, however they lost radar with him, they lost contact 
with him, they lost everything and they don't have any idea where he is or 
what happened. So what we've done at the surrounding centers here is to 
look out for limited codes or primary targets, whatever the case may be. 
 
25.             Team Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis: Number of patterns 
communicated among team members; the time to detect those patterns and 
 67
accuracy of the patterns. 
            -No coded examples in transcripts. 
 ADDED MACRO-COGNITIVE PROCESSES 
26.            Decision to Take Action: the act of issuing an action (coa) or a request to 
take action (rta).  A course of action was defined as a required immediate task 
ordered by a superior or a team member.  Request take action was not considered 
immediate or an order but more of a request between team members. 
             - Get those aircraft scrambled towards him! (coa) 
 
             - ok, if you could do me a favor and have them call us (rta) 
27.            Miscellaneous: these codes do not fall into any of the 26 macrocognitive 
categories.   
            - Ok, go ahead. 
            - Hold on one second. 
            - Stand by one. 
            - Thank you. 
            - Roger! 
The cognitive process with the second largest percentage, 284 out of 1221 speech 
turns (23.3%), of the codes were miscellaneous.  In the NEADS and FAA air traffic center 
communications this code is used to denote information that does not fall into any of the 26 
cognitive categories.  These communication turns usually include greetings to open a 
communications channel between the sender and addressee, acknowledgment of a received 
message, spoken personal emotions, and so on.  Although these miscellaneous codes are 
important in maintaining communications order they do not in themselves have cognitive 






Table 8.   Cognitive Processes Occurrence Percentages. 
Code Cognitive Process Number Percentage  
        
  Individual Knowledge Building     
Iic Iterative information collection 17 1.39 
Itk Individual task knowledge development 612 50.12 
Imm Individual mental model development 7 0.57 
        
  Team Knowledge Building     
Prta Pattern recognition and trend analysis 3 0.25 
Tmm Team mental model development 12 0.98 
Re Recognition of expertise 3 0.25 
Suk Sharing unique knowledge 81 6.63 
Ur Uncertainty resolution 9 0.74 
Ki Knowledge interoperability 115 9.42 
        
  Developing Shared Problem Conceptualization     
Vrm Visualization and representation of meaning 1 0.08 
Bcg Building common ground 3 0.25 
Ks Knowledge sharing 0 0.00 
Kt Knowledge transfer 8 0.66 
Tsu Team shared understanding 3 0.25 
        
  Team Consensus Development     
Ct Critical thinking 0 0.00 
Ms Mental simulation 1 0.08 
Idm Intuitive decision making 1 0.08 
iic2 Iterative information collection 0 0.00 
Sog Solution option generation 1 0.08 
Sb Storyboarding 1 0.08 
Tprta Team pattern recognition and trend analysis 0 0.00 
Tnsa Team negotiation of solution alternatives 0 0.00 
        
  Outcome Appraisal     
Fi Feedback interpretation 0 0.00 
Rp Re-planning 1 0.08 
Tprta2 Team pattern recognition and trend analysis 0 0.00 
        
  Added Codes     
Dta Decision to take action 58 4.75 
Misc Miscellaneous/admin/incomplete 284 23.26 
        
  TOTAL CODES 1221 100.00 
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To prevent the distortion of values in the data miscellaneous codes were removed 
and the data recalculated as shown in Table 9.  The majority, 612 out of 1221 (50.1%), of 
the team communications were coded as individual task knowledge development (itk).  In 
the NORAD and air traffic center communications these codes correspond to individual 
team members asking for clarification to data or information about the task at hand, or a 
response to clarification about the task.  This implies that the watch-standers and air 
traffic control personnel were asking a great deal of questions and obtaining large 
amounts of information.  The large number of questions should not be interpreted as 
incompetency on the part of the watch-standers, but rather as a means for them to 
understand and put together a picture of the large scale unique attack that took place on 
September 11, 2001. 
Table 9.   Revised Cognitive Processes Occurrence Percentages (excludes 
miscellaneous codes). 
Code Cognitive Process Number Percentage 
        
  Individual Knowledge Building     
Iic Iterative information collection 17 1.81 
Itk Individual task knowledge development 612 65.38 
Imm Individual mental model development 7 0.74 
        
  Team Knowledge Building     
prta Pattern recognition and trend analysis 3 0.32 
tmm Team mental model development 12 1.28 
Re Recognition of expertise 3 0.32 
suk Sharing unique knowledge 81 8.65 
Ur Uncertainty resolution 9 0.96 
Ki Knowledge interoperability 115 12.28 
        
  Developing Shared Problem Conceptualization     
vrm Visualization and representation of meaning 1 0.10 
bcg Building common ground 3 0.32 
Ks Knowledge sharing 0 0 
Kt Knowledge transfer 8 0.85 
tsu Team shared understanding 3 0.32 
        
  Team Consensus Development     
Ct Critical thinking 0 0 
ms Mental simulation 1 0.10 
idm Intuitive decision making 1 0.10 
Iic2 Iterative information collection 0 0 
 70
Code Cognitive Process Number Percentage 
sog Solution option generation 1 0.10 
Sb Storyboarding 1 0.10 
tprta Team pattern recognition and trend analysis 0 0 
tnsa Team negotiation of solution alternatives 0 0 
        
  Outcome Appraisal     
Fi Feedback interpretation 0 0 
Rp Re-planning 1 0.10 
tprta2 Team pattern recognition and trend analysis 0 0 
        
  Added Codes     
dta Decision to take action 58 6.19 
        
  TOTAL CODES 937 100 
The cognitive process codes with smaller percentages of use show that the 
NEADS and FAA decision makers needed to collect a great amount of information 
before they were able to reach the Team Consensus Development stage and once there it 
was very difficult to develop a consensus due to the unusual nature of the attacks.  
Confusion as to the number of hijacked aircraft and which aircraft were hijacked in the 
Team Knowledge Building stage played a role in slowing down decision makers in 
reaching the Team Consensus Development stage and eventually Outcome Appraisal 
stage. 
B. INTER-RATER RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
To assess the potential for subjectivity to influence the coders when applying the 
definitions for the cognitive processes, two coders were used to code the NORAD / FAA 
transcripts.  After all coding had been finished by each coder individually; the results 
showed that the coders had initial disagreements where an agreement was reached in 41 
of the 1221 (3.36%) communication turns.  The disagreements where agreement was 
reached are highlighted in yellow in the transcripts found in the Appendix.  Coders could 
not agree on a code in 18 of the 1221 (1.48%) communication turns.   The disagreements 
where no agreement was reached are highlighted in red and denoted with an asterisk in 
the transcripts found in the Appendix.  
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Out of the 1221 communication turns the coders agreed on 1162 (95.16%) codes. 
It was observed that as the coders became more understanding of each others application 
of the cognitive definitions there were less disagreements.  This is clearly seen by noting 
the high frequency of disagreements in the beginning stages of the transcripts. As the 
coding process continued the frequency of disagreements decreased dramatically. 
Most of the disagreements between the coders occurred between the use of the 
codes sharing unique knowledge (suk), exchange process where any information held 
uniquely by an individual is made available to all other group members and the group 
uses this information in their option selection process) and knowledge transfer (kt), the 
act of exchanging, actionable knowledge among team members.  In order to differentiate 
between these codes the coders established a guideline for coding turns that were coded 
suk or kt.   
To use the suk code the information being exchanged must not have been 
exchanged before in the transcript, in other words it had to be a new piece of information 
being introduced to the team.  To use the kt code the information exchanged might have 
been shared prior to being discussed again but the team as a whole was not aware of that 
piece of information and therefore the transfer of the information was useful to develop 
the team’s mental model. 
C. COGNITIVE PHASES IN RESPONDING TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS 
All teams collaborating on a problem must have a mental model within which 
they are making their decisions (Garrity, 2007).  Although there was confusion as to 
which aircraft were hijacked, and even some reports of aircraft with bombs onboard, for 
NEADS watch standers and air traffic control personnel the events of that morning were 
unforeseen and therefore they needed to continually revise their mental model of the 
situation and correspondingly alter their approach in responding to the events.  The 
NEADS and FAA transcript is divided into four phases that correspond to the four major 
events which caused the mental models of NEADS watch-standers and air traffic control 
personnel to change. 
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The first event was the notification regarding the American Airlines flight 11 
hijacking.  Working this original mental model the FAA/NEADS team did not anticipate 
that terrorists would hijack an aircraft and crash it into a building; it was presumed by the 
team that the hijackers would make certain demands and once negotiations had been 
reached the passengers and the aircraft would be safe.  As stated in the 9/11 Commission 
Report, “protocol presumed that the hijacking would take the traditional form: that is, it 
would not be a suicide hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile (p. 
35).”   
The second event that changed the watch standers mental model was the crashing 
of AA 11 into the North Tower of the World Trade Center.  During this phase the watch-
standers and air traffic control personnel realized that they were dealing with an event 
that they had never trained for. The team was trying to handle an event for which no 
standard operating procedure had been developed; therefore team members had to change 
their mental model from “traditional” hijackings to hijacked aircrafts that were turned to 
missiles. 
The third event that brought about a change of the FAA/NEADS team mental 
model involved the hijacking and crashing of United Airlines flight 175 into the South 
Tower of the World Trade Center.  In a matter of minutes the team had faced a situation 
never before seen with the hijacking and crashing of AA 11, and now they had to deal 
with a second hijacking and intentional crashing of an aircraft.  The team did not have 
much time to react to the news that a second aircraft had been hijacked since UA 175 
crashed within minutes of the team learning of the hijacking.   
The fourth and last event to require the FAA/NEADS team mental model to adapt 
was the hijacking and crashing of American Airlines flight 77 into the Pentagon, and 
finally the hijacking and crashing of United Airlines flight 93 into a field in 
Pennsylvania.  It was now apparent that the United States was under attack.  There was 
no telling how many other aircraft could be hijacked and used as missiles.  The teams 
were scrambling to find a solution to the attacks and soon reached one when it was 
decided to shut down the North American airspace. 
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1. First Phase of Responding to the September 11 Attacks 
Initially air traffic controllers did not suspect that AA 11 had been hijacked.  The 
controller, on instruction from his supervisor, was following standard procedures for 
handling a “no radio” aircraft.  A hijacking was finally suspected after the following 
transmission was received from one of the hijackers speaking in the cockpit of AA 11: 
We have some planes. Just stay quiet, and you’ll be okay. We are 
returning to the airport.  Nobody move. Everything will be okay.  If you 
try to make any moves, you’ll endanger yourselves and the airplane.  Just 
stay quiet (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States, 2004). 
Upon receipt of this transmission the air controller followed standard operating 
procedures; he notified his supervisor who then notified the Herndon Command Center.  
After NEADS learned of the hijacking they took action in accordance with standard 
procedures and ordered two F-15 alert aircraft to battle stations.   
During this first phase there were a total of 266 speech turns of which 150 
(56.4%) were coded as individual task knowledge development (itk).  The initial news of 
a hijack for both teams required personnel from NEADS and the FAA to begin 
collaborating on this complex and ambiguous problem.  The high number of individual 
task knowledge development codes is explained by the need for members of both 
organizations to develop an understanding of the situation.  Both teams involved are 
requesting information, need clarification of information, and are responding to the 
requests for clarification of information.  These are analysis techniques which capture the 
communicative acts involved in individual task knowledge development (Fiore, 2007).  
Although other macrocognitive processes were also used during this phase, none 
of the other macrocognitive processes are used as frequently as individual task knowledge 





Table 10.   Frequency of macrocognitive processes used during first phase of the 
NEADS / FAA channel 4 transcripts. 
Cognitive processes used in 1st phase of  
September 11 attack 
No. of 
occurrences  Percentage 
Iterative Information Collection 7 2.6 
Individual Task Knowledge Development 150 56.4 
Individual mental model development 2 0.8 
Pattern recognition and trend analysis 3 1.1 
Team mental model development 1 0.4 
Sharing unique knowledge 16 6.2 
Uncertainty resolution 6 2.3 
Knowledge interoperability 26 9.8 
Visualization and representation of meaning 1 0.4 
Knowledge Transfer 1 0.4 
Solution Option Generation 1 0.4 
Decision to take action 10 3.8 
Miscellaneous 42 15.8 
      
Totals 266 100.0 
The second most frequently used macrocognitive process during the first phase of 
the 9/11 attacks was knowledge interoperability (ki).  The FAA and NEADS teams were 
exchanging their knowledge of the problem to reach a common understanding and reduce 
uncertainty about the situation.  By resolving uncertainty the team moves towards greater 
knowledge interoperability (Fiore, 2007). 
2. Second Phase of Responding to the September 11 Attacks 
In the second phase of the 9/11 attacks there continues to be a high number of 
speech turns coded as individual task development (itk) (65 occurrences accounting for 
53.7% of the macrocognitive processes).  By reducing uncertainty amongst team 
members in the first phase of the September 11 attack, there is a slight reduction in the 
team’s questions and clarifications also known as individual task knowledge development 
(itk).  This is seen by the slight decrease in the frequency of individual task knowledge 
development (itk) occurrences from the first phase (56.4%) to the second cognitive phase 
(53.7%), a difference of about 3 percentage points (see Tables 10 and 11). 
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This difference is attributed to teams exchanging their knowledge of the problem 
(knowledge interoperability) to reach an agreement between team members regarding 
their understanding of the problem.  This in turn reduces the number of individual task 
knowledge development codes as reflected in Table 11.    
Table 11.   Frequency of macrocognitive processes used during second phase of the 
NEADS / FAA channel 4 transcripts. 
Cognitive processes used in 2nd phase of 
September 11 attack No. of occurrences Percentage 
Iterative information collection 3 2.5 
Individual task knowledge development 65 53.7 
Individual mental model development 1 0.8 
Team mental model development 1 0.8 
Recognition of expertise 1 0.8 
Sharing unique knowledge 14 11.6 
Knowledge interoperability 17 14.1 
Decision to take action 11 9.1 
Miscellaneous 8 6.6 
      
Totals 121 100.0 
3. Third Phase of Responding to the September 11 Attacks 
In the third phase of responding to the September 11 attacks, we also observe a 
further decrease in the frequency of individual task knowledge development occurrences 
(47.0%) compared to the second cognitive phase (53.7%).  Although much confusion is 
still observed in the transcript, the NEADS and FAA teams are now working with a 
shared mental model of the situation with each other; and therefore, the number of 
questions asked to clarify their understanding between the teams are decreasing.  
An increase in the frequency of knowledge interoperability (ki) codes was also 
observed from the first phase (9.8%) to the second phase (14.1%).  This increase in the 
frequency of knowledge interoperability (ki) occurrences accounts for the decrease in the 
percentage of individual task knowledge development codes from the second phase 
(53.7%) to the third phase (47.0%) of the September 11 attack, a difference of about 7 
percentage points (see Tables 11 and 12).   
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It is during the third phase that the third airliner (United Airlines Flight 175) has 
been hijacked and crashes into the South Tower of the World Trade Center.  It is also 
during this phase that the teams realize the gravity of the attacks and begin taking actions 
to shutdown the airspace in Boston and New York. Given that the problem is becoming 
bigger, one would think that more questions and clarifications would be asked between 
the team members in order to understand the scope of the situation, and therefore the 
number of individual task knowledge development codes (itk) would increase; but this 
was not the case.  Although the problem as a whole became more complex from the 
second phase to third phase, the mental models of personnel at NEADS and the FAA 
were improving and adapting to each other’s manner of passing information, thus 
decreasing the number of individual task knowledge development (itk) occurrences. 
Table 12.   Frequency of macrocognitive processes used during third phase of the 
NEADS / FAA channel 4 transcripts. 
Cognitive processes used in 3rd phase of the 
September 11 attack No. of occurrences  Percentage 
Individual information collection 5 2.0 
Individual task knowledge development 116 47 
Individual mental model development 2 0.8 
Team mental model development 1 0.4 
Recognition of expertise 1 0.4 
Sharing unique knowledge 17 6.9 
Uncertainty resolution 1 0.4 
Knowledge interoperability 34 13.8 
Building common ground 1 0.4 
Knowledge transfer 4 1.6 
Mental simulation 1 0.4 
Intuitive decision making 1 0.4 
Decision to take action 17 6.9 
Miscellaneous 46 18.6 
      
Totals 247 100.0 
In the third phase additional macrocognitive processes were being used for 
information exchanges between team members.  As the teams attained a clearer 
understanding of the situation they moved into other stages of the model of team 
collaboration.  In the first and second phases of the September 11 attacks, the teams were 
operating mostly in the individual knowledge building and team knowledge building 
phases.  In the third phase of the September 11 attacks, the macrocognitive processes 
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labeled mental simulation and intuitive decision making that occur in the team consensus 
development phase of the model are being used, as depicted in Table 12.  Although these 
macrocognitive processes were used once each in the third phase they nonetheless show 
that the team is moving towards a consensus in their mental model. 
4. Fourth Phase of Responding to the September 11 Attacks 
As the team reached the fourth phase they were fully aware that the United States 
was under attack and continued to develop their mental model to reach a solution.  
Although no final determination has been made about shutting down the national airspace 
at the beginning of the fourth phase, the decision will be rapidly passed down to air 
traffic controllers across the nation.  The FAA air traffic controllers and NEADS team 
had handled the situation as best as they could and as they were trained (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States., 2004).   
In this fourth phase of the September 11 attack, the percentage of individual task 
knowledge development codes (47.9%) remains unchanged when compared to the third 
cognitive phase (47.0%) as depicted in Table 13.  The percentages of the macrocognitive 
processes used during the third cognitive phase of the September 11 attack, sharing 
unique knowledge (suk), knowledge interoperability (ki), and knowledge transfer (kt) 
account for 22.3 percent of all codes in the third phase. This high percentage of 
information sharing helps keep speech turns coded as individual task knowledge 
development (itk) almost constant from the third phase to the fourth phase. 
Due to the rapid nature of these unforeseen attacks the teams needed to quickly 
reach a decision as to how best to alleviate the situation.  It is towards the end of the 
fourth phase that the FAA reached the decision to shutdown the national airspace, in turn 
reaching the final stage of the model, outcome appraisal.  Although no mention of 
shutting down the national airspace appears in transcripts, the order was indeed given by 
the FAA, clearing the national airspace of all private and commercial aircraft just after 12 
PM (EST) (Bronner, 2006). 
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Table 13.   Frequency of macrocognitive processes used during fourth phase of the 
NEADS / FAA channel 4 transcripts. 
Cognitive Processes used in 4th phase of 
the September 11 attack No. of occurrences  Percentage 
Iterative information collection 2 0.3 
Individual task knowledge development 281 47.9 
Individual mental model development 2 0.3 
Team mental model development 9 1.5 
Recognition of expertise 1 0.2 
Sharing unique knowledge 34 5.8 
Uncertainty resolution 2 0.3 
Knowledge interoperability 38 6.5 
Building common ground 2 0.3 
Knowledge transfer 3 0.5 
Team shared understanding 3 0.5 
Storyboarding 1 0.2 
Replanning 1 0.2 
Decision to take action 20 3.4 
Miscellaneous 188 32.0 
      
Totals 587 100.00 
D. CHI-SQUARE TEST 
To test for independence between the cognitive processes a chi-square test was 
performed.   The chi-square analysis was done on all 27 cognitive processes between all 
four phases of the attacks.  The null hypothesis ( 0H ) was that there would be no 
difference in the usage of cognitive processes between the phases of the model.  The 
alternate hypothesis ( 1H ) was that there would be a difference in the usage of cognitive 
processes between the phases of the model.  The observed values of the percentages of 
cognitive processes used during the four phases of the September 11 attack are found in 
Table 14. 
Table 14.   Observed values of cognitive processes per phase. 
CODE 
NUMBER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CODE iic Itk imm Prta tmm Re suk 
Phase 1 7 150 2 3 1 0 16 
Phase 2 3 65 1 0 1 1 14 
Phase 3 5 116 2 0 1 1 17 
Phase 4 2 281 2 0 9 1 34 
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Total 17 612 7 3 12 3 81 
CODE 
NUMBER 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
CODE Ur Ki Vrm Bcg ks Kt Tsu 
Phase 1 6 26 1 0 0 1 0 
Phase 2 0 17 0 0 0 0 0 
Phase 3 1 34 0 1 0 4 0 
Phase 4 2 38 0 2 0 3 3 
Total 9 115 1 3 0 8 3 
        
CODE 
NUMBER 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
CODE Ct Ms idm iic2 sog Sb Tprta 
Phase 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Phase 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Phase 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Phase 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Total 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
        
CODE 
NUMBER 22 23 24 25 26 27   
CODE Tnsa Fi rp tprta2 Dta Misc N 
Phase 1 0 0 0 0 10 42 265 
Phase 2 0 0 0 0 11 8 121 
Phase 3 0 0 0 0 17 46 247 
Phase 4 0 0 1 0 20 188 588 
Total 0 0 1 0 58 284 1221 
From the observed values, the calculation of expected frequency is performed 
using the following equation: 
Expected Frequency = (row total)/(column total) x (sample size) 
Where (row total) is the total number of communication turns coded as that 
cognitive process, (column total) is the total number of communication turns, and (sample 
size) is the total number of communication turns in that cognitive phase.  The expected 
values are found in Table 15. 
Table 15.   Expected values of cognitive processes per phase. 
CODE 
NUMBER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CODE iic itk imm prta Tmm Re Suk 
Phase 1 3.69 132.83 1.52 0.65 2.60 0.65 17.58 
Phase 2 1.68 60.65 0.69 0.30 1.19 0.30 8.03 
Phase 3 3.44 123.80 1.42 0.61 2.43 0.61 16.39 
Phase 4 8.19 294.72 3.37 1.44 5.78 1.44 39.01 
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Total 17.00 612.00 7.00 3.00 12.00 3.00 81.00 
CODE 
NUMBER 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
CODE ur ki vrm bcg Ks Kt Tsu 
Phase 1 1.95 24.96 0.22 0.65 0.00 1.74 0.65 
Phase 2 0.89 11.40 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.79 0.30 
Phase 3 1.82 23.26 0.20 0.61 0.00 1.62 0.61 
Phase 4 4.33 55.38 0.48 1.44 0.00 3.85 1.44 
Total 9.00 115.00 1.00 3.00 0.00 8.00 3.00 
        
CODE 
NUMBER 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
CODE ct ms idm iic2 Sog Sb Tprta 
Phase 1 0.00 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.22 0.22 0.00 
Phase 2 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 
Phase 3 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.00 
Phase 4 0.00 0.48 0.48 0.00 0.48 0.48 0.00 
Total 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
        
CODE 
NUMBER 22 23 24 25 26 27   
CODE tnsa fi rp tprta2 Dta Misc N 
Phase 1 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 12.59 61.64 265.00 
Phase 2 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 5.75 28.14 121.00 
Phase 3 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 11.73 57.45 247.00 
Phase 4 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.00 27.93 136.77 588.00 
Total 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 58.00 284.00 1221.00 
Finally the chi-square ( 2χ ) value is obtained by:  
 ( )22 Observed -Expected / Expectedχ = ∑  
The chi-square value of each cognitive code is seen in Table 16. 
Table 16.   Chi-square values of each cognitive processes per phase. 
CODE 
NUMBER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CODE Iic itk imm prta Tmm Re Suk 
Phase 1 2.97 2.22 0.15 8.47 0.99 0.65 0.14 
Phase 2 1.03 0.31 0.14 0.30 0.03 1.66 4.44 
Phase 3 0.71 0.49 0.24 0.61 0.84 0.25 0.02 
Phase 4 4.68 0.64 0.56 1.44 1.80 0.14 0.64 
Total 9.38 3.66 1.09 10.82 3.65 2.70 5.25 
        
CODE 
NUMBER 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
CODE ur ki vrm bcg Ks Kt Tsu 
Phase 1 8.38 0.04 2.82 0.65 #DIV/0! 0.31 0.65 
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Phase 2 0.89 2.76 0.10 0.30 #DIV/0! 0.79 0.30 
Phase 3 0.37 4.95 0.20 0.25 #DIV/0! 3.50 0.61 
Phase 4 1.26 5.45 0.48 0.21 #DIV/0! 0.19 1.67 
Total 10.90 13.21 3.61 1.42 #DIV/0! 4.80 3.23 
        
CODE 
NUMBER 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
CODE ct ms idm iic2 Sog Sb Tprta 
Phase 1 #DIV/0! 0.22 0.22 #DIV/0! 2.82 0.22 #DIV/0! 
Phase 2 #DIV/0! 0.10 0.10 #DIV/0! 0.10 0.10 #DIV/0! 
Phase 3 #DIV/0! 3.15 3.15 #DIV/0! 0.20 0.20 #DIV/0! 
Phase 4 #DIV/0! 0.48 0.48 #DIV/0! 0.48 0.56 #DIV/0! 
Total #DIV/0! 3.94 3.94 #DIV/0! 3.61 1.08 #DIV/0! 
        
CODE 
NUMBER 22 23 24 25 26 27  
CODE tnsa fi rp tprta2 dta misc  
Phase 1 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 0.22 #DIV/0! 0.53 6.26  
Phase 2 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 0.10 #DIV/0! 4.80 14.42  
Phase 3 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 0.20 #DIV/0! 2.36 2.28  
Phase 4 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 0.56 #DIV/0! 2.25 19.19  
Total #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 1.08 #DIV/0! 9.95 42.15  
          
Chi-Square Value 139.47       
The 20 cognitive processes that were used were compared across all four phases 
of the September 11 attack and resulted in a chi-square (χ²) value of 139.5.  The critical χ² 
value for α of 0.05 is 101.9.  Since our χ² is greater than our critical χ² for α of 0.05 
(139.5 > 101.9) our null hypotheses is rejected.  It is then determined that there is a 
significant difference in the usage of cognitive processes between the phases of the 
September 11 attack and that these cognitive processes are independent of each other.   
The results also show that the team moved between the various cognitive phases 
suggested by the model.  As stated before, progression through the phases of the model is 
not necessarily linear.  The team as a whole kept updating its mental model to fit the 
unique events of that September morning and therefore moved between different 
cognitive phases.  The results indicate that the NEADS and FAA teams made a 
progression from the initial individual knowledge building phase to the team knowledge 
building phase, the developing shared problem conceptualization phase, and at certain 
points entered the team consensus development and outcome appraisal phases. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Coding results from the communication turns of NEADS and FAA air traffic 
centers on September 11, 2001 indicate that 20 of the 27 (74%) cognitive processes from 
the structural model of team collaboration were used. There was a total of seven unused  
codes; these were: knowledge sharing (ks), critical thinking (ct), iterative information 
collection (iic2) for team consensus development, team pattern recognition and trend 
analysis (tprta), team negotiation of solution alternatives (tnsa), feedback interpretation 
(fi), and team pattern recognition and trend analysis (tprta2) for outcome appraisal.   
B. FAA / NEADS AND THE STRUCTURAL MODEL OF TEAM 
COLLABORATION 
Analysis of the NEADS and FAA transcripts on September 11, 2001, is a 
beneficial addition in the validation of the structural model of team collaboration. The 
model can be applied to the NEADS and FAA communications transcripts. From the 
New York Fire Department (NYFD) team communication transcripts in the Garrity 
thesis, the FAA/NEADS channel 2 communications transcripts in the Johnson and 
Donaldson thesis, and now the FAA/NEADS channel 4 transcript the model has 
continued to grow, and is continually moving towards developing a better understanding 
of the team’s cognitive processes during collaboration and decision making during real-
world events.  
C. FAA / NEADS - ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT 
On the morning of September 11, 2001, standard operating procedures (SOP) for 
interagency collaboration and the technology to communicate between the agencies was 
outdated.  Although certain progress has been achieved since the attacks of September 
11, 2001, there is vast room for improvement in the practices and technology used in 
interagency collaboration.  The common operational picture used by civilian and military 
agencies is one of the areas where improvement can be made. 
 84
1. Common Operating Picture (COP) 
To maintain situational awareness at all levels between government agencies, new 
measures are needed to keep these agencies equally focused.   One of these measures is 
the development of a system that integrates all assets and feeds data obtained into a 
common operating picture.  As Colonel Routt states in his report “Interagency 
Improvement for Controlling and Protecting U.S. Airspace,” “we must embrace and 
purchase existing and future technology.  We do not need to use only FAA radars to build 
our picture.  We can tie in an airborne warning and control system (AWACS), early 
warning systems, ships, temporary ground radar sites, fighter aircraft and perhaps 
satellites.”  Navy Commander Pat Bindl, Joint Data Networks Branch chief with the Joint 
C4I Systems Directorate (J6), describes it as, “the whole concept is to take diverse 
information from diverse platforms and put that information into a common format, 
correlate it, and fuse it to provide a singular output (Routt, 2008).” 
Although there is existing technology that provides time critical information to 
decision makers it is important that the technology used is adaptable to all systems 
(Routt, 2008).  This will help all agencies increase their situational awareness by keeping 
the agencies on the same picture.  A coordinated effort to tie all capabilities into one 
operating system that each agency can utilize is of utmost importance and oversight 
needs to occur to ensure all agencies are focused on one common operating picture 
(Routt, 2008). 
D. FUTURE RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES 
Additional research can study the relationship between the individual task 
knowledge development macrocognitive process and knowledge interoperability macro-
cognitive process through different phases.  It was observed in this thesis that as 
knowledge interoperability increased between teams, individual task knowledge 
development decreased in the next phase.  Future research can study if there is an 
interdependent relationship between these codes as teams progress through cognitive 
stages.  Data for this research can be obtained from this thesis, the Garrity thesis (2007), 
and the Donaldson and Johnson thesis (2008). 
 85
E. USE OF LABORATORY COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN REAL-WORLD 
SCENARIOS 
Use of laboratory cognitive processes such as recognition of expertise (re), 
building common ground (bcg), and critical thinking can be redefined and used in real 
world scenarios.  As was the case in this thesis, the laboratory cognitive process re and 
bcg were slightly modified and used in the coding of the NEADS / FAA channel four 
transcript, since they best explained the essence of the information exchange between 
team members.  Limiting these cognitive processes to definitions pertinent to laboratory 
settings hampers the ability to correctly code team communications from real world 
scenarios. 
F. EXCESSIVE INFORMATION IN THE MODEL 
Too much information in team collaboration or any communications network 
hampers the ability of commanders to make decisions and delays achieving situational 
awareness in complex team problem solving.  Research can be performed to study how 
too much information delays teams in progressing through the different cognitive stages.  
Research can also investigate if information overload prevents teams from reaching the 
team consensus development stage and outcome appraisal stage in the structural model 
of team collaboration. 
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APPENDIX.  NORTHEAST AIR DEFENSE SECTOR AND FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 
CHANNEL 4 TRANSCRIPTS FROM SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, 0837 THROUGH 1106 (EST) 
Line Coder 1 Coder 2 
Time 
(EST) Speaker Statement 
1 ki/rta ki/rta 8:37:52 
Boston 
Center 
hi. Boston center TMU (traffic management unit), we 
have a problem here. We have a hijacked aircraft 
headed towards new york, and we need you guys to, 
we need someone to scramble some F-16's or 
something up there, help us out. 
2 itk itk   Powell is this real world or exercise? 
3 itk itk   
Boston 
Center no, this is not an exercise, not a test. 
4           
5 itk itk   Stacia Woah! What was that? 
6 itk itk   Sgt Watson Was that real world? 
7 itk itk   Stacia Real world highjack 
8 itk itk   Sgt Watson Cool . Where is it? 
9 misc misc   Sgt Watson No shit… 
10       *panting”   
11 itk itk   Stacia Who called you? 
12 misc misc   Hunters 3 Locksend visual one right now 
13 misc misc   Sgt Watson Locksend? 
14       Open line   
15 misc misc   Agency man Locksend lowtech 
16 suk suk   Sgt Watson Yes, Hunters calling in reference to the highjack 
17 itk itk   
Boston 
Center Yes? 
18 itk itk   Sgt Watson We’re checking to get some information from you if 
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Line Coder 1 Coder 2 
Time 
(EST) Speaker Statement 
we could? 
19 itk itk   
Boston 
Center OK, what do you need? 
20 itk itk   Sgt Watson We need call signs, type aircraft? 
21 itk itk   
Boston 
Center It’s a American 11 
22 itk itk   Sgt Watson American 11? 
23 itk itk   
Boston 
Center Type aircraft is a 767 
24 itk itk   Sgt Watson And…??’s number, do you know that? 
25 itk itk   
Boston 
Center 
Um, I don’t know…hold on. Hey Dan? Do you got 
souls on and all that information? (we don’t have any) 
No we don’t have any of that information. 
26 itk itk   Sgt Watson You don’t have any of that? 
27 itk itk   
Boston 
Center ?? location’s about 40 miles North of Kennedy 
28 itk itk   Sgt Watson 40 miles north of Kennedy? 
29 itk itk   
Boston 
Center Right. 
30 itk itk   Sgt Watson Do you have a mode 3? 
31 itk itk   
Boston 
Center No we don’t he’s a primary target only 
32 itk itk   Sgt Watson Primary target only? 
33 itk itk   
Boston 
Center Yup 
34 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
OK and you don’t know where he’s coming from or his 
destination? 
35 itk itk   Boston No idea. He took off out of Boston originally heading 
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Line Coder 1 Coder 2 
Time 
(EST) Speaker Statement 
Center for Los Angeles. 
36 itk itk   Sgt Watson Boston to Los Angeles? 
37 itk itk   
Boston 
Center That was his original destination yea. 
38 itk itk   Sgt Watson And where are they going now do you know? 
39 itk/imm itk/imm   
Boston 
Center 
No idea, he’s heading towards Kennedy, oh looks like 
speed is decreasing. Um not exactly sure where, 
nobody really. 
40 itk itk   Sgt Watson Are you the controlling agency? Or is New York? 
41 itk itk   
Boston 
Center Right now we are, he’s heading to the New York center 
42 itk itk   Sgt Watson And is there any military assistance requested? 
43 itk itk   
Boston 
Center Uh, yes we are actually trying to get F16s to.. 
44 itk itk   Sgt Watson Yes, did you want F16s out? 
45 itk itk   
Boston 
Center Yea F16s out of Otis 
46 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
But you don’t have uh, have any modes or codes on 
him? 
47 itk itk   
Boston 
Center 
Um nope right now its just uh, no we don’t have any 
modes yet 
48 itk itk   Sgt Watson Is he inbound to JFK? 
49 itk itk   
Boston 
Center We, we don’t know 
50 prta/itk prta/itk   Sgt Watson You don’t know where he is at all? 
51 misc misc   
Boston 
Center 
He’s being high jacked, the pilots having a hard time 
talking to the…I mean we don’t know, we don’t know 
where he’s going. He’s heading towards Kennedy, he’s 
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Line Coder 1 Coder 2 
Time 
(EST) Speaker Statement 
uh, like I said he’s about 35 miles outside of Kennedy 
now at 367 knots. 
52 itk misc   Sgt Watson Ok 
53 itk itk   
Boston 
Center I have no idea where he’s going or… 
54 tsu itk   Sgt Watson 
If you could please give and let us know of any 
information that would be great. 
55 itk/suk itk/suk   
Boston 
Center 
OK right now I guess we’re tryin to work on, I guess 
there’s been some threats in the cockpit, the.. 
56 itk itk   
(backgroun
d) Stacia:  threats in the cockpit 
57 itk itk   Sgt Watson Threats in what? I’m sorry. 
58 iic iic   
Boston 
Center 
Um…we’ll call you right back as soon as we know 
more info. 
59 misc misc   Sgt Watson Thank you. Sure. 
60 misc misc   
Boston 
Center OK. *hang up* 
61 ki ki   Stacia Ok he said threats in the cockpit 
62 ki ki   Sgt Watson 40 miles north of JFK 
63 misc misc   H4 we don’t have ?? 
64 misc misc   Sgt Watson ?? threat level 
65 ki itk   Stacia  40 miles out of New York 
66 itk itk   Sgt Watson we don’t even know 
67 itk/suk itk/suk   Stacia 
that’s fine, how many souls onboard, he was originally 
going into Boston 
68 misc misc   H3 ?? Check 
69 misc misc   Stacia Oh no 
70 misc iic    Sgt Watson 767 
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Line Coder 1 Coder 2 
Time 
(EST) Speaker Statement 
71 misc iic   Stacia 767 
72 misc iic   H4 Boston to LA 
73 itk imm   Sgt Watson Boston to Los Angeles was his original supposed… 
74 ki ki   Stacia well his original was Boston to Los Angeles 
75 misc misc   Sgt Watson  no kiddin 
76 misc misc   Stacia yup that was… 
77 misc misc   Sgt Watson  umm, Boston to Los Angeles I wonder 
78 itk itk   H4 American what? 
79 itk itk   Sgt Watson American 11 
80 imm suk   Stacia No way we can find him without a mode 3 
81 misc misc   Sgt Watson I got cold chills, oh my God 
82 itk itk   Sgt Watson Ok F16 
83 itk itk   H4 can’t find him? 
84 iic iic   Sgt Watson Uh, no..Well she’s gonna try to query an American 11 
85 ki ki   H4 well call back and see if they had a mode 3 
86       *dial tone*   
87       
*dialing and 
calling 
tone*   
88 misc misc   
Boston 
Center Boston center 
89 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
yeah hunters calling ?? did u guys have a mode 3 on 
American 11? 
90 suk suk   
Boston 
Center 
 Last uh, last altitude we saw him he was descending to 
flight level  2-9-0. 
91 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
Do you have a, im sorry, a prior mode 3 for American 
11? 
92 misc misc   Boston  Um 
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Line Coder 1 Coder 2 
Time 
(EST) Speaker Statement 
Center 
93 iic* ur*   
(Backgroun
d)H4 calling back to see if they have a mode 3 
94 itk*/suk ur*/suk   Sgt Watson 
 do you have anything, any information for mode 3 
because we can locate him on the ?scope? so… 
95 suk suk   
Boston 
Center 
well uh, last known altitude was flight level 2-niner-0, 
before that he was requesting, uh, hold on it looks like 
he was requesting flight level 3-5-0. 
96 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
ok all we’re asking is your mode 3…your mode 3. Did 
you assign any mode 3 to that aircraft? 
97 itk itk   
Boston 
Center  uuum, original was uh…hold on 
98 sog sog   Sgt Watson we still should be able to get it without 53 
99 ki ki   
Boston 
Center you have to file it, you have to file a 3 
100 imm imm   
Boston 
Center uh, we don’t have any mode 3 right now, 
101 misc misc   Sgt Watson nothing, you guys… 
102 prta prta   
Boston 
Center 
hes a primary target only, um I don’t even know what 
his original..i could try and find his original mode 3 
103 itk itk   Sgt Watson yeah that’s all we need 
104 misc misc   
Boston 
Center hold on 
105 ki* ur* 8:41:58 Sgt Watson they don’t know yet 
106 ki* ur*   
Boston 
Center  they don’t know, they don’t have a mode 3 
107 misc misc   Sgt Watson he’s gonna try to give us… 
108 itk itk   Boston  can’t you even fly him with a mode 3 though? ?? says 
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Center American 11 
109 ki ki   Sgt Watson 
he uh, he’s having a rough time talking cause he’s 
making threats in the cockpit 
110 sog/itk ki/itk   H4 
you know what I have an idea. ask him if he’s got 
anybody like near the aircraft that’s got stats on him, 
??? maybe he can find out where the hell he’s by 
111 misc  misc   Sgt Watson Ok 
112 ki  ki   
Boston 
Center they can see him on primary 
113 itk  itk   Sgt Watson  so…anybody 2-9-0 altitude 
114 misc misc    
Boston 
Center  Hello 
115 misc misc    Sgt Watson yes go ahead 
116 ur/suk ur/suk   
Boston 
Center his original code was 1443 
117 ur ur   Sgt Watson 1443…copy that, sir. One more question 
118 misc misc   
Boston 
Center Yup 
119 itk/rta itk/rta   Sgt Watson 
are any aircrafts close by him that uh maybe can give 
us a mode 3? 
120 misc misc   
Boston 
Center Umm 
121 misc misc   Sgt Watson Yes 
122 itk/suk itk/suk   
Boston 
Center 
I think we’re working on that. I don’t have anybody 
next to him right now but um his speed is slowing 
down now, he’s flying southwest bound now so… we 
don’t have anybody close to him 
123 misc misc   Sgt Watson ok thank you sir 
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125 misc misc   
Boston 
Center None 
126 misc misc   Sgt Watson  none! 
127 suk suk   
Boston 
Center he’s not coming up on a 1443 
128 itk* misc*   Sgt Watson 1443 
129 itk itk   
Boston 
Center 
 ??  speed check on the scope up there, approximate 
location 
130 itk itk   H3 last known position? 
131 ki/coa ki/coa   Sgt Watson 
he said nobody should have a surveillance, hit up that 
area, looks like they are though 
132 itk itk   H3 you know what just hittin up ?? around that area 
133 itk itk   Sgt Watson he said nobody in that, nobody in…uh 
134 itk itk   H3 ok whats this uh… 
135 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
have they…who’s talking to New York? Giving them a 
heads up? Anybody called New York, giving them a 
heads up? 
137 itk itk 8:44:59 Fox 
MCC(mission crew commander), I don't know where 
I'm scrambling these guys to. I need a direction, a 
destination 
138 itk itk   Nasypany 
O.K. I'm going to give you the Z point (coordinate). 
Its just north of new york city. 
139 itk itk   Fox I got this lat/long, 41-15, 74-36, or 73-46 
140 itk itk   Nasypany head'em in that direction 
141 misc misc   Fox copy that 
143 misc misc   Stacia ?? centers ID 
144 misc misc   Sgt Watson its around there steve. 
146 ki suk 8:46:58 Sgt Watson New York ?? hunters ID…? New York, yes I am…are 
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you aware of the possible high jack of American 11. 
147 itk itk   NY no I’m not 
148 suk/ki suk/ki   Sgt Watson 
??? boston center, ma’am, we just got information 
theres a real world high jack American 11 he is 
headed…he was 40 miles north of JFK, headed  
towards JFK, um we’re trying to find out any 
information that we possibly can, apparently the pilot 
was having a rough time because there has been threats 
in the cock pit 









tk   Sgt Watson 
he was started out of boston headed for los angeles now 
headed for JFK, we do have military assistance that is 
after him, 2 F16s, uh wanted to give you a heads up to 
let you know American 11 and we are trying to locate 
any information as far as a location to where he is 
currently, a mode 3, do you have any information 
whatsoever? 
151 ki tmmd   NY 
um I do not hold on one second….(talking to own 
people) She’s trying to locate that mode 3 
152 ki ki   NY2 we got nothing, 1443 that’s mode 3, uh at this point… 
153 itk itk   ny  hold on, you heard that right? 
154 misc misc   Sgt Watson Hmm 
155 itk/coa itk/coa   Sgt Watson 
 cmon new York…airborne?...hey you know what? 
Lets get a tail number off of him for American 11. Call 
boston American 11, 
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156 coa coa   Stacia tell them we need the tail number of the aircraft 
157 itk itk   H4 American 11? 
158 itk itk   Sgt Watson yes it is 
159 ki ki   NY  right now he’s primary only 
160 itk itk   Sgt Watson you have no mode 3 or anything? 
161 misc misc   NY umm, im not… 
162 itk itk   Sgt Watson or a location? 
163 itk itk   NY not showing anything no 
164 itk itk   Sgt Watson a lat long? 
165 itk itk   NY hold on a I can get a lat long hold on a second 
166 itk itk   Sgt Watson we’re gonna get an updated lat long now…what 
167 itk itk   Stacia we got an updated lat long. 
168 itk itk   H4 do you have an illustration 
169 ki ki   Stacia 
We called Boston his filed one was 1443 but he’s not, 
he’s not working that he’s on primary only, we’re 
getting an updated lat long position and im gonna get a 
.. 
170 itk itk   NY  he’s showin a 40-39 North 
171 itk itk   Sgt Watson 40-39 north 
172 itk itk   NY  and 74-03 west 
173 itk itk   Sgt Watson  74-03 west 
174 itk itk   Sgt Watson  what was your last one 
175 itk itk   NY whats what? 
176 misc misc   Sgt Watson  thank you ma’am 
177 itk itk   Sgt Watson hey did we get a tail number? 
178 itk/vrm itk/vrm   Stacia right there 
179 prta prta   Sgt Watson 
that’s where she said it was I don’t see anybody going, 
what wait a minute…learn how to offset 
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180 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
hello…forgot how to offset…4-6 scrambled?...that v-
point? 
181 itk itk   Stacia 40-29-34 
182 itk/ki itk/ki   H4 uhh..rough 40, at 4-6 nope…I got 8 miles.. 
183       
*phone 
ringing*   
184 misc misc   H4 ok me and him will sit down 





a   Stacia 
well we are looking to see for a search target, all they 
have is primary, I don’t see…well she knows that…tell 
them, hey call her back and tell her that we want uh ask 
if its possible, if shes not too busy that we need updates 
every 3-5 minutes…we need lat long updates 
187 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
 is there any way ma’am that we can get updates as far 
as the latlong for that aircraft, you know as often… 
188 itk itk   NY 
actually I’m showing their tracking coast right now, so 
I don’t 
189 itk itk   Sgt Watson tracking coast what does that mean…is he northbound? 
190 itk itk   NY 
 it means as far as I’m showing we lost track on him, let 
me see if I can find out and… 
191 misc misc   Sgt Watson Yea 
192 misc misc   NYMC 
Yes hi good morning, this is New York military calling 
at New York center. 
193 misc misc   Sgt Watson hi how are you doing 
194 itk itk   NYMC 
good good, our uh watch supervisor needs a number for 
a possible highjacking, he wants to call somebody in 
case we need some assistance with your fighter jets 
195 itk itk   Sgt Watson  alrighty, our phone number is, dsn or commercial? 
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196 itk itk   NYMC  uh its going to be commercial out there. 
197 itk itk   Sgt Watson  Ok its going to be area code 315 
198 misc misc   Stacia just give’em, here 
199 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
no they want the commercial number..yeah they don’t 
have dsn though 
200 itk itk   Stacia I know that’s what im saying 
201 itk itk   Sgt Watson  What 
202 itk itk   Stacia 
just give’em this one I doesn’t matter…they’re 
monitoring us anyway 
203 misc misc   Sgt Watson hunters id 26 
204 misc misc   NYMC ma'am go ahead 
205 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
you can contact 631-468-5959 and they can keep you a 
little more updated on that 
206 itk itk   NYMC thats a local ma'am 
207 itk itk   Sgt Watson im sorry ? No that's New York Center 
208 coa coa   Stacia dial that number 
209 itk itk   Sgt Watson can we dial out long distance from here? 
210 itk itk   Stacia Yeah 
211 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
*dialing* (call could not be completed as dialed) we 
can't call long distance 
212 ki ki   Stacia there gonna give us lat long updates  
213 rta rta   Sgt Watson you wanna dial this number 
214 ki tmmd   Stacia 
shes watching him, that last lat long is 40-39 n, 74-03w 
and their gonna give 3 and 5 minute updates 
215 itk/itk itk/itk   Sgt Watson a plane just flew into the world trade center?...a 737 
216 itk itk   Stacia who you talking to? 
217 coa/misc coa/misc   Stacia get, patch into them...oh my god (repeated) 
218 suk suk   Sgt Watson its not on the news, a plane just crashed into the world 
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trade center 
219 coa tmmd   Stacia gotta update new york 
220 misc misc   Sgt Watson  New York this is hunters id 
221 coa coa   Stacia see if they lost altitude on that plane altogether 
222 misc misc   NYMC New York 
223 ki ki   Sgt Watson 
yes ma'am did you just hear the information regarding 
the world trade center 
224 itk itk   NYMC No 
225 ki ki   Sgt Watson being hit by an aircraft 
226 itk itk   NYMC im sorry 
227 itk itk   Sgt Watson  being hit by an aircraft 
228 misc misc   NYMC it couldn't  
229 ki/itk ki/itk   Sgt Watson 
its on the world news....do you still have altitude on 
that aircraft 
230 itk itk   NYMC no, like I said I don’t work the radar here 
231 itk itk   Sgt Watson you said you lost contact though? 
232 coa coa   Stacia call this number right here again 
233 ki ki   NYMC um 621-468-5959 
234 ki/itk ki/itk   Sgt Watson 
we cannot get through to that number is there any other 
number for New York Military? 
235 itk itk   NYMC 
um no theres no, that’s the only number I have for 
operations here 
236 ki/suk ki/suk   Sgt Watson 
ok, just wanted to give you a heads up that there was an 
aircraft that hit the world trade center just a few 
minutes ago, but apparently its not that guy 
237 misc tmmd   Stacia Nope 
238 ki ki   Sgt Watson  
we're just trying to find out what we can ma'am, we're 
trying to sort it out but that phone number you gave us I 
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can't reach anybody 
239 rta rta   Stacia 
we need to find out who's tracking this guy on that 
scope in new york center and see if he still has an 
altitude 
240     8:51:55     
241 itk itk   Sgt Watson  
new york center hunters id...is anyone tracking the 
highjacked American 11 
242 itk itk   NYMC im sorry start over again, what about American 11 
243 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
the highjacked aircraft American 11, is anyone tracking 
from new york center that aircraft 
244 itk/ki itk/ki   NYMC 
we had a primary target on him we are trying to follow 
the best we can, hes not squawking a beacon code 
whatsoever 
245 itk itk   Sgt Watson can you still see primary 
246 itk/suk itk/suk   NYMC 
no I don’t not see a primary target at this moment 
however he's not in my airspace so 
247 ki tmmd   Sgt Watson 
ok just wanted to give you a heads up new york, I don’t 
know if you know but the world trade center's just been 
hit by an aircraft, real word 
248 itk itk   NYMC you have that confirmed 
249 itk itk   Sgt Watson it is on the news sir, right now 
250 misc misc   NYMC 
hmm, ok...im sorry theres too many people talking at 
once 
251 misc misc   Sgt Watson 
yeah I hear that too thank you...if theres anything else 
we need we'll give you a call 
252 misc misc   NYMC ok thank you 
253     8:54:05     
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254 itk itk   Stacia are we still trying to work a tail number on this guy 
255 itk itk   Stacia 
you have a hot line to new york military..o no boston 
military 
256 itk/itk itk/itk   Stacia  
where is it as in comparison to u track... And they lost 
primary 
257 itk/ki itk/iic   Sgt Watson 
theres the number, he's giving me the tail number on 
the line right now, but theres the number for new york 
if you want to call them 
258 ki/itk ki/itk   Stacia 
that’s the same number Shelly got...did you get that to 
work?...a 1427 
259 rta rta   Sgt Watson tried it on the phone...you can try the black phone 
260 itk itk   Stacia 
he did crash into the world trade center whos giving 
you that confirmation? 
261 itk/itk itk/itk   Stacia 
Boston? Boston's confirming that was the aircraft that 
crashed into the world trade center 
262 suk suk   Sgt Watson American 11....Boston's confirming it is the aircraft 
263 itk itk   Sgt Watson souls on board yet? 
264 suk suk   Stacia 
the tail number is November 334 Alpha Alpha, on 
American 11 
265 ki ki   Sgt Watson November 334 Alpha Alpha 
266 itk suk   Stacia 
....that it dropped down to 280 knots and they lost 
altitude 
267 itk/itk itk/itk   Sgt Watson 
where would you get that phone number?...state of 
emergency phone number is that what she needs? 
268         *dialing* 
270 misc misc   Sgt Watson 985 hunters ID go 
271 rta rta   Sgt Watson 
985 hunters, you're coming in broken please send mode 
3 
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272 suk suk   man 5362 
273 iic iic   Sgt Watson 985 hunters copies 5362, please stand by 
274 rta rta   Sgt Watson 
um mo you want to scream up to weapons and tell them 
985 is the delta north of J53 they were wondering about 
it 
275 itk itk   h4 can we get the confirmed crash time 
276 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
no, I don’t have the confirmed crash time, she was on 
the phone with it 
277 itk itk   h4 estimate 12:57 
278         *call in* 
279 coa coa   Sgt Watson give me...ok mode 4 out of 53, not access, im sorry 
280     9:01:58     
281 misc misc   Sgt Watson 985 hunters 
282 misc misc   985 yes go ahead ma'am 
283 suk suk   Sgt Watson 
yes sir im open mode 3 but unable to open mode 4 
through hunters 
284 itk itk   985
copy that, do you have a control of whiskey 105, this 
morning 
285 rta rta   Sgt Watson 
985 please stay on the line im going to have hunters 
come up on 364 – 02 
286 suk suk   Sgt Watson they have a second possible highjack 
287 suk tmmd   h4 3320 is way over here by lake Erie 
288 suk/imm suk/imm   Sgt Watson united 175 is the other aircraft...mode 3, 3321  
289 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
boston hunters calling you back, do you have any 
information on the united 175 aircraft at all? 
290 itk itk   Boston Mil uh standby is that the call sign you have? 
291 itk/ki suk   Sgt Watson we have a united 175 possibly a highjacked also 
292 itk/itk itk/itk   Boston Mil united 175? …do you wanna check anything on that 
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because we can…what was your request on that 
293 ki/itk/itk ki/itk/itk   Sgt Watson 
request for a united 175, possible highjacked aircraft 
also, we are looking for, we have a mode 3 of 3321, 
we're looking for information. Any information 
regarding a tail number or anything that you have. Do 
you have any information on that? 
294 itk/itk itk/itk   Boston Mil 
ok I will check on that mode 3 3321, united 175, do 
you know his departure and destination, by any chance, 
we're looking at… 
295 itk/suk/itk itk/suk/itk   Boston Mil 
negative, we just found out from new york center of a 
possible crash also, you heard about the first? 
296 itk itk   Sgt Watson Yes 
297 suk suk   Boston Mil ok possibly a second 
298 suk suk   Boston Mil 
checking on the flight plan right now if you want to 
hold on a second…ok we shut down our traffic here at 
boston center 
299 kt kt   Sgt Watson Boston has shut down their aircraft all around 
300 itk itk   Boston Mil what you say now?...Boston to Lax? 
301 itk itk   Sgt Watson Boston to lax? 
302 misc misc   Boston Mil hold on a second 
303 rta/ki rta   Boston Mil 
you still tracking now, can we go to code 3321 see if 
we can hit anywhere him, that’s where they believe it is 
304 itk itk   Sgt Watson type aircraft sir? 
305 itk itk   Boston Mil 
uh…do you have a type aircraft on that united 
175…767? 
306 itk itk   Sgt Watson another 767? 
307 itk itk   Boston Mil tsp down says it’s a 767 
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308 rta/itk rta/itk   Sgt Watson 
ok and if you want to you can go ahead and give us a 
call back if you find out anything as far as tail number 
or souls on board or anything like that sir? 
309 misc misc   Boston Mil Ok 
310 misc misc   Sgt Watson we realize your busy thank you sir 
311 ki ki   Sgt Watson 
ok sir Boston has stopped all their traffic around 
completely. 
312 misc misc   ?? Man copy 5362 
313 misc misc   Sgt Watson open line, hunters id  
314 itk itk   East ID 
hi its 10 east id mast corp nickelson, have a quick 
question, did something happen to the world trade 
center? 
315 itk/ki itk/ki   Sgt Watson 
yes sir just wanted to give you a heads up two 
confirmed, not confirmed, one highjacked aircraft 
possibly another one, yes we do have the information 
and we are working it all right now 
316 itk itk   East ID this is for live world right? 
317 itk itk   Sgt Watson real world  
318 itk itk   East ID Possibly one highjack? 
319 itk itk   East ID 
um these are two aircraft out of boston, headed for 
LAX, apparently highjacked, we don’t have anything 
other than that right now 
320 itk iic   Stacia you got mode 3? I need that or else I can't find'em 
321 itk/itk itk/itk   Stacia who are they out of, where are they out of? 
322 ki ki   Stacia I need to get team 2, no tankers 
323 ki ki   Stacia 204 to 212, en route, 204 to 212… 
324 iic iic   Steve let me get more data 
325 ki/itk/itk ki/itk/itk   Stacia yes we definitely need a mode 3 or else we can't find 
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them steve…did they say last known flight level of the 
second aircraft 
326 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
ok so you got your united 175 information from New 
York 
327 itk itk   Stacia New York 
328 itk itk   Stacia did we get a tail number on that united 175 yet? 
329 itk coa   Sgt Watson I can call Boston back 
330 misc misc   Boston Mil Boston military desk 
331     9:06:58     
332 itk itk   Stacia 
yes sir sorry to bother you again this is hunters, any tail 
numbers whatsoever on these aircrafts, actually I don’t 
have it on the American 11 they are asking for the 
united 175 
333 suk itk   Boston Mil ok we are on the phone with united right now 
334 itk itk   Stacia you are on the phone with united 175 
335 itk itk   Boston Mil no with united airlines 
336 itk itk   Stacia united airlines 
337 misc misc   Boston Mil stand by 1 
338 misc misc   Stacia thank you 
339 itk itk   Stacia boston is online with united right now 
340 suk itk   Boston Mil 
united airlines dispatch says what they know is united 
175 is at this time the aircraft is nordo, not in radio 
contact  
341 itk itk   Sgt Watson nordo? 
342 itk itk   Boston Mil that is correct 
343 itk/ki/ms 
itk/suk/m
s   Sgt Watson 
is it still airborne sir because we have possible 
confirmation that this is another highjacked aircraft that 
could crash into the world trade center 
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344 itk/ki itk/ki   Boston Mil 
we don’t not know if he's airborne right now, we’re 
trying to research it, he's in New York airspace 
345 itk itk   Sgt Watson you get a tail number? 
346 itk itk   Boston Mil no I don’t have that information 
347 misc misc   Sgt Watson ok copy, thank you boston 
348 misc misc   Sgt Watson giant killers hunters id 72 
349 itk Itk   Sgt Watson yes sir how many aircraft do you have in 72 at this time 





a   Sgt Watson 
mark whenever you have an aircraft in 72, he's got two 
F18s and one lear jet just so you know, just go ahead 
give giant killer a call, I realize all this stuff going on, 
just give giant killer a call and say he what you got in 
72 right now, you know just don't make him friendly 
352 kt Kt   Stacia we've got Langley on battles stations right now 
353 misc misc   Sgt Watson that's fine 
354     9:11:58 
13:11:58 
(mp3 46:58)   
355 itk Itk   Sgt Watson Im confused why weapons said its Maine 85 
356 misc misc   Stacia doesn’t really know the … 
357 itk Itk   Sgt Watson who mark 
358 itk Itk   Stacia I guess he said it wasn't but it should be Maine 85… 
359 itk/coa/itk itk/coa/itk   Sgt Watson 
could be maybe their aircraft or something I don’t 
know, but find out where he is exactly…the Maine 
85…and ask him why he said that wasn't it 
360 misc misc   Sgt Watson us hunters reference united 175 
361 suk/itk suk/itk   Sgt Watson 
us hunters checking on united 175, apparently 
confirmation the second aircraft hit the world trade 
center 
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362 itk Itk     I have no idea 
363 tmmd tmmd   Sgt Watson 
boston was telling me its in your airspace that’s why 
I'm calling 
364 ki/itk ki/itk     
its in the new york trade con airspace but I have no idea 
what the plane is….someone told me one was an 
American airlines out of Boston to LA 
365 itk Itk   Sgt Watson It was American 11 
366 itk Itk     but the other one I have no idea 
367 itk Itk   Sgt Watson you don’t?  Ok 
368 misc misc   Sgt Watson hunters id  
369 misc misc   NYMC 
this is new york military calling, someone on the floor 
on the floor said they wanted. 
370 misc misc   Sgt Watson there they are 
371 misc misc   NYMC Whatsup 
372 itk Itk   Sgt Watson 
new york military, hunters, checking on united 175i 
heard that he was in your airspace do you have contact 
with that aircraft airborne? 
373 itk/suk itk/suk   NYMC 
no united 175 that was the second aircraft that crashed 
into the world trade center 
374 ur/itk ur/itk   Sgt Watson 
that’s what I needed sir was confirmation, only one 
other question, the souls on board of either aircraft do 
you know 
375 itk/ki itk/ki   NYMC 
you'd have to get Boston center on that, they were both 
out of Boston heading to Los Angeles, Boston would 
have that information, we don't have that information 
yet 
376 misc misc   Sgt Watson thank you sir 
377 misc misc   Boston Mil boston mil 
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378 itk Itk   Sgt Watson 
Boston’s hunters, just checking one last time for the 
souls on board of either aircraft, new york told me to 
call you 
379 itk/suk itk/suk   Boston Mil 
the estimate we have on united 175 is only an estimate, 
they locked it up, so I guess we don't have access 
because they locked it up, the guy said he looked at 
once before and he believes there were only 75 on the 
united 175 
380 itk Itk   Sgt Watson nothing on the American 11? 
381 itk/ki itk/ki   Boston Mil 
that’s an estimate, nothing on the American. I do have a 
tail number for that united if you want it, 
382 misc misc   Sgt Watson ok go ahead  
383 misc misc   Boston Mil hold on one second 
384 misc misc   Boston Mil stand by 1 
385 misc misc   Boston Mil thank you 
386 itk Itk   Boston Mil November 612 uniform alpha 
387 itk Itk   Sgt Watson November 612 uniform alpha 
388 ki/suk/itk ki/suk/itk   Boston Mil 
yeah we shut all our traffic off at Boston center, 
nobody is departing, rerouting all Kennedy arrivals for 
all New York metro airports. I have a question for you 
in case we have any more aircrafts that start deviating. 
we need to know do you have a ?? On alert is that 
something you can do, just in case this happens to any 
more aircrafts  
389 misc misc   Sgt Watson stand by I'll give the message to the commander 
390 re Re   Sgt Watson major we need you to talk to him a minute 
391 misc misc   MAJ go ahead 
392 misc misc   Scoggins - yes ?? Scoggins, boston center military 
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Bost Mil 
393 misc misc   MAJ yes this is major ??? 
394 ki/idm/kt ki/idm/kt   
Scoggins - 
Bost Mil 
how you doing.. Nobody is departing Boston in all 
airspace Boston center, we shut all aircrafts down, 
rerouting New York metro airports, our only concern is 
that there are aircrafts in the sky and in case any more 
of the divert, before they start turning or whatever their 
gonna do, we were just wondering do you have people 
on alert 
395     9:16:58 
13:16:58 
(mp3 51:58)   
396 suk suk   MAJ 
I got predators in whiskey 105 right now, I have a 
tanker as well, I got other aircraft on alert down at 
Langley, and I have trackers over JFK, over Boston and 
in that area right now, just looking for anything 
suspicious 
397 ki ki   
Scoggins - 
Bost Mil 
anything suspicious ok and we'll let you know about 
the internationals, we're not sure what were doing with 
them anymore at this time 
398 itk itk   MAJ ok so JFK and Boston are shut down correct? 
399 itk/suk itk/suk   
Scoggins - 
Bost Mil 
we've shut down Boston, I'm not sure if New York 
center is done, any aircraft at this time in New York we 
are rerouting to somewhere else 
400 rta rta   MAJ 
ok if you have anything, any of your controllers see 
anything, give us a yowl we'll get those fighters into 
that location 
401 misc misc   
Scoggins - 
Bost Mil alrighty, thank you very much 
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402 suk suk   Stacia ok we have two helicopters at New York… 
403 misc misc     * time pass* 
404 misc misc   Sgt Watson new york hunters id reference American airlines 11 
405 misc misc   Sgt Watson Im calling new york right now 
406 misc misc   NYMC this is new york, go ahead 
407 ki ki   Sgt Watson 
yes sir we just had knowledge that American airlines 
11 is airborne headed towards Washington, did you get 
that information? 
408 misc misc   NYMC stand by… air defense,  
409           
410 idm idm 9:21:50 Nasypany 
O.K. American Airlines is still airborne-11, the first 
guy. He's heading towards Washington. O.K> I think 
we need to scramble Langley right no. And I'm-I'm 
gonna take the fighters fro Otis and try to chase this 
guy down if I can find him. 
411           
412     9:21:58 
13:21:58 
(mp3 56:58)   
413 misc misc   Sgt Watson yes go ahead 
414 itk itk   NYMC what beacon code was that 
415 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
sir we don't have a beacon code, we only have a tail 
number, the last known beacon code was 1443 
416 coa coa   NYMC 
im gonna give you a phone number and you need to 
call them because  
417 itk itk   Sgt Watson Is this the 631-468-5959 
418 itk itk   NYMC 
its 631-468-5959, that’s the watch desk and they'll have 
any information you may need on this plane 
419 rta rta   Sgt Watson ok if you could do me a favor and have them call us, 
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we cannot call out for some reason 
420 itk itk   NYMC alright let me have your number 
421 itk itk   Sgt Watson do you have dsn or no? 
422 itk itk   NYMC Im sorry 
423 itk itk   Sgt Watson 315-334-6344 
424 misc misc   NYMC alright thank you 
425 itk/ki itk/ki   Sgt Watson 
major Anderson, what did you need?...American 
airlines 11, new York’s gonna call me back right now 
with the information that they have, im just 
waiting…that’s the first one we thought was going into 
the world trade center, we got a tail number and 
everything 
426 misc misc   Sgt Watson Washington line 1 
427 misc misc   
Wash 
Center Washington 
428 ki ki   Sgt Watson 
Washington center this is hunter id,have you been 
given heads up as far as the aircrafts that have crashed 
into the world trade center 
429 itk itk   
Wash 
Center yea we're aware of it, yes 
430 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
well sir we're tryin to find out some information on 
American 11, we just got… 
431 itk itk   
Wash 
Center we don’t have anything on that one 
432 itk itk   Sgt Watson you do not? 
433 itk itk   
Wash 
Center do not 
434 itk itk   Sgt Watson ok you are aware that he's possibly headed towards 
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Washington? 
435 ki ki   
Wash 
Center 
uh well we uh, we just got word from Boston or 
somewhere, but we don't have anything on him yet and 
yeah theres a lot of different things going right now 
436 misc misc   Sgt Watson just wanted to give you a heads up sir 
437 misc misc   
Wash 
Center ok thank you very much 
438 coa coa     
we have to get this number, this guy on the line he 
knows about the aircraft, American 11 
439           
440 imm imm 9:23:15 Anderson 
They're probably not squawking anything 
(broadcasting a beacon code) anyway. I mean, 
obviously these guys are in the cockpit. 
441 iic iic   Nasypany these guys are smart 
442 imm imm   
Unidentified 
male yeah, they knew exactly what they wanted to do. 
444     9:26:58 
13:26:58 
(mp3 
1:01:58)   
445 itk itk   
Maj 
Anderson 767 we're looking for? 
446 itk itk   Stacia yes 767, tail number November 334 alpha alpha 
447 ki ki   Sgt Watson copy that? Boston is missing another airplane 
448 itk itk   Sgt Watson do you know any phone we can call out long distance 
449 coa coa   Stacia dial this number for her 
450 itk/ki itk/ki   Sgt Watson 
Hi this is hunters calling, I was told to give you a buzz 
from our mission crew commander, is there any 
information, I guess three aircraft out of Boston are 
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missing and apparently two of them just hit the world 
trade center and one is in route to Washington. Did you 
get that information? 
451 itk/ki itk/ki   Sgt Watson 
yea…American 11 is not the aircraft that crashed, it is 
still airborne, did you get that information? That's what 
we just found out, we don't know where it is though. 
It's heading towards Washington was the last known 
information 
452 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
yeah I'm not going to say much right now, just wanted 
to give you a heads up. Do you have any information 
though about where American 11 is? Or anything… 
453 ki/rta ki/rta   Sgt Watson 
just want to say one more thing, too. Washington, I 
don't know if they think its serious or not but they are 
not, unless they hear from the centers, if you could give 
them a heads up and let them know….Washington 
center, they're not..not at all 
454 coa coa   Stacia we've gotta get a plane out on that American Airline 
455 ki ki   
Maj 
Anderson we do, we got it on Langley scrambled 
456 suk suk   Stacia and I'd have the President airborne, wherever 
457 suk* ki*   Sgt Watson 
Boston has no clue where they are, he's gonna let 
Washington center know that this is very serious, 
because nobodys acting serious there 
458 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
Boston sorry to bother you so much, this is hunters, just 
checking with you have you had any contact with 
American 11 since the last known 
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460       Sgt Watson Conversation 
461 itk/ki itk/ki   
Boston 
Center 
no, we don’t have any contact at all, we do know 3 
aircrafts are missing but we don't have a third call sign 
462 misc misc   Sgt Watson you do not, ok if you do please give us a call 
463 misc misc   
Boston 
Center Ok 
464 ki ki   Sgt Watson 
boston just confirmed the third aircraft but they don't 
know who it is, they don't know the call sign of the 
third one but the third one is missing...out of Boston 
465 misc misc   Sgt Watson open line...hunters ID, unsecure line 
466 misc misc   AOR hunters ID this is .....operations manager,  
467 misc misc   Sgt Watson go ahead sir 
468 bcg bcg   AOR 
ok I guess you called here a couple time but you 
haven't talked to me, if theres anything you need or 
anything I can help you with let me know where he is 
right now please 
469 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
ok do you want me to let you know what we have 
going on sir? 
470 itk itk   AOR yes. I have a pretty good idea, but yes 
471 ki ki   Sgt Watson 
ok theres 3 aircraft missing out of Boston, spoke with 
Boston and they said they're not sure of the third 
aircraft call sign but they do have two, one of them is 
United 175 and one is American 11. They thought the 
American 11 was the aircraft that crashed into the 
world trade center with the United 175 however 
American 11 is not the aircraft that crashed he said the 
pilot on American 11 was talking to him, having a 
rough time telling him whats going on, there were  
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threats in the cockpit being made, this is the initial 
highjack information that we got American 11, Boston 
to Los Angeles proposed route, he was headed towards 
JFK at the time that they lost contact but that was not 
the aircraft headed into the world trade center that hit it.
472     9:31:58 
13:31:58 
(mp3 
1:06:58)   
473 misc misc   AOR Ok 
474 ki ki   Sgt Watson 
That's what Boston's saying, the last known and I'm not 
sure where we heard it, through the grapevine, people 
calling, is that American 11 was headed towards 
Washington, that is the only thing. 
475 itk itk   AOR ok headed towards where? 
476 itk itk   Sgt Watson Washington 
477 misc misc   AOR Ok 
478 suk/ki suk/ki   Sgt Watson 
So you're AOR and I just wanted to give you a heads 
up, the last known lat-long that we had primary target 
only 40-38 North, 07-43 West on American 11, but 
remember nothing has been confirmed as to which 
aircraft hit the world trade center, the other one we 
have his information is headed towards Washington 
479 suk suk   
Wash 
Center 
ok let me tell you this, we're looking, we also lost 
American 77 
480 itk itk   Sgt Watson American 77... 
481 itk itk   
Wash 
Center excuse me? 
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482 itk itk   Sgt Watson where was he proposed to head sir? 
483 itk itk   
Wash 
Center Ok he was going to LA also 
484 itk itk   Sgt Watson from where sir? 
485 itk/suk itk/suk   
Wash 
Center 
I think he was from Boston also, now let me tell you 
the story here, Indianapolis center was working this 
guy  
486 itk itk   Sgt Watson what guy? 
487 itk itk   
Wash 
Center American 77 
488 misc misc   Sgt Watson Ok 
489 suk/ki suk/ki   AOR 
at flight level 350, however they lost radar with him, 
they lost contact with him, they lost everything and 
they don't have any idea where he is or what happened. 
So what we've done at the surrounding centers here is 
to look out for limited codes or primary targets, 
whatever the case may be. 
490 misc misc   Sgt Watson Ok 
491 ki ki   
Wash 
Center 
and that was the last time, since 15 minutes ago, that I 
talked to the Indianapolis operations manager 
492 itk itk   Sgt Watson you have a type aircraft sir? 
493 itk itk   
Wash 
Center that was a 767 I believe 
494 misc misc   Sgt Watson and uh.. 
495 misc misc   
Wash 
Center 
somebody is talking, I'm sorry I can't hear you, in the 
background 
496 itk itk   Sgt Watson all I need is the last lat-long position of the 767 
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497 itk/ki itk/ki   
Wash 
Center 
I don't know that was Indie center but they said it was 
somewhere, last time I talked to them, East of York and 
I don't even know what state that is. 
498 coa coa   Sgt Watson ok sir well I’m gonna go ahead and give them a call. 
499 misc misc   
Wash 
Center Ok 
500 misc misc   Sgt Watson thank you sir. 
501         *calling* 
502 misc misc   
Indie 
Center indie center 
503 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
Indianapolis, hunters ID calling, American 77, we have 
heard information regarding this aircraft, you have last 
known position? 
504 itk itk   
Indie 
Center im sorry say it again 
505 itk itk   Sgt Watson you have the last known position of American 77 
506 itk itk   
Indie 
Center Yes 
507 itk itk   Sgt Watson could I have it? 
508 itk itk   
Indie 
Center yes, YRK080 at 010 
509 itk itk   Sgt Watson and is there a lat long sir? 
510 itk itk   
Indie 
Center 
I don’t have a lat-long right here…do you want an 
approximate location? 
511 itk itk   Sgt Watson Yeah 
512 itk itk   
Indie 
Center it would be Henderson, hnn 
513 itk itk   Sgt Watson I don’t know where that is either sir  
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514 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
any last known position of that aircraft if at all possible, 
this is a very serious matter as you know 
515 itk itk   
Indie 
Center yea he was at 35,000 feet and off the Henderson 
516 itk itk   Sgt Watson off the Henderson sir? 
517 itk itk   
Indie 
Center yea he was about 35 west of Henderson, HNN 
518 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
ok I don’t know where that is can you anyway get me a 
lat-long? 
519     9:36:58 
13:36:58 
(mp3 
1:11:58)   
520 itk itk   
Indie 
Center yeah just a moment…..ok you ready? 
521 misc misc   Sgt Watson go ahead sir 
522 itk itk   
Indie 
Center its 3841 North, 08252 
523 itk itk   Stacia 08252 west 
524 misc misc   
Indie 
Center Right 
525 itk itk   Stacia whens that last update sir? 
526 itk itk   
Indie 
Center that is where we saw him approximately 12:56z 
527 misc misc   Sgt Watson Thanks 
528 itk itk   MAJ heading in speed 
529 itk itk   Sgt Watson there asking for a heading in speed for that aircraft 
530 itk itk   
Indie 
Center 
he was heading westbound approximately 270 and I 
don't know his speed at this point. 
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531 itk itk   Sgt Watson last known speed you had? 
532 itk itk   
Indie 
Center um we haven't gotten that information off of the…. 
533 itk itk   Sgt Watson ok is this aircraft still airborne is what I'm trying to… 
534 itk itk   
Indie 
Center we don't know we cannot find it 
535 misc misc   Sgt Watson 
thank you…if we need anything else we'll give you a 
call 
536 misc misc   
Indie 
Center Ok 
537 itk/coa itk/coa   Stacia bravo 112 is that plane out…lets bring up bravo 112 
538 itk itk   Sgt Watson its in a zero extrapolated OAR 
539 coa coa   Stacia 
ok tell them that z point that we have on them right 
now 
540 itk itk   Sgt Watson is American 77 last known position 
541 suk suk   Sgt Watson 
Delta 89 that’s a highjack…they think it’s a possible 
highjack….South of Cleveland, we have a code on him 
though 
542 coa coa   Stacia good pick it up! Find it! 
543 ki ki   Sgt Watson we're picking it up right now. 
544 ki ki   Stacia 89..Boeing 767 
545 suk suk   Sgt Watson …supposed to go to Vegas 
546 itk itk   Stacia ok whats the special number 
547 itk itk   Stacia what do you have it on, just leave it right there 
548 itk itk   Sgt Watson zero 89 
549 ki imm   Stacia Bravo 089 is our Delta 89 
550 ki ki     that’s another highjack, Bravo 089 is the track 
551 coa coa     let's make that a special 15 and PA that real world, 
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please 
552 itk itk   Stacia 
do they have a possible destination of that Delta 89, 
he's headed to Las Vegas 
553 itk itk   Sgt Watson headed to Pentagon 
554 misc misc     *dialing* 
555 misc misc   
Pentagon 
Center Penty center 
556 itk/ki/suk itk/ki/suk   Sgt Watson 
Indianapolis Hunters, reference Delta 89, do you know 
any information about that aircraft? I wanted to give 
you a heads up this is another highjacked 
aircraft…Boston to Las Vegas, he's on a mode 3 of 
1304, we still have contact via… 
557 itk itk   
Pentagon 
Center what was the number again 
558 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
Delta 89, 767 out of Boston heading to Vegas, he's on a 
mode 3 of 1304, I have the last lat-long if you need it 
559     9:41:58 
13:41:58 
(mp3 
1:16:58)   
560 misc misc   
Pentagon 
Center go ahead 
561 itk itk   Sgt Watson lat-long 4121 north 08215 West 
562 misc misc   
Pentagon 
Center Ok 
563 ki* tmm*   Sgt Watson 
just to give you a heads up that’s all we right now but 
he is confirmed highjacked 
564 itk itk   
Pentagon 
Center 
ok we're not showing him in our system at this point, 
you are tracking him you say? 
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565 itk/ki itk/ki   Sgt Watson we have him on the radar sir but he is headed your way 
566 itk* tmm*   
Pentagon 
Center he is headed our way? 
567 itk* tmm*   Sgt Watson Delta 89 
568 itk itk   
Pentagon 
Center ok, he headed off of Boston to LAX right? 
569 itk itk   Sgt Watson LAS…I got Vegas sir, whatever Vegas is 
570 suk suk   
Pentagon 
Center 
ok LAS, ok because we're not showing him in the 
system anywhere 
571 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
ok he's on a…do you have mode 3 capability or 
anything? 
572 itk itk   
Pentagon 
Center he's on a 1304 code? 
573 misc misc   Sgt Watson Correct 
574 imm coa   
Pentagon 
Center ok we'll bring that up 
575 imm coa   Sgt Watson alright sir 
576 imm coa   
Pentagon 
Center thank you 
577 imm coa   Sgt Watson ok sir 
578       
(mp3 
01:17:52)   
579         *dialing* 
580 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center Cleveland Military... 
581 tsu* tmm*   Sgt Watson 
Cleveland military, Hunters ID...we are obviously 
having a pretty bad situation with an aircraft I wanted 
to give you a heads up 
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582 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center Did they get into the...hold on please. 
583 misc misc     ok go ahead 
584 ki/suk ki/suk   Sgt Watson 
yes sir, Delta airlines 89 is a highjack, it is your sector 
currently right now, mode 3 1304, we're not sure if his 
intentions.. 
585 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center hold on, hold on...I want you to talk to... 
586 misc misc   Sgt Watson go ahead sir transfer me out 
587 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center Hello 
588 ki/kt ki/kt   Sgt Watson 
Hello this is Hunters ID, I wanted to give you a heads 
up in your center,  currently we have Delta 89, its a 767 
out of Boston headed for Las Vegas, last known now a 
confirmed highjack on a mode 3 of 1304 and he is in 
your center, as you know we have about five aircrafts 
currently that are missing out of Boston, two of them 
into the World Trade Center, now Washington has 
confirmed near the White House, so this apparently is 
pretty serious, this is Delta 89, I'm not sure what his 
intentions are but if you have any...I'm sorry 1989, I 
just got knowledge 
589 tsu tsu   
Cleveland 
Center 1989 is the confirmed highjack ok. 
590 misc/itk misc/itk   Sgt Watson 
ok ma'am anything that you have please call us, do you 
have our number? 
591 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center 
you know what I'm gonna let you give it to someone 
else, I'm gonna go take care of this. 
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592 misc misc   Sgt Watson Ok 
593 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center 
ok Delta 1989, confirmed highjacked, code is 1304 
correct 
594 itk itk   Sgt Watson yea it’s a 767, Boston to Las Vegas 
595 ki ki   
Cleveland 
Center 767, Boston to Las Vegas 
596 ki/tmm ki/tmm   Sgt Watson 
And apparently we're keeping an eye on this aircraft, 
obviously now that it’s a highjack, the other aircraft 
problem…. 
597 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center 1989.. 
598 rta rta   Sgt Watson 
ok sir if you have any other information I'd like to give 
you a number to call 
599 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center ok go head 
600 ki ki   Sgt Watson 315-334-6311, that’s the mission crew commander 
601 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center ok and who would that be 
602 itk itk   Sgt Watson major Nasypany 
603 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center major Nasypany.. 
604 itk itk   Sgt Watson major Nasypany 
605 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center ok major Nasypany 
606 misc misc   Sgt Watson if theres any deviation from the uh… 
607 misc* itk*   
Cleveland 
Center ok you said you're tracking him right now, while we are
608 suk suk   Sgt Watson we have him on radar sir that’s about all right now, we 
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have all our fighters out over the other aircraft 
609 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center you send fighters out? 
610 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
uh negative on the Delta 1989, let me just check with 
the mission crew commander 
611     9:46:58 
13:46:58 
(mp3 
1:21:58)   
612 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center Ok 
613 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
Cleveland center is wondering if theres any aircraft 
after the Delta 1989… 
614 itk itk     
we're in the process of trying to get some aircraft up 
there sir,  
615 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center 
ok could you please get back to me if you do launch 
your craft out there please? 
616 itk itk   Sgt Watson I certainly will 
617 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center ok thank you 
618 coa coa   Sgt Watson watch for any deviations and call us if you see it sir 
619 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center I understand  
620       
(mp3 
1:22:37)   
621 suk/itk suk/itk   Sgt Watson pentagon got hit you heard that? 
622 itk itk   Stacia WHAT  
623 itk itk   Sgt Watson pentagon just got hit 
624 ki ki   h3 we're trying to get Toledo after this delta 
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625 misc misc   Sgt Watson open line, hunters id on secure line 
626 suk/itk suk/itk   
Wash 
Center 
hey hunters id Washington center, I got a 777 code just 
came out of a restricted area at 23,000 feet, he's about 
15 miles East of Nottingham, I need to know if 
anybody knows about that aircraft hes at 23,000 feet 
627 ki ki   Sgt Watson sir stand by it might be our fighters, please stand by 
628 itk/itk itk/itk     
Joe can you confirm that code, is that our 
fighters?...this is Washington center…the triple 7 code 
is that our fighters? 
629 itk itk     
I believe those are our fighters stand by sir….they are 
fighters sir I believe outside of Atlantic city, Otis I'm 
sorry sir. 
630 itk itk   
Wash 
Center 
So approximate 10 miles due East of Nottingham 23, 
that's your fighters? 
631 itk/suk itk/suk   Sgt Watson 
Stand by, they're out of Langley and those are our 
fighters, theres 3 birds headed your way. 
632 misc misc   
Wash 
Center ok great thanks a lot 
633 misc misc   Sgt Watson your welcome 
634         *hangs up* 
635 itk itk   Sgt Watson Did you copy threat-con Charlie? 
636 itk itk     OK you said out of Toledo? 
637 itk itk   h3 
yeah we're tryin to scramble out of Toledo, we don't 
know if we can get them out or no 
638 itk itk   Sgt Watson who is that, is that our air force? 
639 itk itk   h3 Yea 
640         *dialing* 
641 misc misc   Cleveland Cleveland military 
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Mil 
642 misc misc   Sgt Watson 
Hunters ID calling, referencing the track that’s headed 
your way Bravo 089, the special 15 
643 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Mil the what now? 
644 iic suk   Sgt Watson 
they have a highjacked aircraft, sorry I'm talking 
military I wanted to give you a heads up we are trying 
to get Toledo airborne after this aircraft  
645 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Mil Ok 
646 misc misc   Sgt Watson because someone wanted me to tell them if we were.. 
647 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Mil 
yes that was me, do you know when they're gonna 
launch, you think? 
648 itk itk   Sgt Watson let me just check 
649 suk suk   Sgt Watson 
that track just took a hard right turn sir, just to give you 
a heads up 
650 ki ki   
Cleveland 
Mil we are tracking there 
651 itk itk   Sgt Watson all I know is, I was told out of Toledo, let me just check 
652 itk itk     Cleveland centers wondering out of Toledo how long 
653 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center they're launching aircraft right now off Toledo 
654 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
negative sir, they're trying, they don't have anybody 
out…sir 
655 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center ok yea go ahead 
656 itk/ki itk/ki   Sgt Watson 
they're trying, they don't have anybody yet, they're 
trying out of Toledo and sir he's headed a hard 
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right…has been body got a hold of this.. 
657 itk itk   Sgt Watson no confirmed 
658 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center 
its not confirmed they're tryin to launch him…ok 
alright I got that 
659 itk itk   Sgt Watson sir they are not confirmed yet 
660 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center alright, please get back to me  
661 misc misc   Sgt Watson thanks I will 
662 misc misc     *hang up* 
663     9:51:58 
13:51:58 
(mp3 
1:26:58)   
664 rta/misc* misc*   Sgt Watson 
Toledo, they're trying…Raymond if you want to have a 
seat and write all the information down that I have, I'll 
show you then we'll go from there, that way you'll have 
it on paper…I think we're screwed…I'm worried about 
us now 
665 misc misc   Raymond 
we're small potatoes right now, they're not gonna go 
after the military other than the Pentagon 
666 misc misc   Sgt Watson 
Stacia if we hear anything Cleveland center would 
obviously like us to call them 
667 misc misc   Stacia Cleveland center, tell them that… 
668 misc misc   Sgt Watson I already did…Toledo..yea 
669 itk itk   Stacia are they watching him 
670 itk itk   Sgt Watson yeah they just saw a hard right, right when you said it 
671 misc misc   Stacia 
in that book we used to have a book of important 
places.. 
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672 rta rta   Sgt Watson ok I'm going to have Raymond write all this stuff down 
673         *repeating info on flights* 
674       
(mp3 
1:30:40)   
675     9:57:20 13:57:20 *time repeating in in 5 second increments* 
676         *no sound* 
677       
(mp3 
1:37:01)   
678 misc misc   Sgt Watson 
Hunters ID calling, wanted to give you a heads up on 
the Delta 1989 
679 suk/ki* tmmd*     
Cleveland center OAR hes was giving you the 
information that he was highjacked aircraft, he is not a 
highjacked aircraft he's taking precautionary measures 
and he's landing at Cleveland center, however we do 
have four fighters launched on that aircraft just to be 
sure 
680 itk itk   unknown its Delta 1989…the 1403 code? 
681 suk/tmm suk/tmm   Sgt Watson 
just wanted to give you a heads up, he's headed to 
Cleveland center to land, he is not confirmed a highjack
682 misc misc   unknown thank you 
683 misc misc     *dialing* 
684 misc misc   Canada  good morning.. 
685 suk/itk suk/itk   Sgt Watson 
Hunters ID calling, heads up theres a possible aircraft 
that took off out of Canada somewhere headed to 
Washington, do you know of any information that you 
can give to us on that  
686 itk itk   Canada  
stand by please …(talking to own) one headed from 
Canada to Washington? 
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687 itk itk   
Corp 
Nickelson - 
Canada Yes Hunters, this is Corp. Nickelson 
688 ki/itk ki/itk   Sgt Watson 
hi, just checking, apparently we got confirmation that 
theres an aircraft came out of Canada headed for 
Washington, do you know any information on that 
aircraft, as far as it coming into our AOR 




I saw something on the jack, that's all I got on that, you 
couldn't give me a position on that, could you.. 
690           
691 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
we don't know where he is, that’s what we were tryin to 
get from you, what did you see on that chat? 




just that theres a possible, our intel says theres a 
possible aircraft, im gonna try to follow up with that 
information, I'll get back to you as soon as possible 
693 misc misc   Sgt Watson ok thank you 
694 694 694     *hang up* 
695       Sgt Watson hunters ID secure line 
696 ur ur   
Cleveland 
Center 
I believe I was the one talking about that delta 1989, 
well disregard that, did you… 
697 ur ur   Sgt Watson 
what we found out was that he was not a confirmed 
highjack 
698 itk/suk itk/suk   
Cleveland 
Center 
ok I don’t want you to worry about that right now, we 
got a United 93 out there, are you aware of 
that?...theres a bomb on board 
699 itk/itk/ur itk/itk/ur   Sgt Watson 
a BOMB onboard? And this is confirmed? Do you have 
a mode 3 sir? 
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700 suk/itk suk/itk   
Cleveland 
Center 
No we lost his transponder, what we wanna know is did 
you scramble airplanes so that delta 1989 
701 itk itk   Sgt Watson we did out of Suffridge and Toledo sir, 
702 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center did you? Are they in the air? 
703 itk itk   Sgt Watson yes they are 
704 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center 
is there any way we can get them to where this United 
is? 
705     10:06:58 
14:06:58 
(mp3 
1:41:58)   
706 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
ok what I'm gonna have you do…can you give me a 
lat-long on that aircraft? 
707 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center 
(talking to own) what was the last position of that 
United? 
708 itk itk     
West Mooreland…that’s West Mooreland airport, 
that’s in the Pittsburg area 
709 itk itk   Sgt Watson Pittsburg area? 
710 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center Yes 
711 itk itk   Sgt Watson we have no point for LBE sir, do you have a lat-long? 
712 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center no I don’t got that available right now 
713 itk itk   Sgt Watson do you know where he was going or coming from? 
714 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center he was…ok..all I know is.. 
715 itk itk   Sgt Watson whatever you have sir 
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716 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center 
all I know is hes a united 93, he has a confirmed bomb 
onboard and right now his last known position was in 
the west Mooreland area, 
717 itk itk   Sgt Watson west Mooreland, in the Pittsburg, Pennsylvania area? 
718 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center the Pittsburg, Pennsylvania area 
719 itk itk   Sgt Watson what this confirmation talking to the pilot 
720 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center it came on the frequency 
721 itk itk   Sgt Watson on the frequency sir 
722 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center ok I got two people talking right now 
723       
**********
**********
* *split to diff call* 
724 misc misc   h6 hunters id … 
725 ki/itk ki/itk   
Corp 
Wilson 
yes its corp Wilson, sidecar id, I got that call from you 
guys about that stolen aircraft and you guys wanted us 
to call up And check up on it, we don't have a call sign 
or mode 3 or anything, we just wondered if you guys 
had any further intel on this 
726 itk itk   h6 we don’t have anything, that’s why were calling you 
727 itk itk   
Corp 
Wilson absolutely no position or anything? 
728 itk itk   h6 just the same thing you guys saw on the chat line 
729 itk itk   
Corp 
Wilson 
ok alright we'll keep trying on our end and we'll let you 
know as soon as we have anything 
730 misc misc   h6 thank you very much 
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731       
**********
**********
* *split back to previous call with Sgt Watson* 
732 itk itk   unknown  6 West 
733 itk itk   Sgt Watson ok 3159 N 07846 W 
734 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center Yes 
735 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
do you have any confirmation of any highjackers on 
board at all? 
736 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center 
all we know is that we heard him say he's got a bomb 
onboard 
737 misc misc   Sgt Watson thank you sir 
738 coa coa   
Cleveland 
Center get those aircrafts scrambled towards him 
739 ki/suk ki/suk   Sgt Watson 
sir we're working it right now, we've got 6 aircrafts so 
far but we're working it and we will 
740 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center Ok 
741 itk itk   Sgt Watson what center is this 
742 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center this is Cleveland center 
743 misc misc   Sgt Watson let me just check, stand by 1 
744 misc misc     checking with weapons sir stand by 
745 misc misc   h6 Hunters 




yes northeast, this is corp Nickelson…be advised our 
intelligence people… 
747 misc misc   h6 Yes 
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that we're that our int is not assessing theres a actual 
aircraft problem, its that there could be problems from 
our area, theres no actual aircraft that we suspect could 
be a danger 
749 itk itk   h6 its just a possibility 




our int is suggesting just a possibility, they don't have 
any particular aircraft in mind. 
751 misc misc   h6 ok copy that 





a   Sgt Watson 
Hunters ID, just wanted to give you a heads up, the 
zero point Bravo 424, is the last known position of the 
United 93, the one with the bomb on board, just so you 
know, and we are gonna go ahead and make it a special 
754 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center thank you 
755 misc misc     *hang up* 
756     10:11:58 
14:11:58 
(mp3 
1:46:58)   
757 misc misc   2 secure line 
758 misc misc   
Wash 
Center hey hunters, Washington center 
759 misc misc   Sgt Watson go ahead  
760 itk itk   
Wash 
Center 
hey listen I got some fighters over the top of the 
Nottingham area and they need the frequency ?? With 
the tank…got any ideas, the tanker needs the frequency 
761 itk itk   Sgt Watson standee by we'll get it for you sir 
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762 misc misc   
Wash 
Center Alright 
763 misc misc   Sgt Watson I also wanted to give you a heads up Washington…. 
764 misc misc   
Wash 
Center go ahead 
765 itk itk   Sgt Watson United 93 have you got information on that that yet? 
766 itk/suk itk/suk   
Wash 
Center yea he's down 
767 itk itk   Sgt Watson he's down!?....when did he land, 'cause he just… 
768 suk suk   
Wash 
Center he did not land 
769 itk itk   Sgt Watson oh he's down… 
770 suk suk   
Wash 
Center yes, somewhere up northeast of Camp David 
771 itk itk   Sgt Watson Northeast of Camp David 
772 itk itk   
Wash 
Center that’s the last report, I don’t know exactly where 
773 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
sir but not confirmation of a blow up or anything like 
that? 
774 itk itk   
Wash 
Center 
yes we have a c130 over there and he says yes its on 
the ground 
775 itk itk   Sgt Watson on the ground safe? 
776 itk itk   
Wash 
Center no, negative 
777 itk itk   Sgt Watson alright sir, Northeast of Camp David 
778 itk itk   
Wash 
Center yeah I need a tanker frequency 
779 itk itk   Sgt Watson sir we're tryin to get that right now 
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780 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
the frequency for the aircraft you said, I got my mission 
commander listening right now, sir what say it again 
781 itk itk   
Wash 
Center 
ok I have a tanker over Patoxin, Nottingham area, a 
DC10, flying around and he need a tanker frequency to 
refuel…never mind we got it, disregard 
782 misc misc   Sgt Watson alright, disregard 
783     10:16:58 
14:16:58 
(mp3 
1:51:58)   
784 itk itk   
Wash 
Center 
hey hunters, its Washington, someone ask me for the 
coordinates for the white house 
785 misc misc   Sgt Watson go ahead 
786 itk itk   
Wash 
Center ok this is pretty close, its 3853 N 07702 W 
787 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
ok you got a call for the coordinates for the White 
House 
788 itk itk   
Wash 
Center yes someone from hunters called and asked for them 
789 misc misc   Sgt Watson ok I'll pass it 
790 misc misc   Sgt Watson Hunters ID secure line 
791 ki ki   Oak Grove 
yes ma'am this is ?? From Oak Grove, New York Amos 
just passed us information on an unidentified aircraft 
headed your way and I just wanted to make sure you 
have the same information or lat-tel gave that 
information 
792 ki/itk ki/itk   Sgt Watson 
ok I'm not seeing lat-tel at all, we have that blocked, 
what information do you have? 
793 itk itk   Oak Grove ok he is currently…let me get you a current 
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position…he is currently at position 4103 N 6727 W 
794 itk itk   Sgt Watson and what aircraft is this? 
795 itk itk   Oak Grove 
this came from new york amos, its unknown 
unidentified, its not talking to them  
796 itk itk   Sgt Watson they don’t know who it is 
797 itk itk   Oak Grove 
its squawking a mode 3 of…4651...do you see 
somebody out there on a 4651? 
798 itk itk   Sgt Watson 4651 mode 3? 
799 itk itk   Oak Grove yes ma'am, 4651 
800 misc misc   Sgt Watson 4651 copy thank you 
801 itk itk   Sgt Watson do you have a call sign for the aircraft? 
802 itk itk   Oak Grove you need to coordinate with New York.. 
803 ki ki   Sgt Watson ok Amer? Hasn't contacted us on a 4651 
804 ki/rta ki/rta   Oak Grove 
they are completely unidentified on it, if you could talk 
to them 
805 misc misc   Sgt Watson thank you 
806 misc misc   Oak Grove Thanks 
807 misc misc   Sgt Watson hunters id, on secure line 
808 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center Cleveland center military, referencing united… 
809 misc misc   Sgt Watson stand by sir, we've got too many people talking 
810 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center reference to United 93, do you know 
811 itk/ki itk/ki   Sgt Watson 
yes United 93, I guess we got confirmation that, that 
particular aircraft when down Northeast of Camp 
David 
812 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center that's correct 
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813 itk itk   Sgt Watson and that's it 
814 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center yea, right 
815 itk itk   Sgt Watson that's all we have 
816 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center  do you know the exact position of that? 
817 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
last known position, I believe, yes I do have it, stand by 
I wanna give you the right one, 3159 N 07846 W 
818     10:21:58 
14:21:58 
(mp3 
1:56:58)   
819 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center 07846W, is exactly where he went down 
820 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
that was the last known position, Northeast of Camp 
David 
821 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center Northeast of Camp David, ok thank you 
822 misc misc   Sgt Watson ok sir 
823         *fade into call* 
824 itk/ki itk/ki   Sgt Watson all I have is a lat-long sir and a mode 3 of 4651 
825 itk itk   unk what was the mode 3 
826 itk itk   Sgt Watson we got a mode 3 of 4651 
827 itk itk   unk 4651, hold on a second 
828 itk itk     do you know who made the inquiry? 
829 itk/suk itk/suk   Sgt Watson 
we got the call from Southeast, not sure, they said New 
York called inquiring about an aircraft on a certain lat-
long, and we brought it up, we do have a swordfish 
aircraft out there, I'm not sure if it’s the same one 
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you're talking about  
830 ki ki   unk 
ok what we're showing, we're showing a 4625, mode 3 
indicating 11,300 
831 ki ki   Sgt Watson ok sir that’s one of our aircraft 
832 itk itk   unk that's one of yours? 
833 itk itk   Sgt Watson not one of ours but it’s a swordfish 
834 misc misc   unk ok alright thanks 
835 itk itk   Sgt Watson is that the one you were inquiring about sir? 
836 itk itk   unk 
well I didn't personate the inquiry, I didn’t make the 
inquiry, I'll uhh 
837           
838 misc misc   Sgt Watson if theres anything else you can call us 
839           
840 misc misc   unk alright thanks 
841 misc misc   Sgt Watson id, secure line 
842 suk suk   
Cleveland 
Center 
yes we got a sting out of Toledo, right now that we're 
talking to, is that the aircraft  
843         *call cuts* 
844 misc misc   Sgt Watson Hunters ID 
845 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center 
reference that sting, you said he striked 320.0 what was 
the other one you said? 
846 itk itk   Sgt Watson he's gonna up on 364.2 
847 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center 364.2? 
848 itk itk   Sgt Watson 364.2 
849     10:26:58 
14:26:58 
(mp3   
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2:01:58) 
850 misc misc   Sgt Watson Hunters ID on secure line 
851 suk tmmd   Alexander 
Hi hunters its, ?? Alexander, Air Force One is South of 
Tallahassee now, he's on a 3755 code 
852 tsu tsu   Sgt Watson yea we have him, thank you 
853 suk tmmd   Alexander he's our track Charlie 
854 misc misc   Sgt Watson Hunters ID 
855 misc itk   
Cleveland 
Center yes reference the sting, he tried 
856 suk suk   Sgt Watson 
alright weapons is right here sir, stand by 
one………stand by please…ok Hunters is going to try 
to contact them sir, if they continue to not be able to 
hear them, they're coming up on frequency 328.0 and 
364.0 
857 ki ki   
Cleveland 
Center he's already tried both those, ok 
858 misc misc   Sgt Watson Ok 
859 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center 
ok look I got two people talking, who am I talking 
with? 
860 itk itk   Sgt Watson Sgt Watson 
861 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center 
ok he has already tried both those frequencies, he wants 
to know what he needs to do right now 
862 itk itk   Sgt Watson 
ok stand by….hunters is talking to sting, standby 1 let 
me confirm that 
863 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center Please 
864 ki/itk ki/itk   Sgt Watson ok they're coming up on 355.2 did you copy that? 
865 itk itk   Cleveland 355.2 
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Center 
866 itk itk   Sgt Watson 355.2 
867 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center Ok 
868 misc misc   Sgt Watson thank you sir 
869 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center Alright 
870 itk itk   h2 air force one? 
871 itk itk   unknown Correct 
872 itk itk   h2 going to Andrews? 
873 itk itk   unknown going to Andrews 
874 itk itk   h2 from where please 
875 itk itk   unknown from FRQ 
876 itk itk   h2 FRQ? 
877 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble Hunters ID, Sgt Ginoble 
878 misc misc   unk (not understandable) 
879 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble ?/? 51 
880 misc misc     eh? 
881 misc misc     Delta, yes its your 213 
882 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble they're friendly? 
883 itk itk   unk 
they are friendly, it’s a gold 99 and New York knows 
about it and everything and it had to get up 
884 ki ki   Sgt Ginoble they're friendly aircraft 
885 ki ki   unk yeah it has a mode 2 
886 itk itk   h2 gold you said? 
887 itk itk   unk gold, like silver and gold, 99 
888 ki ki   unk 
we're assuming theres 4, he said theres a mission, he 
was very very brief 'cause he had to go 
 141
Line Coder 1 Coder 2 
Time 
(EST) Speaker Statement 
889 itk itk   h2 New York told you this? 
890 itk itk   unk New York told me this, yes, New York Amos 
891 itk itk   h2 you don't know where they're coming from 
892 itk/ki itk/ki   unk 
they didn’t tell me anything, all I can tell you right now 
is they're ok and they're coming. 
893 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble ok thank you very much 
894 misc misc   unknown ok thank you bye! 
895     10:31:58 
14:31:58 
(mp3 
2:06:58)   
896 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble Hunters ID Sgt Ginoble 
897 ki/itk ki/itk   
Cleveland 
Center 
uh yea reference that sting, he tried two and that didn't 
work either what do you want him to do 
898 itk itk   Stacia who is this  
899 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center Cleveland 
900 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble Cleveland? 
901 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center Yea 
902         *static in audio* 
903 itk itk   Stacia Cleveland are you on? 
904 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center 
yea, do you want to pass something to sting? We're 
talking to him, we're the only ones talking to him right 
now. What would you like us to pass to him? What do 
you want him to do? 
905 itk itk   Stacia 
ok, I understand, I'm gonna get a specific and have our 
captain talk to you that way we could get control of 
him, ok? 
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906 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center that’s fine 
907 re re   Stacia 
Maj Prodder…this guy wants to talk to you so he can 
tell these pilots what you want them to do 
908 coa coa   Stacia 
Cleveland they want them to cap at their present 
position 
909 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center they want them to do what? 
910 itk itk   Stacia Cap 
911 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center what do you mean cap 
912 itk itk   Stacia 
what they want them to do is circle right there in their 
present position 
913 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center Alright 
914 misc misc   Stacia ok? Thank you 
915         *hang up* 
916 itk/rta itk/rta   Stacia 
did we try unknown rider on the position? Lets try 
unknown rider 
917 misc rta   Stacia we're gonna try unknown rider on them 
918 itk itk   Sgt Watson are we on guard 
919 iic iic   Stacia 
Unknown rider, unknown rider at position 4123 N 
06532 W, this is hunters on guard, 283 S kilo, unknown 
rider, unknown rider 
920 itk itk   Stacia still want them to authenticate? 
921 iic/coa iic/coa   Stacia Unknown rider, unknown rider, authenticate 283 s kilo. 
922 iic iic   Stacia they're not answering 
923 iic iic   Stacia unknown rider, at position… 
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924 iic iic   Stacia they're not authenticating 
925 iic iic   Stacia *repeating unknown rider* 
926     10:36:58 
14:36:58 
(mp3 
2:11:58)   
927 misc misc   h2 open line 
928 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center 
this is Cleveland center again, any update on that one 
that went down, there in Pennsylvania? 
929 itk/ki itk/ki   h2 
uh negative sir that it’s united 93, there was a bomb on 
board and confirmed Northeast of Camp David when it 
went down 
930 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center ok alright thank you 
931 misc misc     *hang up* 
932 misc misc 10:41:58 
14:41:58 
(mp3 
2:16:58)   
933 coa coa   h2 gold 99, gold 99, this is hunters authenticate 
934 coa coa   ??? go ahead id 
935 itk/imm itk/imm   h2 
as far as authentication goes, how far out, those four 
ships coming in the Canada east, how far out should 
they be able to hear us? Because nobody is coming 
back with authentication, we're tryin to find the range 
936 itk itk   ?? 
they should be able to hear you as far out as the radio 
coverage goes 
937 ki ki   h2 yup and they're within that 
938     10:46:58 
14:46:58 
(mp3   
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939 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble Hunters ID, Sgt Ginoble? 
940 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center 
Hunters, this is Cleveland center, can you identify if 
you have any known military aircrafts in the Northeast 
corner of Misty 
941 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble Misty? 
942 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center yea any known military aircraft 
943 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble northeast area, stand by 
944 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center Hello 
945 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center 
I need to know if you have any military aircraft in 
misty 
946 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble that’s what we're doing stand by….yes we do 
947 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center can you give me their codes please 
948 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble Standby 
949 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble 4671, 4657 and 4617, 4 aircraft total 
951 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center give them to me again please 
952 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble 4671, 4657 
953 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center 4657 
954 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble and 4617 
955 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center 4617…not a 5617? 
956 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble not on their hands 
957 itk itk   Cleveland 4617, 4657, 4671, that’s all you got that’s only 3 
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Center 
958 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble theres 4 ships out there 
959 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center whats the fourth one? 
960 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble Standby 
961 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble 
they only have three codes available here, whoever the 
fourth guy is… 
962 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center this is not a routine mission is it? 
963 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble standby….what frequency can we reach you at 
964     10:51:58 
14:51:58 
(mp3 
2:26:58)   
965 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center 
frequency…you don’t need to reach us we just need to 
know the frequency 
966 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble whos calling again? 
967 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center Cleveland 
968 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble 
ok we're gonna see if we can get weapons give you a 
call, they're the ones who have all the information 
969 coa/itk coa/itk   
Cleveland 
Center 
ok you get a hold of them, have them give us a call us, 
you do have 3 up there? Have weapons give us a call 
970 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble Ok 
971       
(mp3 
2:29:12)   
972 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center 
Hi Caroline, Cleveland center military again, exactly 
you told me that you scrambled airplanes out of 
siffridge and Toledo is that correct? 
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973 itk itk   Caroline yes sir that is correct, siffridge and Toledo 
974 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center they are up in the air now 
975 itk itk   Caroline standby 1 sir, I will ask the mission crew commander 
976 itk itk   Caroline 
so far we think that’s affirmative sir is there anything 
you need 
977 itk itk   
Cleveland 
Center I just wanted to confirm, do you know how many 
978 itk itk   Caroline I think there's 4, sir, hold on lemme check for sure 
979 itk itk   Caroline yes sir they're still up 
980 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center Thanks 
981 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble hunters id Sgt Ginoble 
982 misc misc   h2 hunters id on secure line 
983 re re   
Cleveland 
Center 
hunters this is Cleveland center  can I speak to the 
mission commander please 
984 misc misc   h2 yes sir standby 
985 misc misc   
Maj 
Nasypany Major Nasypany 
986 misc misc   
Cleveland 
Center Major Nasypany, this Tom Kranko, Cleveland center 
987 misc misc   
Maj 
Nasypany Tom go ahead 
988       
Tom - Clev 
Center (not understandable) 
989 itk itk   
Maj 
Nasypany two military? 
990 itk itk   Tom - Clev two c135s 
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center 
991 tsu tsu   
Maj 
Nasypany 
yea, ok I can have my senior director give you a call 
everytime someone goes in the air 
992 ki ki     
I can give a quick heads up though, I've got two, you 
know Misty Thunder area 
993 ki ki   
Tom - Clev 
center yea, three up there now 
994 ki ki   
Maj 
Nasypany ok good, that’s where im getting a few more out there 
995 itk itk   
Tom - Clev 
center your getting two more 
996 itk itk   
Maj 
Nasypany 
yea two more and it looks like im getting a few out to 
the Cleveland area as well 
997 itk itk   
Tom - Clev 
center 
and who is it this your gonna have call me, because 
with all these planes coming up we're gonna have to 
know that… 
998 itk itk   
Maj 
Nasypany major Jeff potter 
999 itk itk   
Tom - Clev 
center major Jeff potter? 
1000 itk itk     Right 
1001 suk/misc suk/misc   
Maj 
Nasypany 
he's working the midwest issues right now, I got it split 
into three areas right now..its like assholes over elbows 
right now 
1002 misc misc   
Tom - Clev 
center alright  
1003 misc misc   
Maj 
Nasypany anymore just give me a call right here,  
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1004 itk itk   
Tom - Clev 
center what is ur name again 
1005 itk itk   
Maj 
Nasypany 
my name is…I'll spell it for you nov alpha sierra 
Yankee papa alpha nov Yankee. I got my a call sign of 
"nasty" if you need to get a hold of me 
1006 itk itk   
Tom - Clev 
center did you say major? 
1007 itk itk   
Maj 
Nasypany Major 
1008 misc misc     thank you I appreciate it 
1009 misc misc   h2 go ahead 
1010 itk itk   ?? 
are you running a 4602 code, looks like they ran an 
intercept about 80 east of Nantucket 
1011 itk itk   h2 yes sir we are 
1012 misc misc   ?? ok id appreciate it.. 
1013     11:01:58 
15:01:58 
(mp3 
2:36:58)   
1014 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble Hunters, Sgt Ginoble? 
1015 coa coa   
Tom - Clev 
center Hunters, I need to talk to nasty right away please 
1016 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble stand by 
1017 itk itk     whos speaking 
1018 itk itk   
Tom - Clev 
center Cleveland center, Tom Krinko 
1019 itk itk   h2 Cleveland center, he's on the line can I take a message? 
1020 itk/suk rta   
Tom - Clev 
center 
I need to know you got a sting 11 that’s circling over 
Toledo? We've got an unknown aircraft circling over 
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our facility can we move him over to that position? 
1021 itk itk   h2 standby sir we'll check 
1022 itk itk     is it on top you sir 
1023 itk itk   
Tom - Clev 
center its on top of us 
1024 itk itk   h2 its right on top of you circling 
1025 itk itk   h2 stand by sir 
1026 coa coa     you need sting 11 to go identify him sir 
1027 coa* rta*   
Tom - Clev 
center 
we need him to do something to get him the hell outta 
there 
1028 itk itk   h2 
sir they don't know who it is, go ahead with the position 
sir 
1029 itk itk   
Tom - Clev 
center 
the position of..o let me get you the lat-long, the 
position is right over our facility, dryer BOR… 
1030 itk itk   h2 I just need a lat-long sir 
1031 itk itk   
Tom - Clev 
center hold on…. 
1032 itk itk   h2 Cleveland center are you still there 
1033 itk itk   
Tom - Clev 
center yes im still there, trying to get you the lat-long 
1034 itk itk   h2 sir we got it, we got sting 11 in contact 
1035 itk itk   h2 Cleveland center have your controllers evacuated 
1036 itk itk   
Tom - Clev 
center 
yes we have one controller per sector now, we have lat 
longs for you now…4117 n 8222 w 
1037 itk itk   h2 alright sir we'll be all over it..you said 822 w? 
1038 itk itk   
Tom - Clev 
center 08222 W 
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1039 misc misc   h2 alright thank you sir 
1040     11:06:58 
15:06:58 
(mp3 
2:41:58)   
1041 misc misc   ?? New York Atlantic, this is hunters id calling. 
1042 misc misc   Atlantic  Atlantic 
1043 misc misc   ?? close to Owens, on a 1545 code 
1044 misc misc   Atlantic mover 22 
1045 misc misc   ?? ok thank you 
1046 coa/itk coa/itk   
Wash 
Center 
Hey Hunters, Washington center here, listen we got a 
call from…we need to get some MedVac airplanes up 
in the air, would that be a problem if we got them a 
code 
1047 itk itk   h2 for where sir? 
1048 itk itk   
Wash 
Center for the…Washington, DC - Baltimore area 
1049 itk itk   h2 if you standby one, I will check with ??..standby 
1050 itk itk   
Wash 
Center Ok 
1051 rta rta   h2 sir could you call ?? hotline,  Hunters control 
1052 itk itk   
Wash 
Center ok you got the number? 
1053 itk itk   h2 
I believe its the same hotshots, stand by 1 im gonna see 
if I can have them pick up 
1054 itk/coa itk/coa   
Wash 
Center 
you are Washington center? I will have them call you 
sir 
1055 misc misc   h2 thank you bye 
1056     11:11:58 15:11:58   
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1057 misc misc   h2 secure line how may I help you 
1058 imm imm   
Wash 
Center 
this I Washington center, we've got a target we need to 
find out about, he is..DFR 
1059 itk itk   h2 hold on 
1060 itk itk     DFR? 
1061 itk/suk itk/suk   
Wash 
Center 
DFR, 3001 feet, he is 25 miles Northeast out of Dulles 
airport, on a southwest heading…it looks like you 
might have a fighter aircraft in his immediate vicinity, 
at 8000 feet descending, so you might be taking a look 
at that guy already 
1062 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble ok do you have a mode 3? 
1063 itk itk   
Wash 
Center no he's 1200 DFR 
1064 itk itk   h2 1200 DFR 
1065 itk/suk itk/suk   
Wash 
Center 
the mode 3 on your military looks like 4512, he is 
directly overhead now.. of the target 
1066     11:16:58 
15:16:58 
(mp3 
2:51:58)   
1067 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble ok we'll pass the information 
1068         *dial out* 
1069 misc misc   Oak Grove oak grove.. 
1070 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble 
oak grove this is hunters, hey I got a question for you, 
if you could by any chance you're calling over to us, 
could you tell us information like call sign, type 
aircraft, and the center that you contacted 
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1071 itk itk   Oak Grove on the ones that we're telling you… 
1072 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble 
yeah if you tell any tracks any that come into our AOR, 
we just wanna know exactly who they are when they 
come in 
1073 itk itk   Oak Grove just the ones coming into your AOR? 
1074 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble just the ones coming into our AOR. 
1075 itk itk   Oak Grove Ok 
1076 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble 
we just wanna know the call signs of the aircrafts that 
are coming and the craft type 
1077 itk itk   Oak Grove Ok 
1078 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble thank you sir 
1079 misc misc   Oak Grove thank you 
1080 misc misc   
Sam - West 
sect 
western sectors id..?? Speaking, this lines unsecure how 
can I help you 
1081 ki/bcg ki/bcg   Stacia 
hi this is hunters, we have one across from you guys, if 
you have any tracks over to the northeast, we just 
wanna know who they are by call signs and type 
aircraft 
1082 misc misc   
Sam - West 
sect Ok 
1083 misc misc   Stacia 
if they come into our OAR, if you tel anybody later on, 
later in the day ok? 
1084 itk itk   
Sam - West 
sect alright is this Stacia 
1085 itk itk   Stacia Yes 
1086 misc misc   
Sam - West 
sect this is Sammy Davis here 
1087 misc misc   Stacia oh I'm sorry Sam 
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1088 itk itk   
Sam - West 
sect how are things going over there 
1089 itk itk   Stacia shits flying off the handle 
1090 misc itk   
Sam - West 
sect oh I bet, we're pinging over here 
1091 ki/bcg ki/bcg   Stacia 
its bad, if you guys have any crafts that your telling 
over, we just wanna know who they are, we just can 
take anyone as friendly 
1092 misc misc   
Sam - West 
sect oh alright 
1093 misc misc   Stacia thanks honey 
1094 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble open line 
1095 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble hunters id sgt. Ignoble 
1096 suk suk   
Wash 
Center 
I got one more target squawking 1200 VFR, he's 
approximately 26 miles Northwest of Dulles, he is on a 
southwest heading, he dropped altitude 
1097 itk itk   Stacia he's at what squawk sir? 
1098 itk itk   
Wash 
Center he's at a 1200 VFR squawk 
1099 itk itk   Stacia you do not know who this is? 
1100 itk itk   
Wash 
Center no we do not 
1101 itk itk   Stacia and this is Washington center? 
1102 itk itk   
Wash 
Center Yes 
1103 misc misc   Stacia copy we'll pass the information 
1104 misc misc   Atlantic CG this is the coast guard air station Atlantic city again 
1105 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble yes  
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1106 suk suk   Atlantic CG 
just so you know one of our search and rescue 
helicopters is overflying a suspicious 600 foot vessel 
that is anchored right off of Atlantic city and you got.. 
1107 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble a vessel 
1108     11:21:58 
15:21:58 
(mp3 
2:56:58)   
1109 suk/ki itk/ki   Atlantic CG 
right we're flying over it right now trying to figure out 
why its doing it. 
1110 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble what's it doing 
1111 itk itk   Atlantic CG Huh 
1112 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble how is it being suspicious 
1113 misc misc   Atlantic CG let me put you on hold 
1114 misc misc   Atlantic CG you there 
1115 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble yes I am 
1116 suk/kt/sb tmmd/sb   Atlantic CG 
ok its sketch but theres a 600 foot vessel with 1200 
people onboard, foreign captain, mass onboard, as soon 
as the crash happened, this ship was sitting off shore 
for two days, came in and anchored 600 yards off the 
coast of Atlantic City and we've got Coast Guard 
vessels querying it, just to let you know we got Helos 
asking the Master questions on the radio, and that 
helicopter was initially manned for New York 
1117 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble what call sign is that helicopter at 
1118 misc misc   Atlantic CG hold on 
1119 itk itk   Atlantic CG 6579 
1120 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble 6579...do you know what the register of this vessel is 
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1121 itk itk   Atlantic CG 
we don’t know…it’s a cruise ship, we're collecting ID 
and all that , I'm going to let you talk to the controller 
that’s working that case 
1122 suk suk   Atlantic CG 
Hi this is ? Schwartz, just so you know we have a 
cruise ship off shore that’s being suspicious, as far as 
being out there and its next port of call is New York 
city, we have a patrol boat that’s heading up from 
Virginia and we have our small boat from Atlantic City 
to ID the boat with some information than we have 
already 
1123 ki/suk ki/suk   Atlantic CG 
our helicopter just overflew and gathered some 
information, the information that we got from the helo 
matched what we got from the vessel earlier, we're 
gonna keep an eye on it , that helo has just returned on 
deck, they're gonna be picking up some medical 
supplies, and returning up to New York to help with the 
MediVac from the world trade center   
1124 itk itk   Sgt Ginoble 
you got the boats going up there to query the vessel 
correct? 
1125 itk itk     
id like to know the registry of the vessel if you could 
please 
1126 itk/coa itk/coa   Atlantic CG 
British flag vessel…we're gonna contact our district 
and we're gonna contact DoD and you guys will get 
word through them, otherwise  
1127 misc misc   Sgt Ginoble ok, fantastic 
1128 misc misc   Atlantic CG thank you sir 
1129     11:26:58 
15:26:58 
(mp3   
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1130 misc misc   Atlantic CG coast guard Atlantic city 
1131 misc misc   Stacia hey its Hunters ID, Northeast Airborne Sector 
1132 misc misc   Atlantic CG Ok 
1133 itk itk   Stacia 
someone just called here about a suspicious vessel of 
the coast of Atlantic City? 
1134 itk itk   Atlantic CG Yes 
1135 itk itk   Stacia is there anyway I can get a position on that? 
1136 itk* misc*   Atlantic CG yes you ready 
1137 itk* misc*   Stacia Ready 
1138 itk itk   Atlantic CG 
lat 39 degrees 24.5 N long 074 degrees 11.6 W, name 
of the vessel The Aurora,  
1139 misc misc   Stacia ok  
1140 suk tmmd   Atlantic CG 
approx 800 feet long cruise ship, white hull and 1208 
crew…no actually 804 crew, 404 passengers, British 
flag…we have boat going out there to collect more, we 
already overflew it with our helo and we talked to him 
here with our control center 
1141 misc misc   Stacia Ok 
1142 ki* tmmd*   Atlantic CG but it does seem suspicious 
1143 misc misc   Stacia ok alright thanks a lot 
1144     11:31:58 
15:31:58 
(mp3 
3:06:58)   
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